WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY
1989 IN REVIEW



U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

THE USCR MANDATE

- *to defend the basic human rights of refugees, most fundamentally, the principle of* non-refoulement, *no forced return of a person with a well-founded fear of persecution to his or her homeland;*
- *to defend the rights of asylum seekers to a fair and impartial determination of their status for refugee protection;*
- *to defend the right to decent and humane treatment for all displaced persons, the uprooted victims of human conflict.*

For thirty-two years, this has been the task of the U.S. Committee for Refugees—the protection of refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons.

The USCR Mandate is pursued through a rigorous process of documentation and objective reporting of the conditions of refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons worldwide regardless of ideology, nationality, race, religion, or social grouping.

Protecting refugees means on-site documentation. In 1989, USCR gathered unique, first-hand information about refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons in Angola, Burma, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Hong Kong, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, as well as U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service detention centers in Texas and Florida.

Protecting refugees means presenting their cases to the governments involved. In 1989, USCR communicated its concerns directly to a host of governments, including Bangladesh, Burundi, Cyprus, Djibouti, East Germany, France, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Iraq, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, South Korea, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.

Protecting refugees means informing the public and policymakers. In 1989, USCR staff testified before congressional committees, briefed members of congress, government officials, and international organizations; spoke with civic and community groups, and the media. USCR publishes reports on critical refugee situations and on policy matters, as well as its monthly publication, *Refugee Reports*. USCR articles and op-ed pieces in 1989 appeared in the *Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, Philadelphia Inquirer, Baltimore Sun, Asian Wall Street Journal, International Herald Tribune, El Miami Herald*, and many other papers. USCR staff appeared on Nightline, CBS Evening News, the Today Show, as well as other U.S. and international television and radio programs.

We do all of this based on a belief that lies at the center of our work: once the consciences of men and women are aroused, great deeds can be accomplished. And, while some of the refugees of concern to us fled their homes long ago, the same beliefs apply to those who left only last week, or just this morning.

Virginia Hamilton
USCR Assistant Director
Editor

Bill Frelick
Associate Editor
Middle East/South Asia
North America and Europe

Koula Papanicolas
Production Coordinator

Court Robinson
Writer/Researcher
East Asia and the Pacific

Hiram A. Ruiz
Writer/Researcher
Africa and Latin America

Carolyn Moore
Assistant to the Editor

Joseph Cerquone
Development Coordinator

Frehiwot Kiflemariam
Raci Say
Support Staff

Joan Scher, Steve Jacobs, Thant Myint-U,
Kyle Farmbry, David Birt and Nicole Winter
Interns

Officers
Edward B. Marks
Chairman

Nan Borton
Joy Kaiser
Vice Presidents

Lawrence Rosenthal
Treasurer

Matthew Giuffrida
Secretary

Board of Directors
Mary Carswell
Herbert H. Chaice
Martha Cogan
Wayne Dale Collins
James Dumpson
Joseph Fitzpatrick, S.J.
Harriet Greenfield
Berjoohy Haigazian
Phillip Hawkes
Wade J. Henderson
Josephine Jablons
Victor Jacobs
Marjorie Margolies
Jay Mazur
Lou Rose
Raul Yzaguirre

ACNS Executive Director
Wells C. Klein

USCR Director
Roger P. Winter

1025 Vermont Avenue, NW
Suite 920
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 347-3507

USCR IS A PROGRAM OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE, A PRIVATE, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION

The views expressed in signed articles in the *World Refugee Survey* are not necessarily those of the U.S. Committee for Refugees or the American Council for Nationalities Service. *Single copy $8.00; 10 or more copies $6.00 each*

© American Council for Nationalities Service 1990

ISSN 0197-5439; ISBN 0-9365-48-05-7
Federal Identification Number 13-1878704

CONTRIBUTIONS FOR USCR'S EFFORTS TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ABOUT REFUGEES WORLDWIDE ARE NEEDED, WELCOMED, AND TAX DEDUCTIBLE.

Table of Contents

WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY—1989 IN REVIEW

ARTICLES

The Year in Review 2
Roger P. Winter

A Call to Action for Restructuring U.S. Refugee Policy 7
Julia Vadala Taft

Civil Strife and Humanitarian Aid: A Bruising Decade 13
Larry Minear

Europe in the 1990s: The Berlin Walls of the Mind 20
Philip Rudge

Facing New Challenges: UNRWA and the *Intifada* 25
Benjamin N. Schiff

STATISTICS AND COUNTRY REPORTS

Introduction 30

Statistical Tables and Graphs 30

Country Reports
Africa 35
East Asia and the Pacific 51
Europe 60
Latin America and the Caribbean 69
Middle East and South Asia 76
North America 88

Directory 91

Bibliography 96
Refugee Policy Group

COVER PHOTO: Burmese Refugees Cross the Moei River into Thailand.
Photo credit: Reuters

In late 1988, following a brutal crackdown by the Burmese army on pro-democracy demonstrations that left as many as 10,000 dead, Burmese students began fleeing to the Thai border. Some sought sanctuary with ethnic minority groups on the Burmese frontier; others crossed into Thailand. Burmese military offensives at the end of 1989 destroyed student camps and minority strongholds along the border and sent 17,000 refugees into Thailand, where they have been denied asylum and provided with only limited humanitarian aid.

The Year in Review

Roger P. Winter

After 1989, the refugee world will never be the same. While the thaw in the cold war has not yet brought about all the significant repatriations we had hoped for, three major developments have come to pass, all having dramatic impact on the world's refugees—impact we still have not had the time to comprehend.

The first of these must be the breathtaking changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Despite the humanitarian underpinnings of the international refugee protection system, the East-versus-West mentality within which many nations have fashioned their response to refugees has been turned upside down. Relaxation of restrictions against emigration from the Warsaw Pact nations has occurred to a degree unimaginable a year ago. Governments, such as those of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic, have been converted from one-party to multiparty states. Hungary broke new ground by acceding to the international refugee instruments in March; can other reformed East-bloc nations be far behind? How will all this change the international system for dealing with refugees? Will the very concept of *refugee* change? Will donors continue to honor their burden-sharing commitment to nations offering first asylum? How will changes taking place in the Federal Republic of Germany disrupt the planned coordination of immigration controls in Europe after 1992? Will Western nations give a lower priority to refugees and humanitarian issues in the Third World now that geopolitical competition is waning and Eastern Europe is garnering such sympathetic concern? As yet, we cannot predict the impact of the major shifts in Eastern Europe on these issues, but for refugees there are serious threats as well as opportunities in these changes.

Second, after a rocky decade of seeking to preserve asylum for Vietnamese refugees in Southeast Asia, the approach seems to be fundamentally unraveling.

A Vietnamese boat-refugee family detained in Hong Kong. The London Times/S. Townsley

The promises of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) produced this June during the International Conference on Indochinese Refugees proved hollow. By year's end, cornerstone commitments forged in the CPA had been abandoned or unfulfilled: Britain has forcibly repatriated Vietnamese; Malaysia has pushed back thousands of boat people; rescue-at-sea efforts are floundering; and screening programs are either flawed or moribund. The humanitarian concern of governments for Vietnamese asylum seekers plays a minimal role in the new context. Because refugee resettlement from Southeast Asia—and Vietnam in

Roger P. Winter is director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees.

particular—has been a major element in U.S. refugee policy and programs, this unraveling holds many implications for U.S. refugee policy and refugee constituencies.

Finally, 1989 may come to be known as the year in which donor governments defaulted on assistance to the world's uprooted people. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the primary agency on which most of the world's refugees rely, is broke; the new High Commissioner undertakes his massive new responsibility without the resources needed to revive that critical institution. His attention must necessarily be focussed on saving the lives and health of his charges, planning his responses not by the intensity of their need, but by the inadequate resources he has been provided. It is an intolerable condition that must be redressed. The High Commissioner, however, is not alone in this dilemma. The International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, the World Food Program -all have faced significant funding shortfalls in 1989. Next year looks no better. The traditional donor governments are clearly backing away from their responsibilities. In 1989, one looked for but could not find vigorous humanitarian leadership backed by adequate money from the United States, Western Europe, and others to rescue UNHCR. This is no false alarm. Its urgency requires that nongovernmental organizations, religious bodies, and humanitarian institutions worldwide give the highest priority to generating additional resources for these stricken international agencies. Refugees and displaced people will die preventable deaths, their futures will be permanently maimed, if we do not succeed.

One would think that the cold war, having cost uncountable billions to wage, would in its waning yield a substantial "peace dividend" in the West. Although major infusions will clearly be needed to help establish the newly opened societies on a sound footing, the needs of disenfranchised people at home and worldwide also can, should, must be addressed adequately and generously. Refugees and internally displaced people, while among the most vulnerable human beings, can be assisted in great ways with relatively minor allocations of freed-up resources. It is basically a matter of where our values lie. How can our leaders say with integrity that no such peace dividend exists to improve the position of the world's victims and the institutions that serve them?

One of the inherent dangers in UNHCR's current weakened state is that the developed West will use this opportunity to limit further the ability of UNHCR to fulfill its protection mandate in the First World. In fact, limiting that mandate is a significant danger. In several ways, the very countries that in a cold-war context created the world's refugee protection system are now its greatest threat. As large percentages of refugees have traditionally fled countries associated with the Soviet bloc, many in the West viewed that flight as a validation of *our* system and an indictment of *theirs*. As that dynamic weakens, so too may Western concern. Combined with the fact that numerous developed nations are seeking to curtail virtually all migration from the Third World to the First, many governments in the developed world seem to wish that UNHCR would simply leave them alone.

The world's new approach to refugees is being developed right now—too often behind closed doors; too often in an immigration enforcement rather than a human rights context.

A young Kurdish refugee in Turkey.
Jochen Hippler

The theory goes that UNHCR has no critical role to play in protecting refugees in the liberal industrialized democracies, being governed as they are by adequate systems of law, applied in a humane manner. Thus, to save scarce funds, UNHCR offices could be closed and resources redirected to more important work.

Refugee practitioners, of course, know otherwise. They have been repeatedly forced to protest harsh U.S. treatment of Haitian and Central American asylum seekers and efforts to close the doors of Western Europe to asylum seekers from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. UNHCR's task is to administer a universal protection system. Regional approaches have their merit, but they can be dangerous unless adequately placed in a universal framework. What the United States, Western Europe, and others do has a real impact on how less-developed nations treat the refugees they receive. It is therefore critical that the High Commissioner not become the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in the Third World only.

The world's new approach to refugees is being developed right now—too often behind closed doors; too often in an immigration enforcement rather than a human rights context; too often with humanitarian concern far down the list of interests that are shaping the system.

We Must Elevate the Quality of Our Approach to Humanitarian Disasters

This past year has not been kind to most of the world's refugees and displaced people. Because of UNHCR's funding crisis, the condition of refugees has generally deteriorated, with nutritional and medical services curtailed and

Photo Credit: J. Clark

The struggle is in our history and in our hearts. We can no longer allow petty selfishness and fear to confine the immensity of our compassion. We are at our best when we no longer endure injustice, when we take the moral high road, when we see the world as one family—then, we move ahead together and we prosper.

Mickey Leland

This issue of the* World Refugee Survey *is dedicated to the memory of Congressman Mickey Leland and those who died with him on a mission of mercy for Sudanese refugee children in Ethiopia.

education and self-sufficiency programs essentially eliminated.

Those problems are most obvious in *Africa*. The *Horn* remains perhaps the most complex region in the world for refugees and displaced people. Internal wars in *Somalia* and *Sudan* remain unresolved, continuing to produce casualties and uproot millions. Major fighting in *Tigray* and *Eritrea*—upon which a major drought is now superimposed—threatens to produce an Ethiopian famine in which as many as five million people are at risk. The response of donors to cross-border efforts to get food to those in jeopardy in the areas where they live (thus forestalling mass migration in search of food) has been inadequate. By the time this article is in print, a full-blown catastrophe may be taking place. Meanwhile, nearby *Djibouti* is denying more than 30,000 Somalis the refugee status they are clearly due. *Kenya* subjects all ethnic Somalis, nationals and non-nationals alike, to official harassment solely because of their ethnicity. And, major new flows of refugees occurred between Mauritania and Senegal.

Farther south, the conflicts in *Angola* and *Mozambique* continue to churn out death and destruction. The hope is that the incipient peace processes will bloom in each case. But for now, cash-flow problems in UNHCR have disrupted relief supplies and curtailed basic services for the conflicts' victims.

Africa is not without its brighter spots, however. The repatriation of refugees to *Namibia* and the peace process in that country are a real success. And *Rwanda* and *Uganda* have reached an agreement that, if successfully implemented, could result in the resolution of a situation that has placed Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda for more than a quarter of a century.

In *Southeast Asia*, UNHCR does not have adequate resources to carry out its complex responsibilities under the Comprehensive Plan of Action. Pirate attacks against Vietnamese boat people have escalated in viciousness. Border Cambodians have been forced back, by the Khmer Rouge particularly, into the *Cambodia* conflict. Britain has proceeded unconscionably to forcibly return to Vietnam some Vietnamese in *Hong Kong* despite a universally decried screening system and without adequate safeguards to assure their safety upon return. And from May to the end of 1989, authorities in *Malaysia* pushed more than 3,200 boat people back out to sea, where at least five are known to have died. *Thailand* and *Indonesia*, which have also pushed off or deterred many Vietnamese asylum seekers in recent years, watch to see if they should implement harsh new policies of their own.

While tumultuous changes were taking place in other corners of the globe, the situation for many refugees in *South Asia* and the *Middle East* in 1989 was one of stasis. A year after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, more than five million refugees in *Iran* and *Pakistan*—the world's largest refugee population—continued to wait for a clear signal that it was safe to return. Similarly, a 1987 peace accord intended to resolve the civil conflict in *Sri Lanka* failed to meet its expectations, and the repatriation of Tamil refugees from *India* was suspended. Kurdish refugees from the inhuman Iraqi chemical attacks of late 1988 languished in camps in *Turkey* and *Iran* in 1989. And more than a million Iranian refugees scattered in Turkey and

(continued on page 6)

NEWS

FROM
THE U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

MORE REFUGEES, FEWER DOLLARS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS IN REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

By Roger P. Winter
Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees

Consider these statistics: in the last five years, an average of 2,700 people per day have been forced to leave their homelands and become refugees. There are more than 15 million refugees in the world today; 28 developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have refugee populations of more than 50,000. Nine of the ten countries with the highest ratio of refugees to general population have a per capita annual income of under $1,000, usually well under. In Malawi, the fourth poorest nation in the world, one person in eleven is a refugee from Mozambique.

Now consider this: in the last five years, while the worldwide refugee population increased by 50 percent, the budget for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the agency responsible for their care and protection, rose by only 25 percent. U.S. contributions to UNHCR did not go up at all. In 1985, the United States gave $20 per refugee for overseas assistance. This year, our government has given about half that amount.

It doesn't take a math wizard to see that fewer dollars divided by more desperate people equals disaster. The fact is that UNHCR is crippled with the worst funding crisis in its 40-year history. As a result, critical food and medical services have been cut back in refugee camps throughout the world, malnutrition and mortality are on the rise, and the countries that have played reluctant host to large refugee populations are growing increasingly restless and resentful.

An internal UNHCR report circulated in November documents the severe impact of the budget cuts. Up to 225,000 children, ages one to five, who are in UNHCR's care, are suffering from acute malnutrition. "All are in danger of death," the report said. "The underlying cause of the problem is simple but dramatic: a lack of food resources to cover the minimal components of the basic ration, namely, cereals, beans and oil."

Increases of malnutrition have been reported in Malawi from 5 to 15 percent in a year, primarily due to "the inability of UNHCR to pay for grinding of maize for many months ... [or] to establish buffer stocks."

A full food ration in the Sudan "has rarely been achieved," the report said. It said UNHCR plans to reduce food rations in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Honduras are "an example of planning assistance based on resources and not on actual needs and is an extremely dangerous trend."

Unless these trends are reversed, 1990 will be hell for too many refugees around the world. Contributions to UNHCR and other international humanitarian organizations simply have not kept pace with the growth in refugee numbers. The United States, while still the world's largest contributor to aid programs for refugees and displaced persons, has allowed its share of support for these agencies to drop steadily for much of the 80s.

It is arguable that the United States has not made a fair share contribution to refugee assistance since 1985. Given the magnitude of the crisis, and factoring for inflation, a figure of $25 per refugee would be more in keeping with our traditional leading role in humanitarian aid. But that is a long climb from where we are. The 1990 State Department budget for refugee assistance is $169 million, down from $204 million five years ago.

In order to restore U.S. contributions to refugee assistance to credible levels, a new coalition must be forged, bringing together public and private agencies, domestic and overseas perspectives, national and international structures. We need to work together for a U.S. response to refugees that does not force unnecessary choices between admissions and assistance. Historically, our country has always supported both, and must continue to do so.

U.S. admissions commitments, and budgets, have increased significantly in the last several years. There is good reason for this. The exodus from Vietnam persists unabated. And as glasnost in the Soviet Union prompts increasingly spirited debate on a host of social and political issues, old strains of anti-semitism have come into the open, and Jews, by the tens of thousands, are clamoring to get out of the country.

But as we strive to meet the political, moral, and financial obligations of refugee resettlement, we must take better care to give equal weight to the needs of the millions of refugees worldwide who lack such an option.

Lack of adequate funding for overseas assistance takes on new poignancy in light of diminishing cold war tensions. As regional conflicts abate, more and more refugees—Namibians, Cambodians, Mozambicans, Nicaraguans, and Afghans—may find they can go home again, but UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross will have no funds to get them back safely or to help them rebuild their lives.

Ultimately, though, whether we help refugees get home, or make a more tolerable home where they are, there can be no better investment in conflict resolution than to provide for those who have suffered the worst of the world's hatred and mistrust.

(continued from page 4)

throughout the world waited in vain for an indication that it was safe to return home. But, in some ways, the most intractable of refugee situations in the region were also the most violent. Both the civil war in *Lebanon* and the *intifada* of *Israel's* occupied territories took on the character of grim and numbing predictability in 1989. The violence has become so entrenched that it has virtually become ingrained as a "normal" way of life. The frustrations that led to violence in the first place have given way to a fatalism that sees fundamental change as futile and violence almost as an end in itself.

In *El Salvador*, vicious fighting erupted in the major cities, demonstrating why the fears of civilians in flight from that pitiful nation have been well founded. Stepped up interdiction of Central American refugees attempting to flee through *Mexico*, as well as a policy of quick asylum adjudication, detention, and deportation on the U.S. side, limited the options of those seeking sanctuary.

Chinese students in the United States, as well as other parts of the world, looked in dismay as the brutality of a ruling clique in its death throes dashed high hopes that the power of ordinary people in *China* would transform the world's most populous nation. A young man—alone—held off an advancing line of tanks and failed. Or did we somehow fail him?

A major issue for 1990 will be to ensure that we do not fail others like him who strive for freedom or for the chance to live their lives without fear and violence. And our concern in this regard must be international, without boundary. We cannot but be thrilled at the victories achieved for human rights—for people—in 1989, but I believe we break faith with the victims in Timisoara and in Beijing if our vision is myopic. The aspirations that produced revolution in Eastern Europe are endemic to the human species. They are real in Cambodia, in Somalia, in Burma, in El Salvador, in Sudan, in Haiti, too. With traditional geopolitics increasingly neutralized, we can't afford to see this new decade as anything less than a time to make major strides worldwide in improving human rights, responding to the victims of inequity and abuse, and elevating the quality of our approach to those caught in humanitarian disasters.

Ultimately, those whose fundamental interest is the welfare of other people, particularly victims, must respond to the urgent need for a broad program of global advocacy for refugees and for those uprooted within their own countries. As we commemorate the tenth anniversary of the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980, we must assure that the international approach to refugees and humanitarian issues that emerges in the 1990s is not solely the computer construct of technocrats, budgeteers, and politicians, but rather reflects the human hope of ordinary people everywhere for peace, compassion, freedom, and opportunity.

UN Member States: Signatories and Non-Signatories to the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

Listed below are governments that belong to the United Nations, according to whether or not they have signed the 1951 UN *Convention* and/or the 1967 *Protocol* relating to refugees. Those nations in BOLD type *have signed* one or both. Those in regular type *have not* signed either.

Afghanistan, Albania, ***Algeria, Angola,*** Antigua and Barbuda, ***Argentina, Australia, Austria,*** Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, ***Belgium,*** Belize, ***Benin,*** Bhutan, ***Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,*** Brunei, Bulgaria, ***Burkina Faso,*** Burma, ***Burundi,*** Byelorussia, Cambodia (Kampuchea), ***Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde+, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,*** Comoros, ***Congo, Costa Rica,*** Cuba, ***Cyprus,*** Czechoslovakia, ***Denmark, Djibouti,*** Dominica, ***Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia,*** East Germany (GDR), ***West Germany (FRG), Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,*** Guyana, ***Haiti,*** Honduras, ***Hungary, Iceland,*** India, Indonesia, ***Iran,*** Iraq, ***Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan,*** Jordan, ***Kenya,*** Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, ***Lesotho, Liberia,*** Libya, ***Luxembourg, Madagascar*, Malawi,*** Malaysia, Maldives, ***Mali, Malta, Mauritania,*** Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, ***Monaco*, Morocco, Mozambique*,*** Nepal, ***Netherlands, New Zealand,*** Nicaragua, ***Niger, Nigeria, Norway,*** Oman, Pakistan, ***Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,*** Poland, ***Portugal,*** Qatar, Romania, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, ***Samoa*, Western Samoa*,*** Saudi Arabia, ***Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,*** Singapore, Solomon Islands, ***Somalia,*** South Africa, ***Spain,*** Sri Lanka, ***Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland+, Sweden,*** Syria, ***Tanzania,*** Thailand, ***Togo,*** Trinidad and Tobago, ***Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda,*** Ukraine, USSR, United Arab Emirates, ***United Kingdom, Uruguay, United States+,*** Vanuatu, Vietnam, ***Venezuela+, North Yemen (YAR),*** South Yemen (PDRY), ***Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.***

* Signatories to the *Convention* only.
+Signatories to the *Protocol* only.

Note: Although not UN members, the following countries have also signed the UN *Convention* and *Protocol:* Holy See, Liechtenstein, Switzerland.

A Call to Action for Restructuring U.S. Refugee Policy

Julia Vadala Taft

As the world enters the decade of the 1990s, it is time to take stock of the global refugee situation—how it has evolved during the past ten years, and its prospects for diminishing in the years ahead. The 1980s were ushered in with huge flows of boat people in Southeast Asia, with the Cambodian killing fields and the ultimate outpouring into Thailand; the massive displacement of refugees from the Ogaden into Somalia; mass flight from Afghapistan; the Cuban-Haitian boatlift; the revolution in Iran; and the exodus of tens of thousands of refugees from the Soviet Union.

The world, with the United States in the lead, responded well. The U.S. Refugee Act of 1980 became law; close to two million refugees were resettled into third countries; and resources to meet the assistance needs of refugees in countries of first asylum generally kept pace with the growth of the world's refugee population.

The 1990s hold out the promise of dramatic successes in refugee affairs. The fundamental thaw in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States is lessening tensions in Third World regions where ideological conflict-driven warfare has produced refugees. Regional refugee-producing strife in southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia may further lessen with troop withdrawals and intensified efforts on the part of regional leaders to seek peace and accommodation.

Internal political and economic changes within the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc nations may result in major population movements, comprised less of refugees and more of economic migrants and those seeking ethnic reunification. While such movements may not increase the magnitude of Convention refugees, we are bound to see further blurring of distinctions among migrant groups and the agencies that should be called upon to provide assistance and protection.



A young Sudanese girl picks up corn left on the road by a relief truck.
The Dallas Morning News/J. Walgren

As the potential for refugee generation is reduced, it may be that we can now dare to dream of solutions for a majority of the world's 15 million refugees and help create conditions for them to return home safely.

In the refugee field, professionals talk about three durable solutions. The most preferable has always been that refugees could voluntarily return home. The key word, of course, is *voluntary*. The conditions of civil unrest in places like Afghanistan and Ethiopia generally have prevented safe return. The second best solution is for refugees to be absorbed or resettled in the region where they reside as refugees. During this decade, this approach has had practical limitations. Even the most welcoming of first-asylum countries have been reluctant to grant permanence to the refugee populations they are hosting. The solution of last resort is resettlement in a third country like the United States. This solution is viewed as the least desirable because of its high cost and its limitations in terms of providing a realistic option for most of the world's refugees. The net result during the past decade is that most refugees have languished in camps that provide minimal life-support assistance.

Julia Taft, long an active leader in refugee issues, was most recently head of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

There has been some modest success with the repatriation to Namibia, and much talk about prospects for future repatriations elsewhere. The Soviets have pulled out of Afghanistan, enabling refugee planners to begin to prepare for what could be the return of five million refugees. It is incredible to imagine one third of today's refugees going home. The Vietnamese have removed themselves from Cambodia, and have thus stimulated talk about a return from Thai border camps, although of course major problems remain. Former President Jimmy Carter has hosted peace talks between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, the government of Mozambique is talking through intermediaries to the RENAMO insurgents, and there has been some repatriation of refugees in Central America.

A System on the Verge of Collapse

Yet at this moment of promise, a breakdown is apparent in the international refugee system that has served the world so well for decades. Some refugee experts say it is on the verge of collapse. How could this have happened?

It was only four years ago when the world responded so magnificently to the plight of millions of people suffering from famine and civil strife in the Horn of Africa. Yet now, UNHCR has had to cut back on basic refugee assistance around the world.

In 1989, having responded to some costly emergencies and repatriation opportunities with special donor appeals, UNHCR faced a funding shortfall of up to $100 million from its planned level of program. The result has been a dramatic cutback in basic assistance to some of the world's most vulnerable people. All programs, even those for refugees living on the margin, are feeling the bite.

In Southeast Asia, for instance, with an international agreement in the balance for maintaining a system of first asylum for Vietnamese boat people, UNHCR has not had adequate funds to provide key personnel and a public information campaign to discourage unnecessary flight. In Pakistan, UNHCR has cut basic support for programs on the border by one third. In Africa, contracts to maintain water tanker fleets in Ethiopia came close to being cancelled, and basic feeding efforts for 800,000 Mozambican refugees in Malawi have been threatened to a point where malnutrition is widespread. In UNHCR headquarters, key Technical Support Services unit personnel, including nutritionists, epidemiologists, water experts, and camp planners, have been threatened with being laid off. Travel for all UNHCR personnel, including those providing essential services, has been cut sharply.

For 1990, prospects are dim, as well. UNHCR had been projecting a general support budget need for $414 million to maintain essential services to refugees, displaced persons, and for contiguous populations severely affected by the presence of refugees. Under the pressure of donor government cut-backs in funding, UNHCR tabled a compromise budget of $380 million. While pressing UNHCR to maintain essential life support systems, the donors have not provided resources adequate to do so. To make matters worse, UNHCR will carry a $40 million deficit over into 1990, thus mortgaging its future and that of refugees.

These budget difficulties make it apparent that the international community's basic compact that provides first-asylum protection and support services may be in jeopardy. A fundamental assumption undergirding the system has always been that developing countries should allow refugees into first asylum, not push or *refoule* them back, and that the donor countries would help them defray the expenses associated with care and maintenance. No one knows exactly what budget level might cause a revolt among the "have not" host countries, but that this is even a matter of discussion is ominous for future mass asylum requirements.

Resettlement Competes with Overseas Assistance Funding

How could this have happened? At a time when the prospect for large-scale voluntary repatriation is brighter than ever, how could it be that the prospects for refugees are so bleak? Part of the answer is to be found in the budget priorities of countries that generously accept large numbers of refugees for permanent resettlement, such as the United States.

What is true in the United States is compounded by the budgetary impact and focus on resettlement by several of the European nations. Too often, budget systems require that the funds for resettlement compete with funds for international refugee aid and contributions to those organizations that provide direct assistance overseas.

The case of the United States is particularly ironic, as it has always maintained a dual generosity in both refugee admissions and in contributions for support of refugees in countries of first asylum. Currently, U.S. government support for overseas assistance is dwindling, in part due to its focus on refugee admissions from the USSR and Southeast Asia.

Elderly and malnourished Dinkas, dependent on

It is important to put U.S.-funded refugee assistance overseas in perspective and to understand its relationship to refugee admissions. Traditionally, the portion of the U.S. refugee budget devoted to overseas assistance has been approximately two-to-one over the allocation for domestic resettlement. In FY 89, under strong pressure to admit Soviets as refugees to the United States, that proportion dramatically changed, with

more than 50 percent going to refugee admissions.

In 1982, the United States contributed more than 30 percent of the UNHCR budget. In FY 88, despite an upsurge in refugee numbers, that share dwindled to under 22 percent. In FY 89, U.S. support for the general program hit rock-bottom at 16 percent, and an overall low of less than 20 percent for its general and special program budgets combined. The situation for FY 90 looks equally bleak, with the twin pressures of State Department and congressional fixation on Soviet emigration and the need to balance the budget.

The losers in all of this are the refugees who already have lost their homelands, their possessions, and their familial and cultural ties. As budget slashing affects UNHCR and other assistance organizations—including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Relief and Works Agency, and the UN Border Relief Operation—the very survival of refugees in first-asylum countries is threatened. The appetite for funds to admit Soviets as refugees will be so intense, and the rules of the budget game so strict, that it is possible that the State Department-administered Emergency Relief and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund will be tapped to pay for additional admissions. Initiatives that would carry out repatriations and meet even the most urgent, unexpected difficulties will be stillborn within this budget context.

relief food, wait patiently in the Sudanese village of Turalei for their allotment.
The Dallas Morning News/J. Walgren

In FY 90, Congress appropriated a total of $525 million to the Bureau for Refugee Programs and the Office of Refugee Resettlement to cover federal admissions and resettlement costs for 111,000 refugees. While the ORR budget covers an additional 100,000 refugees admitted in previous years, a rough estimate shows the U.S. spending about $4,700 per capita on refugee admissions. Although these figures were higher in previous years, they still compare favorably with the $190 million that the United States provided to assist 14 million refugees overseas, which on a per-capita basis comes to only about $12.00. Furthermore, U.S. refugee resettlement is doing less and less to diminish the populations in first-asylum camps around the world. In FY 89, for example, about fifty percent of U.S. refugee admissions came directly from their home countries to the United States.

Even this does not tell the entire story. At year's end, the State Department still did not have a budget that would accommodate its admissions estimate of 125,000. Its request for a supplemental has been denied by the Office of Management and Budget. Such a dramatic shortfall in financing, estimated at $56 million, will exert enormous budgetary pressure on the refugee program in FY 90. Administration officials are quite frank to admit that the numbers of Soviets far exceed the total number of refugee slots allocated worldwide for admission. The pressure in Congress for emergency consultations, and the supplemental budgets to implement them, will be enormous, overwhelming efforts to focus on the emergency in overseas assistance. In addition to the budget pressure, it will be virtually impossible for the leadership of the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs to devote any meaningful time, attention, and resources to the overseas assistance side of the program.

Time to Consider a Basic Restructuring

In times past, the relative funding given to refugee admissions versus refugee relief assistance overseas was of little significance. It was generally felt that there was enough money to meet U.S. commitments to both, and if unexpected crises emerged, either the ERMA fund could be tapped or a supplemental could be sought. Not so now under the Gramm-Rudman bipartisan budget agreement. For the first time, if additional monies are sought, they must be offset from line items in other budgets. For all practical purposes, then, when the Office of Management and Budget gives a mark, there is a *de facto* cap on the funding level for U.S. support of both admissions and overseas assistance

programs. In such a situation, under this cap, overseas refugee assistance suffers when refugee admissions levels rise.

The problem is aggravated by the pressure of those exiting the Soviet Union. Contrary to the intent of the Refugee Act of 1980, which removed flight from a communist country of origin as an automatic entitlement for refugee status, new legislation perpetuates a situation in which almost all Soviet emigres are considered refugees. In FY 89, some 39,500 entered the United States, and for FY 90, a ceiling of 50,000 has been set. As mentioned earlier, this level will be substantially below the number of current applicants. It is ironic that, under the current procedure, all 280 million residents of the Soviet Union are potentially eligible to apply for the U.S. refugee program.

The answer to the opening of the Soviet empire to emigration cannot and should not be endless admission as refugees to all those who want to come to the United States. This is essentially what has happened for those in Rome and Vienna with the Attorney General's order to review all those offered parole since last year. While I endorse the Administration decision to terminate the route through Rome and Vienna and move all refugee processing to the U.S. embassy in Moscow, even that is not enough.

It is important now to begin to think of the problem of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in an immigration context. For starters, the Administration initiative to develop a special immigrant category for those who are of interest to the United States, but who do not pass the persecution litmus test required of refugees, is a good one. The immigration system simply must be expanded to meet the requirements of the Soviet overture. Concurrently, policymakers should be careful not to couple the willingness of the Soviet Union to allow emigration with an obligation by the United States to accept all seeking to leave. The Jackson-Vanik provisions that confer most-favored-nation status to countries allowing free emigration do not and should not require a moral obligation that the United States accept the emigres from any country complying with the free emigration requirement.

Given budget realities, with an eye on the tradeoffs involved between refugee admissions and overseas assistance, it is time to explore how federal government refugee funds for domestic assistance might be better augmented by private efforts. The most important impediment to increased private involvement is the cost of catastrophic health insurance. Solution to this problem should be high on the agenda for the U.S. Refugee Coordinator. If this obstacle could be overcome, private sector funding might flourish and admissions numbers remain high, but with a lower per-person cost to the federal government. Improved case management and front-end loading of services should also be pursued.

Strengthen Refugee Programs Through Executive Branch Reorganization

Realistically, there are no short-term solutions. Interest groups, including private-sector voluntary agencies that process and resettle refugees, and state and local governments, will fight hard to maintain the status quo. Regardless of Administration resolve to promote privatization, this will undoubtedly be a painful, long-drawn-out struggle.

A breakdown is apparent in the international refugee system that has served so well for the past two decades.

Because of the fiscal and political pressures associated with refugee admissions, the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs has concentrated its manpower and financial resources on admissions processing to the detriment of international refugee relief. If overseas refugee assistance continues to be severely disadvantaged by the cost of burgeoning refugee admissions, it may be time to consider a basic restructuring of the mandates of U.S. government institutions that select and support refugee admissions domestically and fund assistance overseas. In the early 1980s, the Agency for International Development (AID) harbored the idea that overseas refugee assistance might better be done by AID than by State. Perhaps it is time to resurrect that idea. The AID regional bureaus have considerable experience in dealing with massive displaced persons problems, and they have much more practical, on-the-ground experience than is possessed by the State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs.

AID missions in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Sudan, Pakistan, El Salvador, and Sri Lanka have invested enormous amounts of funding and manpower in designing, managing, and monitoring relief activities. By contrast, the State Department has excellent, but very few, field personnel to monitor the multilaterally funded relief programs.

In terms of meeting emergencies, AID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Food for Peace Program could easily assume the functions played by the atrophied State Refugee Bureau's Emergency Operations Unit. OFDA's quick response capability and authority to provide assistance worldwide could, with additional personnel, manage the refugee relief portfolio.

Further, AID will undoubtedly figure prominently in the country-building that will follow repatriations to Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Mozambique that may be likely in the 1990s. In contrast, on matters of refugee relief, the Bureau for Refugee Programs is predominantly a check-writing operation that has not developed the expertise and the adequate personnel necessary to provide meaningful performance monitoring of the international organizations funded to do the field work.

State Department managers may see some advantage at this juncture in rethinking the role it plays in refugee admissions. One can build a good case, particularly as the refugee definition blurs in a worldwide sea of migration, for refugee admissions to be determined by an Independent Advisory Board such as exists in Canada. Such a Board would not be overly influenced by domestic politics or foreign policy interests. It would be responsible for ensuring that the refugee bonafides of the applicants are based on the criteria set forth in the Refugee Act of 1980 and the UN Protocol on Refugees.

Since the refugee resettlement programs are functioning increasingly like

UNHCR tents house Afghan refugees in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan.
UNHCR/H. J. Davies

immigration programs, a dramatic initiative such as an independent Board may be the only approach to maintaining the special integrity of a refugee admissions program and preventing a bureaucratic amalgamation of immigration and refugee admissions. It would also help keep the program apolitical and strictly humanitarian.

Such an initiative would be a radical departure from the current trend to process refugees as an extension of immigration programs. It also would reduce the currently complicated executive branch machinery in which several agencies and State Department bureaus have an active, and sometimes conflicting, role. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, under the Department of Justice, has final authority; however, within the State Department, the Undersecretary for Management, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Bureau for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and the Bureau for Refugee Programs all are involved in the convoluted procedure.

The split responsibility for funding domestic reception and resettlement of refugees within the United States must also be reassessed. Currently, the Department of State and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) each maintains significant levels of staff to set policy, fund, and manage various aspects of the domestic resettlement program. One can argue that an effective refugee admissions and resettlement program requires a coherent federal management structure that can oversee and support the sequential needs faced by refugees from their selection for resettlement, pre-migration counseling, transportation to the United States and their integration within communities across the country.

Some experts believe the responsibility and the financial resources for supporting the entire process should be vested in HHS. I believe it would be premature to recommend such a course of action without a thoughtful debate. However, it is an option that would have the advantage of clearly placing in one domestic agency the budget and management responsibility for federal assistance to refugees resettling in the United States. This would enable the State Department to focus urgent attention on the overseas refugee relief problems and the diplomatic initiatives necessary to ensure their survival and alleviate the political conditions that created their plight in the first place.

Improve the Quality of Congressional Oversight

Not only should the executive branch consider the structural changes, but also Congress must re-evaluate its ability to provide adequate oversight to ensure coherence between the refugee admission and overseas assistance programs. The liabilities of the inclusion of both admissions and overseas assistance appropriations in a single account as is now the case clearly needs review.

The manner in which the refugee debate is framed in consultation between the administration and Congress works against overseas refugee assistance concerns. In testimony by the U.S. Committee for Refugees before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law on September 14, 1989, USCR Director Roger Winter discussed the Refugee Act of 1980 requirement that a cabinet official appear before the Judiciary Committees of the Congress to discuss the refugee admissions levels. Winter suggested that, as now structured, the law precludes serious discussion of the budgetary tradeoffs between refugee admissions and overseas assistance needs. Chairman Morrison suggested that needs of refugees in first asylum were incidental to the concerns of his committee, and were the proper concern of the foreign affairs committees.

The foreign affairs committees, the finance committees, the appropriations committees, and the Select Committee on Hunger all have proper, albeit diverse, interests in aspects of refugee admissions and relief. Yet, to date, there are few efforts toward policy and budgetary oversight and integration.

The sad result is that the refugee program is captive of the judiciary committees and their strong interest in monitoring refugee admissions issues. The members and staffs of these important committees are among the most talented and constructive advocates for refugees, domestically and internationally; however, their primary influence is on the immigration aspects. They could, and should, seek to structure the debate between refugee assistance overseas and domestically, with authority to influence budget resources for both. They too could provide a forum to discuss adequately the tradeoffs between the two competing demands for funds. Until such strong leadership is forthcoming, the

death toll of overseas refugees will inevitably climb, with no element of Congress or the executive branch held accountable.

Create a New Compact for U.S. Refugee Policy in the 1990s

During the 1980s one of the most striking aspects of U.S. refugee policy and programs has been the emergence and solidification of powerful interest groups advocating refugee resettlement.

Ethnic groups and their allies have become very effective in the art of influencing Congress and the executive branch on the merits of continued admissions for their compatriots still overseas. State and local governments, justifiably interested in ensuring that refugees resettled in their communities present no adverse economic impact, have endorsed generous benefits packages at the expense of the federal government. The private voluntary agencies have not only sought and obtained consistent flows of refugees for resettlement, but, having expended much of their own resources, have urged the bulk of the costs must be borne by others. Foreign policy experts have linked U.S. refugee admissions programs to major diplomatic priorities, such as increased Soviet emigration and the maintenance of first asylum in Southeast Asia.

These influential groups have laid a solid cornerstone for the dominant U.S. refugee policy during the 1980s, which was resettlement. Only recently have humanitarian relief agencies pleaded for increased assistance levels for refugees caught in abysmal camps in the developing world. Joining these agencies have been think tanks and advocacy groups raising the alarm over the crisis facing those languishing overseas, underserved and without prospects for repatriation or resettlement.

It has been only within the past year that these alarms needed to be sounded since the financial problems of UNHCR have now become a crisis. Assisting these refugees is not solely a matter of will, but is a matter of money and diplomatic priority. It is not too late to be responsive to the need for additional funding for international relief programs.

There is a confluence of humanitarian interests by both the groups that advocate refugee resettlement in the United States and those who demand greater attention toward those in overseas camps.

Assisting these refugees is not solely a matter of will, but is a matter of money and diplomatic priority.

Ironically, in most cases the groups are the same. What *is* needed is a recognition that both objectives cannot be sustained in the current budgetary framework where scarce resources will force difficult tradeoffs in refugee assistance.

With the dawn of a new decade, and new leadership in the White House and the State Department, it is indeed appropriate and essential that a major reassessment be initiated on the nature of the U.S. role and commitment to refugee assistance—both foreign and domestic. I urge this leadership to convene a national assembly of interested and knowledgeable parties from Congress, voluntary resettlement and relief agencies, refugee communities, federal, state, and local officials, corporate and labor leaders, and academic and advocacy groups. This assembly should be charged with reviewing priorities for domestic resettlement, overseas relief, private-sector funding strategies, and diplomatic advocacy.

Emerging from such a conference could be a compact on the part of all parties that would set a framework and commitment to seek a new approach to admissions, refugee care and maintenance overseas, and diplomatic overtures necessary to facilitate repatriations.

The outcome of such an initiative could not only lay a solid foundation for U.S. policy, but also provide the broad coalition with an opportunity to lead the international community in resolving fundamental political and economic problems that plague more than 15 million refugees in first asylum who, in remote places away from TV cameras, are beginning to die.

Food being distributed in famine-threatened Eritrea in an effort to prevent mass migrations to refugee camps in Sudan. USCR/H. A. Ruiz

Civil Strife & Humanitarian Aid: A Bruising Decade

Larry Minear

The 1980s have been a time of civil strife of devastating breadth and consequences. More than forty countries and sometimes entire regions have been wracked by such violence. Innocent civilians in mind-boggling numbers have been affected, along with the international regime of protection and assistance.

As the decade winds down, its devastation warrants a closer look. Why have the eighties taken such a toll? What has been its impact on those in need of assistance and on those providing it? What lessons can be learned for the nineties?



An airplane transporting food supplies lands in war-torn southern Sudan.
The Dallas Morning News/J. Walgren

The Decade in Retrospect

The decade began with a mass migration of Afghans seeking refuge from the Soviet invasion of December 1979. The conflict reflected the East-West nature of much of the decade's strife, both in its heavy superpower involvement and in the politicized nature of the aid effort. Yet typically too, political ideology was but one element in the complex amalgam of ethnic and tribal tensions, religion and nationalism, poverty and underdevelopment underlying the conflict. Like other wars of the eighties, the Afghan conflict was fought by governments and armed opposition movements with sophisticated weaponry, supported from outside, spilling across national borders, and claiming immense human casualties.

With Iraq's 1980 invasion of Iran, the decade's major classic international war began in earnest. Before winding down in 1988, it had claimed the lives of an estimated 900,000 soldiers and 100,000 civilians. The war was hardly typical of a decade in which most conflicts were internal and most casualties civilian, yet its poison gas, child-soldiers, and human wave attacks were a throw-back to cruder norms of wartime conduct. The war's origins in long-unresolved tensions and its duration typify the international community's lack of effective problem-solving and intervention in protecting human life.

From these early beginnings, the violence reached a crescendo. By the mid-eighties, conflicts had escalated in number and intensity. The Administration in 1985 articulated the Reagan doctrine of providing military and political support to anti-communist insurgencies in arenas such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. The doctrine sought to answer a stated Soviet commitment to support wars of national liberation in developing countries.[1] Conflicts also raged in areas of lesser superpower interest, such as Lebanon, Guatemala, and Sudan. By 1987, 27 wars were in progress. "Conflict and tension seem to be on the rise in nearly every region of the world," concluded one authoritative study.[2]

At the end of a decade that hosted an all-time record number of wars, there is a general sense that conflicts are easing. Contributing to that impression has been the moderating of superpower tensions and the resulting progress in regional conflict resolution—the negotiation of peace agreements in Central America and Namibia in 1988, limited moves towards peace in Sudan and Ethiopia/Eritrea in 1989, the departure of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and Cubans from Angola in 1989.

"The war fever in the Third World has begun to subside," observes Ruth Leger Sivard in her *World Military and Social Expenditures 1989*. The year 1989, she finds, represents "the first time in 31

Larry Minear has worked on public policy issues in the Washington Office of Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief since 1975.

years [that] no new wars . . . have started. At least eight wars which were going on in 1988 appear to have ended, and three more may be winding down."[3] She places the decade's death toll through May 1989 at a staggering four million persons, including civilian deaths of 2,733,000, military deaths at 1,267,000. Casualties would drive the figures higher still.

Euphoria, however, would be premature. New refugees numbering 60,000 from Afghanistan since the Soviet withdrawal attest to the reality that peace accords do not always put an end to conflict and upheaval. The withdrawal of foreign occupiers from Cambodia hardly presages the long-awaited return to productive lives of 300,000 refugees. The resettlement of Salvadoran communities from Honduras has been accompanied by fresh violence even as the protagonists explore peace options. Even barring new arms shipments from the American and Soviet governments—major arms suppliers, respectively, of sixteen and fourteen of the decade's warring governments—many conflicts would remain unresolved.

cade's conflict has been to increase the suffering among civilians. Sudan is a case in point. The resumption of the civil war in 1983 between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) produced widespread displacement and malnutrition. "Military operations by both sides dislocated hundreds of thousands of people and effectively depopulated vast areas of the south," reported the U.S. State Department in early 1989. "Estimates ranged up to 2 million displaced persons, including 360,000 forced to flee into neighboring Ethiopia."[4] Civilian loss of life is widely believed to have been at least 250,000. Table I indicates the staggering toll of other conflicts of the decade on combatants.

The greater vulnerability of civilians to the conflicts of the eighties reflects the predominance of guerrilla over conventional warfare and the extent to which such warfare has targeted economic as well as military assets. "Total conflicts with total mobilization of human and economic resources," reports

ern weapons of great destructive power are also implicated.

Though warfare has always created hardships for civilians, the eighties have been worse. Civilian dislocations have frequently been used as an explicit military or political tactic by protagonists seeking to deny their adversaries a population's support. The Khartoum government has provided modern weapons to tribal militias that have terrorized civilian populations in SPLA areas, as have government security forces themselves. For its part, the SPLA has discouraged the resettlement of civilians into the countryside surrounding the government-held towns to which they had fled. Protagonists in Central America's civil strife have also taken a strategic approach to civilian populations.

Impeding the access of civilians to emergency assistance, not unknown in earlier decades, has also become a common tactic. The State Department reported that in Sudan, the troops of both sides "frequently interfered with or failed



Reprinted with permission of The Miami Herald.

As the decade's violence winds down, the problems experienced by civilians and aid agencies merit review. The situations in Sudan and El Salvador illuminate other conflicts as well.

The Effects of Conflicts on Civilians

The most obvious effect of the de-

one international study, "have meant an increasing participation of civilian facilities and of civilians themselves in the war efforts."[5] Their expanded role makes them a greater target for hostile action. In the wars of the eighties, more than ninety percent of the casualties have been civilians, a reversal of the pattern in World War I and earlier, when civilian casualties were estimated at five percent.[6] Readily available mod-

to cooperate with international relief efforts in order to gain advantage in the civil war. As a result . . . many displaced persons suffered from severe malnutrition, and there were many deaths due to starvation and disease."[7] In Mozambique, convoys have encountered similar difficulties, as have efforts to supply Palestinian refugee camps in Israel's occupied territories.

Excruciating though the agony has

been, civilian suffering has often failed to attract attention because protagonists have successfully restricted access by the media. However, in settings where relief personnel have tried in vain to publicize the need, media accounts have eventually mobilized international outrage.

Examples include the BBC report on famine in Ethiopia in 1984, the 1988 *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* expose of slavery and other human rights abuses in Sudan, and the 1988 report by Physicians for Human Rights on abuses of access to medical assistance and other human rights in the occupied territories during the *intifada*. Media coverage of reports by State Department consultant Robert Gersony concerning abuses of civilians in Mozambique in 1988 and Somalia in 1989 also influenced public opinion and public policy.

The Effects of Conflict on Aid Providers

The decade's conflicts have also taken a toll on the agencies providing humanitarian protection and assistance. First, the sheer proliferation of human need has inundated all agencies. At the same time, however, problems of humanitarian access have burgeoned. The reason, of course, is one and the same: the nature of the strife that has created widespread suffering has made its alleviation more difficult.

A case in point is the situation in El Salvador, where the decade has claimed an estimated 70,000 lives, some three-fourths of them civilians. The government, engaged in a fierce civil war with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), has sought to assist civilians in the areas loyal to it and to discourage assistance to persons in FMLN-controlled areas. Most AID and UN assistance, contributed for distribution through recipient governments, has gone to persons in government-controlled areas. Civilians elsewhere—their geographical location in effect becoming a political classification—have not been able to avail themselves of such aid.

Nongovernmental aid groups have attempted to provide assistance and protection to civilians in need, irrespective of location or affiliation. The International Committee of the Red Cross has generally managed to do so, at the same time privately challenging authorities for violations of the human rights of civilians. Some other private relief groups have been less successful, even when using assistance from and through private rather than governmental channels. Particularly vulnerable have been the programs and personnel of church-related aid agencies.[8]

"Army Targets Rebel 'Sympathizers'," read one newspaper headline in early 1989. It describes official and unofficial pressures on the Roman Catholic Church's human rights office and the Lutheran Church of El Salvador. The latter, whose offices had been destroyed by a bomb, was "viewed with suspicion by military authorities because of its work with war refugees hostile to the government and the Army."[9]

During the FMLN urban offensive in November and following the killing of six Jesuit priests and two associates apparently by elements of the Salvadoran armed forces, the Salvadoran military raided Lutheran, Baptist, Mennonite, Episcopal, and Roman Catholic churches and aid agencies. Expressing solidarity across political barriers with those who suffer has thus involved shared vulnerability of aid providers with those in need of aid.

Church-related personnel have also experienced growing difficulty in maintaining access to Salvadoran communities. Some have been denied safe-conduct passes to contested areas; others have been granted such passes, only to be

A refugee from Somalia in an Ethiopian refugee camp holds her food ration card.
UNHCR/B. Press

denied access by local authorities. During 1988 alone, more than 60 church workers, relief personnel, and international visitors were detained or arrested. In late 1989, dozens of international religious and aid personnel were pressured to leave the country, and some, even holding valid residency visas, were denied entry. Most problems of safety and access, it is agreed, have originated with the government rather than the FMLN.

That conflict affects aid work is not new. What characterizes the eighties, however, is the extent to which aid agencies have been affected by civil strife. In some instances, aid personnel have been intentionally targeted by government opposition forces or have been killed or injured when carrying out conflict-related work, such as defusing mines. In other cases, indiscriminate violence has engulfed aid staffs as well as those they are trying to help.

During 1988–89, 38 national CARE staff were killed in Somalia and about 20 in Mozambique, most of them in vehicle-related attacks. In Lebanon, four Save the Children staff were injured when their feeding program in Lebanon was caught in a crossfire. The agency's Beirut field office was also hit by shells. One Swiss delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has succeeded in functioning throughout war-torn Lebanon, was kidnapped in 1988, two in 1989. In the last half of the decade, World Vision has had local project staff kidnapped in Ethiopia and Sudan and killed in Uganda, Ethiopia, El Salvador, and Afghanistan. UNICEF and the World Food Program (WFP) have lost local staff in the attacks on convoys in Sudan.

Aid agencies are now paying more attention to security issues, temporarily withdrawing personnel and suspending programs as the situations warrant. While some agencies are curtailing their work, (for example, three U.S. groups left Somalia in 1989), there does not seem to be a pattern emerging of terminating such activities in favor of less hazardous surroundings. In fact, the larger number of incidents may reflect, in part, improved outreach into more removed areas of conflict. In any case, it is an indication of the extremity of the situation that not only relief assistance but also relief personnel have become weapons in highly politicized struggles. Some private and UN personnel and agencies have also been expelled for their activities.

The Aid and Protection Regime in Disarray

The decade has left the major assistance and protection channels—multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental alike—overwhelmed and politicized.

UN specialized agencies have for the most part acquitted themselves well in responding to the large increase in need. In 1980, UNHCR was assisting 8.2 million refugees; in 1989, its beneficiaries number 15 million. The United Nations

Impeding the access of civilians to emergency assistance, not unknown in earlier decades, has become a common tactic.

World Food Program (WFP) expanded its emergency operations (some unrelated to civil strife) from 67 in 1979 to 79 in 1987. During that period, the number of emergencies more than doubled in sub-Saharan Africa (from 23 to 48) and more than tripled in Latin America (from 3 to 11). Agencies such as the UN Development Program, the World Bank, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development have also sought to respond to the needs of those displaced by conflict.

In some situations, however, multilateral organizations have proved unable to render the necessary protection and assistance. UNHCR and the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) have not succeeded in maintaining the necessary levels of access to and protection in camps in Thailand, to the detriment of Cambodian refugees and of accountability for aid resources. In Pakistan, UNHCR allowed essential distinctions between Afghan civilians and combatants to blur and camps, themselves dominated by various resistance groups, to serve as a support mechanism for the war effort. UNHCR has also had difficulty assuring protection for Salvadorans in its camps in Honduras. Working through governments, WFP, too, has had difficulty assuring impartial distribution of its food, particularly in contested areas. At issue is the vulnerability of such agencies to politicization by powerful member governments, not multilateral malfeasance.

A notable exception has been UNICEF, which has managed not only to maintain access to communities on all sides of conflicts, but to use humanitarian assistance to bridge hostilities. In El Salvador and Lebanon, UNICEF has encouraged ceasefires that have brought immunization to children and facilitated broader political dialogue among adversaries. UNICEF pressed the United Nations to launch and the protagonists in the Sudan to accept Operation Lifeline Sudan, which helped position large tonnages of relief supplies in 1989 to avoid a repeat of the 1988 famine.

U.S. bilateral aid has acquitted itself less well than most multilateral assistance. Two developments have eroded the natural constituency for U.S. foreign assistance and cast a shadow over the future of such aid.

First, humanitarian assistance, traditionally exempt from political considerations, has been pressed unashamedly into the service of short-term U.S. foreign policy objectives. U.S. policy in effect took its cue from a 1985 editorial supporting aid to the contras, which claimed that "any aid directed at overthrowing communism is humanitarian aid."[10] The United States denied disaster aid to Nicaragua following the devastating hurricane of 1988 while lavishing resources on Costa Rica, barely grazed by the same storm. In settings outside Central America, too, humanitarian aid has become an extension of the Cold War by another means.

Second, U.S. foreign assistance as a whole has come to be characterized less by a serious concern for human needs than by an overriding political-military agenda. In 1980, $3.5 billion of a total U.S. foreign aid program of $8.9 billion was committed to development assistance: bilateral and multilateral disaster and refugee aid, technical and capital assistance, and the Peace Corps. In 1989, $4.5 billion of $12.7 billion in total foreign aid was directed toward such purposes. The remainder—and the centerpiece of foreign aid during the eighties—was security assistance: that is, military and economic assistance for political allies.[11]

AID's close association with highly political activities such as providing aid to the contras and apparently now to opposition parties in the upcoming Nicaraguan election has further undermined its credibility. Meanwhile, U.S. foreign aid contributions relative to gross national product place the United States eighteenth of eighteen developed countries. During the decade, Japan overtook the United States as the largest aid provider in absolute terms. Major arrearages during the eighties in U.S. contributions to the United Nations and substantial reductions in support for specialized UN organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees have called into further question U.S. commitments to serious, cooperative alleviation of human needs.

The eighties also saw the stepped-up human needs involvement by U.S. armed forces. Building on a history of providing personnel and material aid to developing countries, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in 1986 expanded the scope and scale of its aid activities. Coordinated by its Office of Humanitarian Assistance, DOD assisted private aid agencies by providing excess government property and transporting private relief supplies. DOD personnel themselves mounted expanded "humanitarian aid" and civic action programs. While opinion is divided about the appropriateness of DOD's expanded role, there is little dispute that in the United States and elsewhere today, "the military is more heavily engaged in humanitarian operations than before."[12]

The humanitarian work of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), too, emerges battered from the decade, though public and congressional support remains strong. The impact of civil strife is reflected in conversations facilitated by their professional association, InterAction. Spanning the years 1985–87, these discussions, summarized in *Helping People in an Age of Conflict: Toward a New Professionalism in U.S. Voluntary Humanitarian Assistance*, suggest the difficulties that civil strife has posed for such groups.[13]

Agencies that have prided themselves on functioning quickly and apolitically have been thrust into situations in which impartiality has proved difficult to maintain. Assisting people on both sides of a conflict has often required complex and time-consuming negotiations with all protagonists; yet assisting people on only one side, while easier to accomplish, has risked implying political favoritism.

The good-faith efforts of many NGOs to chart an impartial course have also been complicated by other groups that have functioned in highly political ways. Some of the New Breed NGOs, which ask few probing questions about the political contexts in which they function, are more paragovernmental than private. Some are now referred to pejoratively within the family as GONGOs (government-originated NGOs).

The "new professionalism" that NGOs seek involves a greater willingness to see the unavoidably political contexts and impact of their assistance, particularly in conflicts in which the United States is an interested party. U.S. groups have become more aware of the tensions between their acceptance of U.S. government aid, which encourages them to follow the flag, and their stated commitment to help needy people, whatever the relation of those people to U.S. policy. Despite the new insights, however, the effects of the decade have been divisive and dispiriting, the U.S. government intrusive and manipulating. Moreover, there are few indications that the U.S. NGO community will approach future partnership with the U.S. government more circumspectly, even if in the nineties the United States becomes a less heavily invested party to conflict.

An October 1989 meeting of religious aid agencies from developed and developing countries provided an illuminating glimpse of NGO perceptions at decade's end. The consultation was called by the World Council of Churches to review the abundance of northern and also now southern government resources available to NGOs and, alarming to many, the proliferation of private aid groups prepared to accept such resources uncritically.

From the standpoint of empowering the poor, recent developments were seen as more negative than positive. The resources newly available from governments reflected for the most part the now dominant ideology, articulated in the prescriptions of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, that the task of governments is to provide the context in which corporate capitalism can flourish, with state roles in assisting the poor circumscribed accordingly. Governments are providing more political space, the group found, for NGOs willing to help deliver the social services from which governments are distancing themselves. However, such space is narrowing for NGOs seeking to facilitate authentic development and questioning the prevailing economic orthodoxy.

Representative of Norwegian People's Aid at work with displaced Sudanese refugees in Kapoeta, southern Sudan. Morten Hvaal

Challenges to U.S. Policy

The bruising experience of the eighties points to the need for fundamental changes in U.S. policy. First, greater respect for the principles of humanitarian assistance and protection is essential. There is no great mystery about what these entail, only a lack of political will to honor them. The 1984 recommendations of an AID assessment team, rejected for El Salvador, offer ground rules for U.S. policy in civil strife situations during the nineties.

The AID team observed that assistance "must be disbursed on the basis of need ... to noncombatants regardless of political affiliation, location of residence, and/or ethnic origin ... and should not be used as an inducement to encourage displaced persons to participate in relocation programs. All humanitarian activities should be strictly separated from military and security actions, plans, and programs, [with relief organizations] free from intimidation by the military, police, or other security forces of either party in the conflict."[14]

Such principles appear to command growing congressional support. Three committees addressed problems of humanitarian access in El Salvador in 1990 aid legislation. In stating its expectation that "the rights of civilians to relief assistance and other essential services" will be assured, the House Foreign Affairs Committee noted that "the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, which seek to balance the military and security interests of the parties to the conflict against the rights of civilians and noncombatants, were promulgated precisely to address such situations."[15] In approving assistance to the contras in April 1989 that Congress conceded was not, strictly speaking, "humanitarian," lawmakers acknowledged "the importance of returning to a more precise use of the term in the future."[16]

Second, while there is no way to recoup the lives of the more than 2.7 million civilians claimed by the violence of the eighties, there is an opportunity to help shattered people and nations rebuild their lives. However, the current scale of U.S. commitment to international reconstruction efforts in such settings as Afghanistan and Central America remains in the tens of millions of dollars as against reasonable U.S. contributions in the hundreds of millions. Again, there are signs that Congress would like the Administration to take a more serious look at more generous U.S. contributions.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee has asked the executive branch "to give greater priority to efforts to meet human needs in post-conflict settings" and to review "the extent to which the objectives and make-up of future U.S. foreign assistance might be recast in the light of the changing world geopolitical situation."[17] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has expressed the view that "U.S. humanitarian traditions and U.S. national interests compel our full participation in international efforts to help build a brighter future for war-weary people" in regional conflict settings.[18]

Yet it would be naive to believe that reduced regional conflict, liberally underwritten while it raged by a decade of foreign aid, will now free up significant resources for post-conflict reconstruction. Cresting at mid-decade, levels of U.S. aid have already begun to slip. Moreover, those whose support for foreign aid has been based primarily on anti-communism are already arguing that the lessening of East-West tensions should mean aid savings, not aid reallocation. It is not, therefore, altogether far-fetched to consider whether "a superpower military retreat from the Third World will trigger total withdrawal of aid and economic assistance."[19]

The decade has left the major assistance and protection channels—multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental alike—overwhelmed and politicized.

An elderly African refugee.
The Dallas Morning News/J. Walgren

Third, U.S. policy needs to pay attention to the things that make for peace, including effective human needs aid. Worth replicating from the eighties is not the denial of food to communist Ethiopia in 1983–84, but the subsequent policy that a hungry child, even Ethiopian, knows no politics. In retrospect, the American people will surely take greater pride in U.S. participation in the earthquake relief effort in Soviet Armenia than in the U.S. denial of hurricane assistance to Nicaragua. Authentic humanitarian assistance in the nineties should once again become a force for expressing human solidarity across ideological divides, not a mechanism for reinforcing such divisions.

Higher priority for conflict resolution will mean, in addition to significantly reduced levels of security assistance, expanded U.S. support of the aspirations of people throughout the developing world for a better life. A redefinition of what is understood by U.S. national security in a decade in which nations are increasingly interdependent and in which economic challenges are likely to upstage military ones would be a good place to start. There is also an urgent need for the United States to exercise its good offices to speed the resolution of continuing conflicts—and to assist in reconstruction efforts—in places such as the Horn of Africa, Sri Lanka, Burma, Lebanon, and the occupied territories.

Fourth, there is no substitute for a reaffirmation of a U.S. commitment to international law and international institutions and a more studied fidelity by U.S. officials to binding U.S. obligations. The World Court's 1986 judgment, which led the United States to withdraw from its compulsory jurisdiction, found the U.S. in violation both of universally accepted principles of humanitarian assistance and of Nicaraguan national sovereignty. The expressed willingness of the USSR once again to accept the Court's

compulsory jurisdiction should make it easier for the United States now again to do so.

The new-found interest of the Soviet Union in the United Nations and its specialized agencies and its payment of most of its arrearages should make it easier for the United States to take a more constructive approach. Currently, the crucial work of agencies such as UNHCR is hobbled by shortfalls in U.S. contributions. The basic principle of multilateralism will require the United States to support these agencies in their own right rather than seeking to make them extensions of U.S. policy.

The international regime would also benefit from prompt U.S. ratification of the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to which the United States is already a party. The United States played an active role in negotiating the Protocols, which clarify and extend the protections afforded civilians in situations of armed conflict, both international (Protocol I) and non-international (Protocol II). The Protocols require the free and safe passage of relief supplies and recognize the right of impartial humanitarian agencies to provide relief assistance.

The Reagan administration requested the Senate to ratify only Protocol II, asserting that Protocol I legitimizes guerrilla movements.[20] International legal opinion supports both Protocols and views Protocol I as enhancing the protections for civilians since guerrilla groups exercising the right of self-determination assume the same legal obligations as States. Again, recent ratification by the Soviet Union makes U.S. inaction the more damaging. The Bush administration has requested ratification of only Protocol II.

In sum, the very instincts and institutions abused during the eighties need to be nurtured and strengthened in the nineties. According high priority to this task will not restore the millions of lives lost. However, a principled commitment to help rebuild shattered societies and strengthen the structures of protection and assistance will have manifold constructive effects. Among them will be a rekindled sense of U.S. participation in the international effort to create a more just and secure world.

NGOs working in volatile areas can gather vital information. UNHCR/A. Diamond

Notes

1. For a discussion of superpower involvement in the conflicts of the eighties, cf. Thomas G. Weiss, ed., *American, Soviet and Third World Perceptions of Regional Conflicts*. (International Peace Academy: New York, 1989).
2. Steven D. Goose, *SIPRI Yearbook 1987: World Armaments and Disarmament*, p. 298.
3. Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures: 1989*. (Washington, D.C., World Priorities, 1989), p. 23.
4. U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 345.
5. Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, *Modern War: The Humanitarian Challenge*. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ and London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1986), pp. 28–9.
6. Ibid, p. 25.
7. *Country Reports*, p. 345.
8. For a comparison of the approaches taken by the ICRC and religious aid agencies, cf. Larry Minear, "Terms of Engagement," *Ecumenical Review* [published by the World Council of Churches], January 1990.
9. Chris Norton, *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 13, 1989, p. 6.
10. *The Washington Times*, "Resistance Aid, not Party Games," May 10, 1985, p. 9A. For a more extended treatment of international human needs policies of the Reagan administration, cf. Larry Minear, "The Forgotten Human Agenda," *Foreign Policy* (Number 73, Winter 1988–89), pp. 76–83.
11. This and related data are available from the Interfaith Action for Economic Justice, Washington, D.C.
12. Frederick C. Cuny, "Dilemmas of Military Involvement in Humanitarian Relief," paper prepared for an October 1989 Workshop on Humanitarian Emergencies and Armed Conflict: The Possible Contribution of Outside Military Forces. [Publication by the International Peace Academy, forthcoming]
13. InterAction: New York and Washington, 1988.
14. U.S. Agency for International Development, *Displaced Persons in El Salvador: An Assessment*. (Washington, D.C., 1984), pp. 16–17.
15. Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, *International Cooperation Act of 1989* (Report 101–90), p. 123.
16. Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, *Implementation of the Bipartisan Accord on Central America Act of 1989* (Report 101–23, Part 2), p. 2.
17. Committee on Foreign Affairs, *op.cit.*, p. 5
18. Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1989* (Report 101–80), p. 19.
19. Weiss, *op.cit.*, p. 7.
20. *Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Message from the President of the United States*, U.S. Senate Treaty Document 100–2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987).

Europe in the 1990s: The Berlin Walls of the Mind

Philip Rudge

For once, the customary retrospection and anticipation that come with the turn of every decade entitle us to say at the end of 1989 that the 1990s could open up totally different perspectives leading towards real progress in the treatment of the world's refugees. This year has been dominated by astonishing and rapid changes in the political and human rights context in Central and Eastern Europe. The truly historic scale of these events and the spectacular transformations witnessed in the late 1980s will profoundly affect not only the structures, but more crucially, the assumptions that have determined the post-war arrangements in Europe. Comfortable stereotypes will now have to be jettisoned, uncomfortable uncertainties confronted. The effects are only just beginning to become clear, their ramifications right across the spectrum of social, economic, and political life can still only be guessed at.

Human Rights versus Border Control

In the final years of the decade, the issue of asylum and refugee policy has become more acute in public debate in Europe. It has provoked an intensification of governmental activities both on the national level and in various regional groupings that have an interest in these matters, most particularly the 23 member states of the Council of Europe, the 5 states of the Schengen Group, the 12 states of the Trevi Group, the Nordic Group, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)-Governmental Consultations, the International Civil Aviation Authority, and even the European Free Trade Association. Aware of the "north-north" implications of these discussions, Canada and the United States have become regular observers and participants in a number of these forums.

Nonetheless, it remains a cause of deep concern that Western Europe, at the end of the 1980s, still has neither a coherent asylum policy nor an international refugee policy. The reasons for this unhappy situation are many. It is not simply a matter of the inherent complexities of the situation, nor the very real difficulties of devising long-term strategies; good ideas abound, strategy documents of high quality are emerging from governmental and intergovernmental sources. Important constituents of civil society in the form of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), confessional groups, legal and human rights bodies have elaborated an informal critique of present policies and clear criteria for future action around which to mobilize public support. But still the debate remains anchored to the floor, and all the reasons lead to the inexorable conclusion: there is a major failure of the principle of *positive solidarity* based on human rights principles, both among states themselves and between states and persons seeking asylum in Europe, mostly from Third-World countries. Rather than an approach to the refugee and asylum issue rooted in human rights strategies, there is a preoccupation with immigration control and the more pressing political priorities of economic development and security, particularly those associated with the realization of the Single European Act and the creation of a common market of the European Community by or about 1992. The central problem seems to derive from the notion that in some way the increase in the number of asylum seekers in Europe is intolerable and can be dealt with by measures taken in Europe alone.

It is now well-documented that during the 1980s many European states have introduced a series of measures that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has called "restrictive and even repressive." Such measures include an increasingly illiberal interpretation of the Geneva Convention, sanctions on carriers, the targeting of visas, rejection at borders, inhumane detention, and so on. The question now is whether in the run up to 1992 we are seeing a process that will harmonize the worst of the measures into regulations, and possibly even treaties and conventions, that will consolidate for all time a tough, Eurocentric attitude, irrespective of the cost to the individuals concerned and to the whole principle of international refugee protection and solidarity among the states of the world. There is much evidence that this is so, although events in central Europe are beginning to rock the boat seriously. The clearest illustration of the

"How far will Western countries be prepared to tion policies to meet the growing pressures to

Philip Rudge is General Secretary of the European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles.

thinking in Western Europe at the end of the 1980s was the so-called Schengen process. This referred to policy and actions planned by five states—France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—who in 1985 set themselves the task of abolishing their internal frontiers by 1990. The importance of this process was that it was to constitute the model for the 12 states of the European Community. The basic working principles have gradually become clear: the reinforcement of external border controls; a harmonized visa policy; a *one-chance* rule preventing the asylum seeker from exercising a right to choose his or her prospective country of asylum; and the creation of an enormous data collection facility, the so-called Schengen Information System.

Critics have identified in the plan a number of dangers to the exercise of the right to seek and enjoy asylum. They believe that its overall effect would be to make entry into Europe more difficult; that the process of fining carriers and targeting visas would lead to an increase in external decision-making beyond European frontiers, reducing the legal control and due process of claims; that only quota refugees would be permitted, while spontaneous claims would receive less attention; that the abolition of external border controls would make stricter internal controls and checks more likely; and that the Schengen Information System would endanger the lives of families and friends of asylum seekers if political information held on them were to fall into the wrong hands.

support the growing liberalization in Central and Eastern Europe by adapting their asylum and immigra- move?" The Washington Post/Carol Guzy

Whatever the content of the proposed Schengen Agreement, a serious objection to the process has been the secrecy of the planning and the absence of democratic debate of the proposals. We are not, of course, talking here about a mere administrative exercise, but a piece of policymaking with important human rights dimensions. It is therefore all the more astonishing that states wedded in principle to the notions of democracy, solidarity, and human rights are behaving in a way they have always rightly criticized on the far side of the Berlin Wall. Indeed, UNHCR itself has not been a party to these discussions despite Article 35 of the Geneva Convention, which requires states to cooperate with UNHCR regarding "laws, regulations, and decrees which are or may hereafter be in force relating to refugees."

However, the Schengen horse appears to have stumbled if not fallen at the last jump. Disagreements among the five states aborted the signing of the agreement scheduled for December 1989. Member states objected to a number of articles other than those relating to asylum, but a central stumbling block was the fear of some states, a fear exacerbated by the growing preoccupation of West Germany with the East, that the agreement would permit large-scale movements of East Germans, and indeed Czechs, Poles, and other Eastern European migrants, to slip into West Germany and move on westwards unhindered. Formally, the completion of the agreement has been postponed for a year: but the implications of this abrupt reversal may be of great importance for the vision of a frontier-free Europe after 1992.

Given the global dimension of the refugee issue, the attitudes encapsulated in the approach of the Schengen Group were never the answer. The substance has come to look very much like the building material of Fortress Europe; the style suggested a Europe of closed minds, as well as closed frontiers.

Change in Eastern and Central Europe

Towards the end of 1989, the developments in Central Europe have seen the largest movement of persons in 30 years, not only from East to West, but within the region itself. Such is the speed of events that to write about the present situation carries the risk that one will be immediately out of date, overtaken by yet another unforeseen event, wrong-footed by a new leap into territory that was hitherto easily mapped or else off limits. At a time when concern has been growing that the developments of the European Economic Community are leading towards a Fortress Europe of the 12 member states in 1992, it is suddenly and dramatically clear that completely new groupings of states' interests are on the agenda.

The demand for free movements of peoples from the countries of the Soviet bloc has been a cornerstone of Western European (and indeed North American) human rights policy for the past 40 years, and indeed is explicitly on the agenda of the Helsinki Accords. What will the Western response be as this becomes a reality? This will be a matter for all Western states to a greater or lesser extent, but the key country to watch is the Federal Republic of Germany, which expects more than 300,000 ethnic Germans (not refugees) to come to settle in 1989; in addition, some 100,000 are expected to come from East Germany under normal interstate immigration agreements. On top of this are the new movements associated with recent freedom of movement regulations passed by the East German authorities. It could well be that half a million persons may arrive and intend to stay in the territory of West Germany alone in 1989.

Elsewhere in Central Europe, Poland now has a Solidarity government, and few Poles are granted asylum in other Western European countries these days. Nonetheless, the grave economic crisis confronting that country means that several million Poles will travel abroad this year in search of work. In June 1989, the Polish authorities took the unprecedented initiative of hosting a meeting jointly sponsored by UNHCR and the San Remo Institute for Humanitarian Law on the subject of international refugee law.

Hungary has pulled down its border fences with Austria, and in March 1989 signed the Geneva Convention, the first country of the erstwhile Eastern bloc to do so for some years. In a very real sense, it was the critical decision of the Hungarian government to give priority to the 1951 refugee Convention and to its new obligation under the European Conference on Security and Cooperation over its historical treaty agreement with East Germany that broke the log-jam and permitted the East German migrants to leave in huge numbers. Hungary further signed an agreement with UNHCR in October 1989 to authorize the setting up of a UNHCR branch office in Budapest.

By the end of the year, other Central European states were embarked on the path of reform: East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, each in its own way; even Albania edges very slowly towards a limited openness.

In the 1990s, the growing demands for cultural, economic, and indeed political autonomy by dozens of nationalities and ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union itself, will make for a tense and unpredictable situation as long-standing historical problems come to the surface again and demand resolution. The movement of peoples associated with these developments is already underway, not only from East to West, but also within the Central and Eastern European countries; such movements can be expected to increase in the months and years ahead. The question is whether all concerned can develop the necessary range of responses to cope with these historic changes with patience and generosity.

Deterrence dehumanizes the asylum seekers and reinforces the division between us *and* them; *it constitutes a Berlin Wall in the mind.*

Who amongst the tens of thousands of persons on the move are in fact refugees or in need of international protection on humanitarian grounds? What impact will these extraordinary surges of disaffected peoples have on the orderly evolution of East/West relations? What will be the effect of these movements on the developmental capacity of the states they leave, states that are opting for new economic and social configurations that will require the best qualified and educated people to manage them? What, if any, are the breaking points beyond which states will not permit the hemorrhage of their skilled manpower? What are the risks of destabilization and backlash? Will the movements put such pressure on the already creaking asylum and immigration mechanisms of Western Europe that chances for non-European asylum seekers will be further threatened? What is the future of the traditional resettlement program in North America, long-established as a burden-sharing mechanism for those persons who entered Western Europe from the Soviet bloc? How far will Western countries be prepared to support the growing liberalization in Central and Eastern Europe by adapting their asylum and immigration policies to meet the growing pressures to move?

One thing is clear: in the 1990s, these changes will open up the political debate and advance the observance of individual and collective human rights in a Europe no longer of the 12 or the 23, nor of NATO versus the Warsaw Pact, nor of the socialist collectivist bloc versus the capitalist individualist bloc, but of an area of shared humanistic values stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, *the common European home*. The scale of this project will test to the fullest the imagination and political commitment of all concerned. To be really successful, it will also have to avoid two obvious dangers: first, a crude "West is best" triumphalism about events in Central Europe; second, the risk increasingly expressed by advocates of solidarity with the Third World, that the crisis of forced migration involving underdeveloped states will be forgotten or downgraded.

Refugees and Forced Migrations in the 1990s

Movements of asylum seekers from Third-World states to Europe meanwhile remain significant. It is reasonable to assume that, if progress on the human rights front continues in Eastern and Central Europe, refugee movements from there will diminish, and non-Europeans will become again the overwhelming majority of the asylum seekers coming to Europe. One of the most disturbing trends at the end of the 1980s has been the way such people are being dismissed as "merely" economic migrants. There is at present a depressingly low level of analysis and debate on the nature of the movements we are witnessing; the mishandling of the issue continues to do harm to the refugee and the migrant, not just in the way it stokes up xenophobia and racial hatred, but in the destabilizing effect it is having on official policies. The issue that European governments are inadequately addressing here is the question of how to ensure protection for the persecuted and the endangered in a world where people are leaving their countries for many other reasons relating to demographic, economic, and ecological crises.

Afghan asylum seekers in Italy. UNHCR/J. Marando

That the level of human rights violations around the world remains high, or is even increasing, is without doubt: the practice of torture itself is growing, and we witness again the barbarism of chemical weapons used by governments against their own populations. That the respect for the right "to seek and to enjoy asylum" from persecution is more necessary than ever remains a tragic indictment of our century and a reminder of the fundamental need for international solidarity as expressed in the 1951 Geneva Convention and all other related human rights and humanitarian law instruments.

But as well as those states whose actions strike at the civil and political rights of their citizens, it is evident that there are a number of other states that for a variety of reasons are unable to ensure the economic, cultural, and social rights of their populations. The social disorder that often arises from poverty, hunger, and deprivation provokes governmental responses, leading to a downward spiral of protest and the suppression of protest. The victims of the process will become both refugees in the classic sense of the definition and people forced out to seek a tolerable existence elsewhere.

It is not really very surprising that the world is witnessing ever greater migratory pressures when the gulf between richer and poorer parts of the world gets wider every year, when it is beyond the capacity of many states to guarantee a tolerable life for their citizens, and when our commercial strategies and technological sophistication mean that Western lifestyles are beamed into virtually every last village on earth. While many northern states are experiencing levels of affluence and prosperity unprecedented in their history, elsewhere levels of hunger rise, environmental degradation accelerates, the chances for the world's 800 million absolute poor recede, the increasing working age populations demand the creation of many millions of new jobs in developing countries. The will of Third World states to buy and the northern world to sell military weaponry contributes over 250 billion dollars to the devastating debt burden. These and other factors inevitably contribute to the pressures on human beings to move.

The developed countries of Europe in the 1990s will need to come up with a range of policies in the aid, development, trade, financial, and military fields to address these problems. It is morally indefensible and politically short-sighted to dismiss asylum seekers coming to Europe as merely economic migrants without (a) giving far better evidence than has hitherto been the case of the alleged abuse of the asylum system, (b) treating asylum seekers rejected as Convention refugees with some dignity and care for their humanitarian predicament, and (c) offering some hope and practical planning to deal with the growing crisis of global forced migration.

Fortunately, those circles that advocate yet more repressive measures to stamp on the various migratory movements rather than solve the problem are increasingly discredited. The Schengen approach was criticized for the encouragement it has given to those who start from the notion that an asylum seeker is a potential criminal and should be dealt with in the same policy area as drug traffickers, terrorists, and "illegal aliens." The damage in such an approach is that it will not, of course, ultimately prevent the movement of persecuted and other desperate people; it just means that they will increasingly be treated as illegal.

A Positive Agenda for the 1990s?

However, there *are* encouraging signs (a) of more strategic thinking by governmental and intergovernmental organizations and (b) of a growing sense that Europeans do not need to defend their prosperity and security by offensive behavior towards people who, for a wide range of reasons, wish to share our space. There is also some cause for optimism that in the 1990s a democratic debate over asylum and refugee policy can be resumed between governments on the one hand and a wide range of nongovernmental, human rights and legal groups on the other, after a period where the gulf between their positions has been deep.

There is in fact a great deal of common ground between governments and their critics that can form the basis for policymaking that may attract a wider consensus in the 1990s than has been the case in the 1980s. The need is clearly to develop policy in two areas and accept that neither makes sense without the other: asylum policy and refugee policy.

Asylum Policy:

1. Approaches based on secrecy and the extension of frontier controls are inappropriate to the seriousness and complexity of the issues in Europe. We need more than the status quo plus a ring fence. The harmonization of European policy must not get stuck at devising ever more ingenious schemes to control frontiers. It must also address the need to respect the dignity of those to whom asylum is granted by agreeing to high standards of treatment throughout the

European area. At present, harmonization looks as if it will be at the lowest common denominator because governments fear that different standards of treatment between countries will have a *pull* effect. The better way to deal with the pull effect must surely be to aim at harmonization at the level of the highest common denominator while developing policies of burden-sharing.

2. Agreement is needed on which country is responsible for examining an asylum request in order to avoid the *refugee in orbit* syndrome. This must, however, take due note of the individual asylum seeker's wishes and the need to have a second chance against a negative decision in any one country. Such flexibility is vital so long as major differences exist between states about the way they decide on different refugee groups.

3. The present backlog of undecided cases in Western Europe is more than 200,000, causing blockages to the system and, more important, real misery to the individuals concerned. The 1990s must see improvements in the procedures and speed of assessing asylum claims with scrupulous fairness. A further and related challenge to states will be to develop forms of humanitarian protection for persons not conforming to the strict Convention criteria, as well as ways of treating with some dignity other persons not deemed to have a refugee claim or other humanitarian grounds for remaining in Europe.

4. New policies or even regional instruments will be required to deal with the fact, widely accepted now, that there are persons coming to Europe whose needs for protection fall outside the criteria of the Geneva Convention, but who need protection all the same. It will help to formulate such policies if we start not so much by asking, "Who is a refugee," but rather "Who needs protection?"

5. Governments and NGOs alike must become fully informed about the very extensive system of human rights and humanitarian standards that can be invoked both in defense of the asylum seeker and refugee and in sanctioning the human rights violators and refugee generators.

Refugee Policy:

1. International refugee policy needs a shot in the arm. In the post-war chaos in Europe, the great plan was to empty the camps of millions of displaced persons. This was done, and done at a time of enormous economic and social dislocation in Europe. Could not all of Europe take the lead to promote a similarly great ambition of the 1990s: to empty the camps of refugees around the world?

2. The second issue is real action on the agenda of root causes and prevention of refugee movements. There is no lack of ideas; there is even a consensus at the UN on measures to avert new refugee flows. We do not need to reinvent the wheel; as always, the problem is the political will. Such measures include strengthening the UN peacekeeping role and early warning mechanisms, greatly increasing the information on human rights situations in various countries; aiming economic cooperation policies towards favoring human rights and mass participation in social development; greater confidence in and use of the international machineries to promote the respect for human rights for all people, irrespective of which side of their national borders they find themselves; the orientation of development policies towards the prevention of natural calamities that force people to flee.

3. UNHCR must be properly supported, and the current undermining of its protection mandate must stop. This means all countries properly funding UNHCR's activities; fulfilling their obligations to meet the present, and hopefully temporary, financial burdens; and maintaining the policy of seeking durable solutions to refugee problems. The accession of Central European states to the Geneva Convention is a good sign.

4. Within Europe, at first perhaps within the framework of the European Communities, but later within a greater Europe, a consultative body should be created, with representatives from the governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental sectors to coordinate responses to the needs of countries of first arrival and to the violations of human rights in refugee-producing countries. Outmoded notions of nonintervention in countries responsible for human rights atrocities must be rethought.

5. Resettlement policies should be further developed as a positive act of state policy to assist those refugees with no alternatives on the basis of need. If this could be done in a positive spirit instead of grudgingly, it could reap rich rewards in terms of humanitarian intervention on behalf of the refugees themselves and solidarity with the country of first-arrival.

Conclusion

In many respects, the decade of the 1980s has been a distressing time when many European states have manifestly failed to adapt to realities of the new refugee situation and have tried to contain the situation through restrictive and deterrent policies. The problem with such policies is that they contradict the proclaimed commitment of states to the principle of asylum, they lead to a violation of important legal standards, and they do not ultimately work. Deterrence dehumanizes the asylum seeker and reinforces the division between *us* and *them*; it constitutes a Berlin Wall in the mind. By the end of the century, we may hope to reach a stage where the notion of *deterrence* is used only with reference to ending human rights violations rather than to measures to prevent the exercise of the right to "seek and enjoy" asylum from persecution.

The four freedoms on which the unified Europe of the 12 is supposed to be built are these: the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and persons. This is the vision of a brave new world for the strong, the prosperous, the powerful, and the white. With events in Central and Eastern Europe and the crisis of Third World forced migration in mind, we might care to add to these freedoms four others that are not new, but which if incorporated into our political priorities will make Europe a better place to live for us and for the refugees who seek asylum here in the 1990s. These are the four freedoms outlined in the preamble to the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in 1948 that are still denied to most of the world and whose violation leads to vast misery in the world, and to refugee movements and other migratory flows. They are freedom of speech, freedom of belief, freedom from want, and from hunger. To a large extent, the demands of the Cold War during the last four decades have diverted resources and intelligence from seriously addressing these problems; indeed, the economic and military arrangements of the world have contributed to the creation of refugee movements. For too long, international human rights discussions have been divided along ideological grounds, with the Western liberal democracies strong on the civil and political agenda, and the Eastern socialist bloc stressing the economic, social, and cultural agenda. At the dawn of the 1990s, it is just possible to hope that the coming decade will see the demolition of that artificial division, and some of the other Berlin Walls in the mind.

Facing New Challenges: UNRWA and the Intifada

Benjamin N. Schiff

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has been transformed by the *intifada* (uprising) in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Its new high profile in the territories—and tacit tilt toward the refugees—has made it much more popular among the refugees and has helped it to reinvigorate itself, but has also presented UNRWA with new long-term challenges.

For forty years since its founding, the agency has provided vital assistance to refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. The United Nations General Assembly established UNRWA to provide emergency relief to the refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and to spearhead economic development in the Jordan Valley region. Until 1987, it maintained a low international profile, scrupulously avoiding the appearance of political involvement with, or advocacy for, the Palestinian refugees.

UNRWA's development efforts—small-scale employment schemes and large-scale "works" projects—foundered on the rocks of regional political conflicts culminating in the 1956 Suez War. It turned to health, welfare, and education programs. In the last three years, UNRWA has departed from a long tradition of laboring in relative obscurity. It has sought support for itself, and a measure of protection for the refugees, by becoming quite public in its efforts to aid refugees caught in the chaos of Lebanon and in the *intifada* in the occupied territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

UNRWA has been reinvigorated by the demands of the *intifada*, and its officials say that the agency will play a central role in preparing the refugees for a coming new political order in which they will move toward greater self-governance. But the *intifada* has lasted much longer than observers expected. As the emergency becomes routine, donor countries could lose interest in UNRWA. Refugees could once again include UNRWA in their list of frustrations if political progress continues to lag. Israel could take an even harsher line toward both the Palestinians and the agency if it decides to crush the *intifada* or if the uprising dissipates from the refugees' exhaustion.

A doctor at Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza treats a Palestinian boy who was beaten by Israeli soldiers. Normally providing mother-and-child care and health education, UNRWA health services since the *intifada* have expanded to assist casualties from beatings, shootings, and tear gas. UNRWA/M. Nasr

Benjamin Schiff is writing a book about UNRWA based on research in UNRWA's archives and on extensive interviews of current and former agency employees, officials of Israel, and of donor and host countries. He is an associate professor of government at Oberlin College in Ohio.

Current Refugee Population

There are currently approximately 2.33 million registered UNRWA refugees, out of a global Palestinian population estimated to be more than 4.5 million. Of the registered refugees (many of whom have become self-supporting and do not use UNRWA services), approximately 764,000 live in refugee camps. UNRWA runs school programs for about 351,000 refugee children. Its health clinics were visited for curative care approximately 5.2 million times in the reporting year 1988–89. It provided food and other relief for approximately 142,000 individuals in its *special hardship* program and

continues to provide emergency food, shelter, and medical assistance to refugees in Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[1]

With more than 17,000 employees, UNRWA is the largest UN agency. About 135 international civil servants work for the Agency. The rest of its employees are local Palestinians, over half of whom are teachers. During its first five years of operations, UNRWA spent an annual average of about $30 million. Its current regular budget is approximately $200 million per year, supplemented by tens of millions of dollars for emergency operations.

UNRWA's Creation

When Britain announced its intention to leave the Palestine Mandate, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted on October 29, 1947 to partition Palestine and to establish separate areas of Jewish and Arab control. The Arabs rejected the partition plan. Great Britain officially withdrew on May 15, 1948, and the Jewish leadership proclaimed establishment of the state of Israel. Well before May 15, as the British departure began, Arab-Jewish fighting erupted. By June of 1948, Jewish forces were pitted against the armies of surrounding Arab states. In the war, Israel took control of areas beyond those allocated to it under the UN partition plan. Of the territories the UN had allocated to the Palestinians, only the West Bank, which came under the control of Jordan, and the Gaza Strip, under Egyptian control, remained in Arab hands. Approximately 170,000 Arabs remained within the expanded boundaries of Israel, while approximately 750,000 refugees fled into Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip.[2]

Unlike the post-World War II European refugees, who eventually returned home or found asylum, the Palestinians remained refugees. The 1948 armistice did not produce a territorial settlement or citizenship rights for them. And the refugees maintained their claims to their homeland. In response to their claims, UNGA Resolution 194 of 1948 called upon Israel to permit them to return, and established the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) to act as mediator between the Arabs and Israelis to settle their conflict. Paragraph 11 of the resolution declared:

> the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and . . . compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property . . .[3]

In Resolution 302 of 1949, the UNGA declared that it recognized the need for continuing assistance to the refugees to "prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them and to further conditions of peace and stability." Res. 302 established UNRWA as the organization that would provide short-term aid, implement long-term development programs, and coordinate shifting responsibility for the refugees from the international community to the governments of the region.[4]

UNRWA is a unique organization. No other intergovernmental agency has been created to protect the rights of a particular national group. And the Palestinian refugees have become a special case. Their status is defined not by the standard UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) criteria, but by standards developed in the course of relief efforts by UNRWA. UNRWA defined a refugee as

> a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in 1948, and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his home and his means of livelihood and took refuge in 1948 in one of the countries where UNRWA provides relief. Refugees within this definition and the direct descendants of such refugees are eligible for Agency assistance if they are: registered with UNRWA, living in the area of UNRWA operations, and in need.[5]

Though unique, the commitment to the Palestinian refugees is limited in scope. UNRWA is funded by voluntary contributions, not by mandatory assessment through the UN, and it is supposed to provide assistance to, not political advocacy for, the refugees. Until very recently, UNRWA did not consider *assistance* to include the kinds of activities usually identified with *protection* in the UNHCR sense of the term. This has changed somewhat as a consequence of the *intifada*, as is described below.

Funding

Along with political issues, budgetary uncertainties and limits have dominated the history of UNRWA's program development, relations with donor and host countries, and even with its clients. Although it began with great promises of massive development funding, UNRWA budgets were soon held by donors to a constant low level. Given the expanding refugee population and deterioration of facilities never designed for long-term use, financial stringencies became increasingly problematic as UNRWA aged. The majority of UN members do not contribute to UNRWA. It has been chiefly supported by the United States, Western European, and Scandinavian countries. (In its early years, the United States contributed up to 73 percent of its budget. This has now fallen to approximately 30 percent.) For most of its history, UNRWA has been unable to convince Arab states to make large contributions. The Arabs have argued that since the refugee problem arose because of the 1947 partition, which they opposed, and continued because of Western support of Israel, it is the West that bears the financial responsibility for the refugees. In a few times of crisis, and currently during the *intifada*, Arab states have contributed significantly, especially when asked to do so by the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Financial crises in the late 1970s and early 1980s were caused by a combination of outdated budgeting procedures and a real shortfall in resources to keep up with the increasing needs for maintenance and construction. The deterioration of camp facilities, continued emergencies in Lebanon and the occupied territories, and growing numbers of needy refugees continue to present major long-term problems for UNRWA.

Relation with Host Governments

From the outset, host governments were suspicious of UN authority operating in their territories. UNRWA officials constantly had to negotiate with the governments to establish and maintain UNRWA's independence of action and the inviolability of its premises. The refugees were suspicious of the agency too. They thought the international civil servants, the General Assembly, and especially the major donor countries (the United States and Britain) were involved in a plot to "liquidate" the Palestinian refugee problem by settling them where they were, instead of helping them to return to the lands they claimed. While there were periodic tensions between the refugees and the host governments, they shared a commitment to refugee welfare and return to Palestine. The agency remained suspect. But because of the services it had to offer and its continual diplomatic efforts, UNRWA

The Israeli military presence on the streets of Gaza has become a highly visible part of daily life. UNRWA/G. Nehmeh

developed generally effective and frequently cordial relations with the host governments and came to be a fixture in the refugees' lives.

Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the 1967 war presented a fundamentally new situation. For the first time, the refugees were in basic conflict with the government in power. UNRWA officials had always walked a tightrope between cooperation with governmental authorities and maintenance of UN impartiality. With the occupation, that tightrope shriveled to a thread between collaboration with the authorities and advocacy for the refugees. From 1967 until 1987, UNRWA carried out its services while maintaining sometimes tense but effective working relationships with the Israeli authorities, upon whom the agency depended for cooperation in transportation, construction, provision of utilities services, and maintenance of civil order.

UNRWA extended emergency assistance to refugees during the PLO-Jordanian war of Black September (1970), and official relations between the Jordanian government and UNRWA have remained quite good. In Syria, the government has always attempted to exert maximum possible control over UNRWA operations, and this has resulted in tight constraints on the freedom of action of field officials. In Lebanon, UNRWA coordinated with the PLO in the south following 1974 as the Lebanese government effectively ceded authority to the PLO "state within a state." It extended emergency aid to refugees in Lebanon trapped in the midst of internecine warfare, the Israeli invasion of 1982, and the civil war thereafter, becoming prominent particularly for delivering food and medical supplies as the camp wars of the late 1980s destroyed refugee areas. Its officials continue to spend enormous amounts of time coordinating with the various armed groups who control the areas in which the agency operates or across which it transports materials and employees.

Critics

UNRWA's critics assert that the existence of the organization has reinforced the Palestinians' refugee status; that the refugee camps have been breeding grounds for nationalist violence; that UNRWA's employees have led nationalist uprisings; and that its facilities have been used for military purposes. Some Palestinians see these same things positively. Critics on both sides argued, at least up until the *intifada*, that UNRWA made the refugees more comfortable, thereby perpetuating their status by (a) reducing their discontent and undermining incentives to assimilate and/or emigrate, or (b) reducing their discontent and undermining revolutionary consciousness. UNRWA's defenders argue that refugee consciousness would exist with or without UNRWA; that nationalist agitation is bred by political and material circumstances, not by a humanitarian organization; that UNRWA employment doesn't create revolutionary consciousness or activity, but that educated and professional people do tend to be more politically active and aware than others; and that UNRWA's efforts to educate the refugees and improve their quality of life is pacific or neutral in its political effects. UNRWA's chief nonpolitical appeal since the end of the "works" projects in the 1950s has been that its educational programs give refugees the skills necessary to productive participation in whatever society they live, regardless of the political situation.

Since its activist reaction to the *intifada*, UNRWA's image among refugees and Arab states has improved enormously. Western donor states have rediscovered its utility as a channel for aiding the Palestinians and monitoring the Israelis.

Transition

The new visibility and activism of the agency came primarily in response to the *intifada*. But changes in the organization were already underway when the occupied territories erupted. The financial crises forced UNRWA to streamline its budgetary and fundraising operations by 1983–84. UNRWA further responded to its financial problems with an effort to improve its relations with—and the generosity of—donor governments. In May 1986, the agency invited donor representatives to informal informational sessions at headquarters in Vienna. Improved donor understanding and appreciation of the agency's role enabled UNRWA successfully to request emergency funding when, in early 1988, the UN Secretary General requested that it respond to the *intifada* with new programs and activities.

The donor meetings were one aspect of the new UNRWA Commissioner General's attitude toward the public stance of the agency. Ambassador Giorgio Giacomelli of Italy, newly appointed to UNRWA in 1985, diverged from the pattern of previous Commissioners General, believing that international publicity could help the agency raise money and could influence change in the treatment of the refugees, especially in the occupied territories. As a result, UNRWA officials began to be quoted in press reports about the conditions of refugee life much more than ever before.

Effects of *Intifada*

In 1988, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar redefined UNRWA's task as one of general assistance protection of the refugees, rather than merely humanitarian assistance. He told the Security Council that general assistance means that an outside agency can intervene with the authorities of an occupying power to help individuals or groups of individuals to resist violations of their rights (e.g. land confiscations) and to cope with the day-to-day difficulties of life under occupation, such as security

Because of prolonged curfews during the *intifada*, UNRWA has prepared food parcels for distribution to all children at its schools in the Gaza Strip and extra rations and milk powder at UNRWA health centers. UNRWA/Zaven Mazakian

restrictions, curfews, harassment, bureaucratic difficulties and so on. He said that *protection* includes *protection by publicity* through use of the international news media. Perez de Cuellar said that UNRWA's international civil servants could be helpful because, in contrast to Palestinian employees,

> It is usually easier for them to gain access to Israeli authorities in emergency situations; and their mere presence at points of confrontation has a significant impact on how the civilian population (including UNRWA Palestinian staff) is treated by the security forces and helps it psychologically by making it feel less exposed.[6]

Consonant with the Secretary General's observations, in late February 1988, UNRWA presented donors with its plans to respond to the *intifada*, which included creation of new positions for UNRWA international officials in the territories. UNRWA's proposal included emergency health services (necessitated by the tremendous rise in casualties in connection with violent confrontations between the Israeli security forces and the refugees), emergency food distributions (necessitated by curfews), physical therapy care (for *intifada* casualties), cash grants for emergency housing (necessitated by shelter demolitions), and extra staff to provide these services.[7]

Nineteen "Refugee Affairs Officers" (RAOs) positions were created to "circulate throughout the refugee camps for the purpose of reporting to the Field Office on any urgent requirements or unusual or abnormal circumstances" and to report generally on problems affecting the welfare of the refugees.[8] New "Legal Assistance Officers" (one in Gaza and one on the West Bank) were added to give legal advice, to monitor trials of UNRWA personnel and refugees generally, and to improve liaison with the authorities.[9]

Donor states reacted very positively. In 1988–89, UNRWA was able to raise an additional $22.5 million for its program of Extraordinary Measures for the Occupied Territories (EMOT) necessitated by the *intifada*. It also initiated a three-year Expanded Program of Assistance (EPA) for aid to the territories projected to cost approximately $65 million. By mid-1989 UNRWA had received over $29 million in pledges to the EPA.[10]

In response to the *intifada*, UNRWA has also relaxed its restrictions on the

distribution of relief supplies. During crises, when identification of registered refugees is difficult anyway, and when many other Palestinians are in as much need as are the registered refugees, the Commissioner-General has instructed field officials to distribute aid without regard to refugee status. Prior to the uprising, only in Lebanon were UNRWA services flowing beyond the registered refugee population.

The success of efforts to fund the EPA enables it to plan infrastructure repairs and improvements, but military controls, strikes, and disruptions thwart implementation. The EPA has further significance, however. It represents the first time that Arab governments have assented to UNRWA's allocating its resources unequally among its five fields of operation, and may signify a tacit acceptance of the idea that UNRWA is aiding what will eventually become a Palestinian state in less than all of Palestine.

Since the onset of the uprising, UNRWA officials' willingness publicly to criticize the occupation authorities' actions demonstrated how negatively they view the Israeli response to the uprising, but was also consonant with the UN Secretary General's idea of general assistance. They told foreign press representatives about security operations inaccessible to the media, and they released information gathered from their health clinics showing the numbers and severity of physical attacks upon refugees. UNRWA health officials brought to the attention of the media, the UN, and international health authorities Israeli troops' use of riot-control gasses in confined areas where they constituted a lethal hazard, and have publicized the lethal effects of plastic coated bullets.

Israeli officials are quite aware of UNRWA's statements to the international press, innovations in the delivery of services, and increases in international staffing. UNRWA officials and Israeli representatives use curiously similar adjectives to describe their relationship. Both say that relations are normal at the high levels, but that at the ground level, problems sometimes arise. Israeli officials speak of errant UNRWA international employees who misrepresent the nature and consequences of Israeli security measures in the territories. UNRWA representatives say that Israeli Defense Forces personnel on the ground sometimes obstruct discharge of UNRWA's duties.

Israeli representatives stress that UNRWA's proper role is a humanitarian one. From their standpoint, the mandate calls for UNRWA to carry out its medical, educational, and relief program as before, and they say that Israel seeks fully to cooperate with those programs. They take exception, however, to UNRWA statements about the condition of refugees as result of Israeli security measures during the *intifada*, particularly the claim that they have used riot control gas inappropriately. They object further that while criticizing the way Israel has carried out its security measures, UNRWA personnel have not urged the Palestinians to desist from the behavior that necessitated those measures.

Challenges to UNRWA

UNRWA's role and reputation hinge not only on the efficient delivery of service to the refugees, but also on perceptions of progress in resolving the political circumstances that make it necessary. UNRWA officials, galvanized by the *intifada* and absorbed in responding effectively to it, see the current situation as transitional. Either UNRWA will soon be engaged in assisting in the creation of some sort of independent Palestinian political unit, or it will again be mired in the depression caused by the apparent hopelessness of the refugees' future.

Similarly, the agency will be threatened if donor states lose interest in it as a vehicle for improving refugee welfare, maintaining communications with the Palestinian population, and showing resolve to support the refugees against Israeli political rigidity. At the close of 1989, the UNWRA Commissioner-General said that he was "seriously worried" about funding prospects for the coming year, saying that the United States was considering a major cut, and that other donors had yet to make pledges. Refugee anger will increase as projects languish, as the novelty of the RAOs wears off, and general frustration rises further due to lack of positive movement toward a resolution of their grievances.

Conceived as a stop-gap measure, UNRWA has become permanently entwined in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It represents a tremendous asset for the delivery of services to the growing refugee population, and is currently an important buffer between Israelis and the refugees in the occupied territories. It provides vital services in all the fields, and its emergency aid has been a lifeline for refugees trapped in the Lebanese civil war. None of the host countries seeks to remove the agency—its contributions are too important. But ultimately, its fortunes in all fields of operation are tightly and increasingly connected to the course of political events in the occupied territories.

A West Bank refugee woman walks along the fence blocking access of Dheisheh camp residents to the main road. UNHCR/M. Nasr

Footnotes

1. UNGA, Official Records: Forty-Fourth Session. Supplement No. 13. (A/44/13). "Report of the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East." 1 July 1988—30 June 1989. Statistical annexes.
2. Don Peretz, *Israel and the Palestine Arabs*. (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1958. p. 95).
3. UNGA Resolution 194(III) "The Palestine Question." 11 December 1948.
4. UNGA Resolution 302(IV) "Assistance to Palestine Refugees." 8 December 1949.
5. UNGA document A/2717 Add. 1 Part III Para. 19 (1954) as cited in UNRWA, *UNRWA, Past, Present, and Future: A Briefing Document*. (Vienna: UNRWA, 1986).
6. UN Security Council, "Report Submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General in Accordance with Resolution 605(1987). S/19433." 21 January 1988. pp. 10–13. Also reprinted in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 67, Vol. XVII, No. 3. pp. 66–79.
7. A/44/13 Parts VI.C. and D.
8. UNRWA internal document INT/4/5, 29 May 1989: Background Note, "Refugee Affairs Officers."
9. UNRWA, International Job Description: Legal Officer. (undated.)
10. A/44/13 Parts VI.C. and D.

1989 World Refugee Statistics

Published documents and other sources often vary in the numbers of refugees reported in a particular situation. Such variation can be disconcerting and may bring into question the sources' credibility. One obvious reason for discrepancies is the fluidity of refugee situations—a country quiet in February may be overwhelmed by June, and equally correct reports might be available for both periods. Counts obtained in relatively stable or contained situations may be more reliable than those from large or rapidly changing ones; statistics about populations in camps from which refugees are processed for resettlement, as in Southeast Asia, for example, appear regularly and are quite reliable. But even here, updated or revised censuses or estimates can lead to some discrepancies. Media reports—although providing prompt, continuing information—may be inconsistent about whom they term a refugee or may not cite sources.

More subtle differences in refugee counts arise because those collecting data—while most often drawing on figures provided by the governments of asylum countries—do so according to definitions and criteria that may differ significantly. For example, numbers provided by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees include all refugees (of whom UNHCR assists some) reported by asylum-country governments, while reports such as those of the U.S. State Department classify refugees as "requiring protection and assistance" or "refugees resettled and persons granted asylum."

Politics and nations' administrative procedures affect counts of refugees. Some sources, for example, report certain aliens in a country as meriting international recognition as refugees, while others term them as economic migrants. It may be in the political interest of a government to understate its refugee population or, in other instances, to report inflated numbers. Because countries may admit individuals under classifications other than refugee, some who may fit this description by virtue of their circumstances may not be counted as such; in countries of resettlement, these might include family reunification and special humanitarian admissions. Asylum seekers who have not been granted permanent asylum but who nevertheless are permitted to stay in a country may also not be reflected in refugee counts.

Some clarity in reporting is feasible: for example, agencies can report with some confidence the numbers for whom aid is provided or planned. Ideally, assistance and protection would be provided to all those who require it, and thus, counts of actual recipients of aid or "registered" refugees would represent all who are in need. In reality, of course, this is not always the case. Also, international assistance is sometimes provided to individuals who do not meet the international refugee definition per se, but who are deemed to be "in refugee-like situations"; these may appear in refugee counts. In Africa, for example, UNHCR operates in accordance with the mandate of the Organization of African Unity, whose refugee definition is broader than that of the UN's own Convention and Protocol, so its count of refugees of concern there is of broader scope than for other regions.

In some instances, accuracy may be detrimental, even dangerous. Figures following rigid definitions may jeopardize agencies' ability to provide adequate services to those quite obviously in need. Also, individuals may rightfully fear to draw attention to themselves, even in countries of asylum, for fear of retribution.

In view of the many deficiencies in the available data, questions may arise about the usefulness of collecting and reporting refugee statistics at all. But when used carefully and with a good understanding of their flaws, statistics provide one means to grasp the magnitude of "the refugee problem." Credible, clear, comparable data disallow flagrant exaggeration as well as understatement. For assistance to be provided and programs to be planned, reasonably reliable numbers are vital; data also allow one measure of success of efforts on behalf of refugees. Numbers are useful, too, to establish clearly that the burden of caring for refugees is shared, and that nowadays it is often the least well-off nations that support refugee populations.

In collecting data for the statistics and country reports, we rely on a variety of sources whom we judge to be responsible. Instances where key sources differ significantly (for reasons we could identify as other than time period of reports) are indicated in the statistical tables with an asterisk (*). We have used the most current figures available. All numbers have been rounded, and we stress that none should be interpreted as absolute. For further detail or clarification of numbers in the tables, see the country reports.

TABLE 1
REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE

Refugees and asylum seekers who require international protection and/or assistance are unable or unwilling to repatriate due to fear of persecution and violence in their homelands or to be permanently settled in other countries. In some cases, they may no longer require assistance, but still need international protection. Starting in 1989, USCR includes asylum seekers in Table 1, recognizing the increasing numbers of countries worldwide that have instituted asylum adjudication procedures and the need for protection and assistance while their claims are pending. In this table, totals for asylum seekers (primarily in Europe and North America) are for those persons who applied for asylum during the past year. Hundreds of thousands of other cases are pending from previous years.

Asylum Country	Subtotal by Source Country	Total
AFRICA		
Algeria		**170,000***
W. Sahara	165,000*	
Others	5,000	
Angola		**26,500**
S. Africa	10,000	
Zaire	9,500	
Namibia	7,000	
Benin		**900**
Chad	900	
Botswana		**800**
S. Africa	300	
Angola	200	
Others	300	
Burkina Faso		**300**
Chad	300	
Burundi		**90,200***
Rwanda	80,000*	
Zaire	9,600	
Uganda	400	
Others	200	
Cameroon		**4,200**
Chad	4,000	
Others	200	
Central African Republic		**2,800**
Chad	2,600	
Sudan	100	
Others	100	
Congo		**2,100**
Chad	1,500	
Zaire	300	
Others	300	

Djibouti		**46,500**
Somalia	30,000	
Ethiopia	16,500	
Egypt		**7,500**
Palestinians	5,800	
Ethiopia	700	
Somalia	600	
Angola	200	
Others	200	
Ethiopia		**740,000**
Sudan	385,000	
Somalia	355,000	
Gabon		**100**
Ghana		**100**
Guinea		**13,000**
Liberia	13,000	
Ivory Coast		**55,800**
Liberia	55,000	
Southeast Asia	300	
Others	500	
Kenya		**15,500***
Uganda	6,400	
Somalia	3,000*	
Ethiopia	2,800	
Rwanda	2,000	
Others	1,300	
Lesotho		**4,000***
S. Africa	4,000*	
Liberia		**200**
Malawi		**812,000**
Mozambique	812,000	
Mauritania		**22,000**
Senegal	22,000	
Morocco		**800**
Mozambique		**400**
S. Africa	200	
Chile	100	
Others	100	
Namibia		**25,000***
Angola	25,000*	
Nigeria		**5,100**
Chad	4,000	
Others	1,100	
Rwanda		**20,500***
Burundi	20,500*	
Senegal		**48,000**
Mauritania	43,000	
Guinea Bissau	4,800	
Others	200	
Sierra Leone		**100**
Somalia		**350,000***
Ethiopia	350,000*	
S. Africa		**201,000***
Mozambique	200,000*	
Lesotho	1,000	
Sudan		**694,300***
Ethiopia	663,200*	
Chad	24,100	
Zaire	5,000	
Uganda	2,000	
Swaziland		**71,700***
Mozambique	65,000*	
S. Africa	6,700*	
Tanzania		**266,200**
Burundi	156,000	
Mozambique	72,000	
Rwanda	21,000	
Zaire	16,000	
Others	1,200	
Togo		**500**
Ghana	400	
Others	100	
Tunisia		**200**
Uganda		**170,500***
Rwanda	118,000*	
Sudan	50,000	
Zaire	1,000	
Others	1,500	
Zaire		**338,800**
Angola	311,500	
Rwanda	12,000	
Burundi	10,000	
Uganda	4,000	
Others	1,300	
Zambia		**131,700**
Angola	97,000	
Mozambique	20,000	
Zaire	9,000	
S. Africa	3,200	
Others	2,500	
Zimbabwe		**185,500***
Mozambique	185,000*	
S. Africa	500	
TOTAL AFRICA		**4,524,800**

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Hong Kong		**55,400**
Vietnam	55,400	
Indonesia		**8,000**
Vietnam	8,000	
Japan		**2,000**
Vietnam	2,000	
Korea		**200**
Vietnam	200	
Macau		**400**
Vietnam	400	
Malaysia		**19,900**
Vietnam	19,900	
Papua New Guinea		**8,100**
Irian Jaya	8,100	
Philippines		**26,300**
(First Asylum)		
Vietnam	9,600	
(Refugee Processing Center)		
Vietnam	6,038	
Laos	303	
Cambodia	236	
(Orderly Departure Program)		
Vietnam	10,123	
Singapore		**300**
Vietnam	300	
Taiwan		**200**
Vietnam	200	
Thailand		**436,600**
(First Asylum)		
Laos	64,846	
Burma	38,000	
Cambodia	16,704	
Vietnam	12,500	
(In Training)		
Laos	3,895	
Cambodia	526	
(Border Camps)		
Cambodia	300,000	
Vietnam	152	
Vietnam		**16,700**
Cambodia	16,700	
TOTAL EAST ASIA/PACIFIC		**574,100**

EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

Austria		**22,800**
Belgium		**8,000**
Canada		**21,700+**
Cyprus		**1,000**
Denmark		**4,600**
France		**60,000**
Germany		**121,000++**
Hungary		**27,000**
Netherlands		**14,000**
Norway		**4,400**
Sweden		**32,000**
Switzerland		**24,400+**
Turkey+++		**233,000***
Iran	200,000*	
Iraq	33,000	
United Kingdom		**10,000**
United States		**101,700**
Nicaragua	35,400	
El Salvador	29,700	
Guatemala	15,500	
Others	21,100	
Yugoslavia		**8,000**
Other European (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain)		**7,000**
TOTAL EUROPE/ NORTH AMERICA		**700,600+**

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Argentina		**2,100***
Chile	1,400*	
Southeast Asia	400	
Europe	200	
Others	100	
Belize		**5,100***
El Salvador	4,000	
Guatemala	1,100*	
Bolivia		**200**
Brazil		**200**
Europe	100	
Chile	100	
Chile		**100**
Europe	100	
Colombia		**700**
Chile	600	
Others	100	
Costa Rica		**33,400***
Nicaragua	26,500*	
El Salvador	4,000*	
Cuba	2,500	
Others	400	
Cuba		**3,000**
Dominican Republic		**1,600***
Ecuador		**700**
Chile	400	
Others	300	
El Salvador		**500**
Nicaragua	500	
French Guiana		**10,000**
Suriname	10,000	
Guatemala		**4,400***
Nicaragua	3,300*	
El Salvador	1,100*	
Honduras		**34,900***
Nicaragua	23,600*	
El Salvador	10,900*	
Guatemala	400*	
Mexico		**46,300***
El Salvador	3,700*	
Guatemala	41,300*	
Others	1,300	
Nicaragua		**7,400**
El Salvador	7,000	
Guatemala	400	
Panama		**1,200**
El Salvador	700	
Nicaragua	400	
Others	100	
Peru		**700**
Cuba	400	
Europe	200	
Chile	100	
Uruguay		**100**
Venezuela		**200**
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA/ CARIBBEAN		**152,800**

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Gaza Strip		**469,400**
Palestinians	469,400	
India		**260,800***
Sri Lanka	103,000	
China (Tibet)	100,000	
Bangladesh	50,000*	
Afghanistan	5,500	
Burma	800	
Others	1,500	
Iran		**2,825,000***
Afghanistan	2,350,000	
Iraq	475,000*	
Iraq		**60,000***
Iran	60,000*	
Jordan		**899,800**
Palestinians	899,800	
Lebanon		**298,700**
Palestinians	294,300	
Others	4,400	
Nepal		**12,000**
China (Tibet)	12,000	
Pakistan		**3,588,000***
Afghanistan	3,579,000	
Iran	9,000*	
Syria		**272,800**
Palestinians	272,800	
West Bank		**398,400**
Palestinians	398,400	
Yemen Arab Republic		**56,700***
PDR of Yemen	55,000*	
Ethiopia	1,700	
TOTAL MIDDLE EAST/ SOUTH ASIA		**9,141,600**

GRAND TOTAL 15,093,900

* Indicates that sources vary significantly in number reported.

\+ Another 450,000 asylum applicants from previous years are estimated to be backlogged in Europe and North America, awaiting decisions on their asylum claims. This includes more than 100,000 in Canada and 40,000 in Switzerland.

\++ Does not include 720,000 ethnic Germans who entered as immigrants in 1989.

\+++ Does not include 250,000 ethnic Turks from Bulgaria, admitted as immigrants.

TABLE 2
SELECTED POPULATIONS IN REFUGEE-LIKE CIRCUMSTANCES

Great numbers of people who may fear persecution if returned to their home countries—and thus may, in fact, be refugees—are undocumented, unregistered, or for some other reason fall outside the legal protection mechanisms of host countries and international agencies. Information on these groups is fragmentary, and estimates of their numbers often vary widely, especially those numbers marked by an asterisk. (*)

Population	Number	Location
Central Americans	**1,114,000–2,860,000***	
Many have not applied for asylum due to inadequate refugee determination procedures or low asylum approval rates in these countries.	25,000	Belize
	80,000–250,000	Costa Rica
	30,000–220,000	Guatemala
	70,000–200,000	Honduras
	385,000*	Mexico
	800,000–1,900,000	U.S.A.
Haitians	**855,000–1,570,000***	
Governments view them as economic migrants and rarely accord them refugee status. (partial listing of countries)	30,000	Bahamas
	30,000*	Canada
	30,000	Caribbean
	300,000–1,000,000	Dominican Republic
	15,000–30,000	France
	450,000*	U.S.A.
Palestinians	**1,182,000–1,596,000***	
Outside UNRWA's area of operations or not registered by UNRWA in areas of operation. Does not include 1.35–1.6 million Palestinians within Israel and the occupied territories who were not displaced. Table 1 lists 2,334,637 UNRWA-registered Palestinians. (partial listing of countries)	36,000–60,000	Egypt
	20,000	Iraq
	200,000–400,000	Jordan
	300,000–350,000	Kuwait
	200,000–300,000	Lebanon
	24,000	Libya
	110,000–150,000	Saudi Arabia
	10,000	Tunisia
	281,000*	N. America/ W. Europe
	107,000*	Other Arab/Gulf States

TABLE 3
INTERNALLY DISPLACED

Table 3 identifies selected countries in which substantial numbers of people have been displaced within their homelands as a result of human conflict. Although they share many characteristics with refugees who cross international borders, they are generally not eligible for international refugee assistance. Because information on internal displacement is fragmentary, this table presents only reported estimates or ranges, and no total is provided.

Angola	638,000–1,178,000
Chad	150,000–300,000
Ethiopia	700,000–1,500,000#
Somalia	70,000–400,000
South Africa	3,570,000#
Sudan	2,000,000–3,200,000
Uganda	300,000
El Salvador	147,000–397,000
Guatemala	100,000–500,000#
Honduras	22,000
Nicaragua	390,000
Peru	80,000
Afghanistan	2,000,000
Burma	100,000–200,000#
Cyprus	265,000
India	65,000*
Iran	500,000*
Iraq	500,000–1,000,000#
Lebanon	500,000–1,000,000
Philippines	450,000
Sri Lanka	500,000*
USSR	500,000

Includes persons forcibly relocated in government resettlement programs as a result of their race, religion, ethnicity, social group, or imputed political opinion. Sometimes governments seek to explain these relocations as security or development measures.

*Indicates that sources vary significantly in number reported.

TABLE 4
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES

Table 4 identifies countries that have generated the greatest numbers of refugees listed in table 1. Counts may understate the total number of refugees from a given country as asylum nations do not always specify countries of refugees' origin. This table does *not* include populations considered to be in refugee-like circumstances listed in Table 2, *many of whom are also refugees.*

Afghanistan	5,934,500
Palestinians	2,340,500
Mozambique	1,354,000*
Ethiopia	1,035,900
Iraq	508,000*
Angola	438,000*
Sudan	435,100
Somalia	388,600*
Cambodia	334,166
Iran	270,100*
Rwanda	233,000*
Burundi	186,500*
W. Sahara	165,000*
Vietnam	124,779
China (Tibet)	112,000
Sri Lanka	103,000
Nicaragua	89,700*
Laos	69,044
Liberia	68,000
El Salvador	61,100*
Guatemala	58,700*
PDR of Yemen	55,000*
Zaire	50,400
Bangladesh	50,000*

*Indicates that sources vary significantly in number reported.

TABLE 5

SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY REPATRIATIONS—1989

Voluntary repatriation numbers reflect estimates of refugees who spontaneously returned to their homelands, as well as those people who participated in formal programs administered by UNHCR. This is not a comprehensive list, and no total is given.

To	From	Numbers
Namibia	Angola, Zambia, Cuba, and others	41,100
Chad	Cameroon, CAR, West Africa	3,700
Mozambique	Malawi, Zimbabwe	11,600
El Salvador	Honduras, Nicaragua	3,100
Nicaragua	Honduras, Costa Rica	3,600
Laos	Thailand	1,700
Vietnam	Hong Kong	950

TABLE 6

SIGNIFICANT INVOLUNTARY RETURNS—1989

The involuntary repatriation of *refugees* is prohibited under the UN Convention and Protocol. However, many *potential asylum seekers* are pushed back before entering the refugee-determination process. Other *asylum seekers* are involuntarily returned under questionable refugee-status determination procedures. Some numbers are approximate or may not reflect all involuntary returns.

Returned from:	Number Returned:	Returned to:
Djibouti	125	Somalia
Hong Kong (UK)	51	Vietnam
Kenya	500	Somalia
Kenya	237	Uganda
Malaysia	4,100	High seas
Mexico	46,000	Guatemala
South Africa	33,600	Mozambique
United States	4,731	El Salvador
United States	4,035	Guatemala
United States	5,472	Haiti
Zimbabwe	3,000	Mozambique

TABLE 7

REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE IN RELATION TO INDIGENOUS POPULATION AND PER-CAPITA GNP OF THE ASYLUM COUNTRY

Top 15 Countries
(in order of refugees-to-population ratio)

The sheer size of refugee populations should not be considered the only indication of the gravity of a situation. Both the relative size of indigenous populations and the economic strength of asylum countries, for example, are important considerations. Table 7 presents refugee populations in relation to the size of each receiving country's indigenous population and its per-capita gross national product.

Asylum Country	Ratio of Refugee/ Nonrefugee Population	Population (In Millions)	Number of Refugees	GNP Per Capita
Jordan	1/3	4.0	899,800	$1,540
Djibouti	1/9	.4	46,500	N/A
Malawi	1/11	8.7	812,000	160
Lebanon	1/11	3.3	298,700	N/A
Swaziland	1/11	.8	71,700*	700
Iran	1/19	53.9	2,825,000*	N/A
Somalia	1/23	8.2	350,000*	290
Pakistan	1/31	110.4	3,579,000*	350
Sudan	1/35	24.5	694,300*	330
Belize	1/39	.2	5,100*	1,250
Syria	1/44	12.1	272,800	1,820
Zimbabwe	1/54	10.1	185,500*	590
Burundi	1/61	5.5	90,200*	240
Zambia	1/62	8.1	131,700	240
Ethiopia	1/67	49.8	740,000	120
Gaza Strip	1/.5	.7	469,400	N/A
West Bank	1/1.2	.9	398,400	N/A

*Indicates that sources vary significantly in number reported.

TABLE 8

1989 CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE AID AGENCIES

Top 20 Countries
(Ranked by contribution per capita)

Country	Contribution Per Capita	Population (in millions)	Contribution+ (millions)	GNP Per Capita
Norway	$6.35	4.2	$ 26.7	$17,110
Denmark	6.09	5.1	31.0	15,010
Sweden	5.46	8.5	46.4	15,690
Finland	4.10	5.0	20.5	14,370
Switzerland	2.62	6.6	17.3	21,250
Luxembourg	1.39	.4	.6	15,860
Canada	1.35	26.3	35.6	15,080
Netherlands	1.34	14.9	20.0	11,860
United States	1.02	248.8	255.4	18,430
Germany (FRG)	.82	61.5	50.6	14,460
United Kingdom	.68	57.3	39.3	10,430
Australia	.60	16.8	10.2	10,900
Japan	.58	123.2	72.2	15,770
Qatar	.50	.4	.2	12,360
Kuwait	.47	2.1	1.0	14,870
Italy	.46	57.6	26.9	10,420
Israel	.25	4.5	1.2	6,810
France	.24	56.1	13.9	12,860
Libya	.24	4.1	1.0	5,500
Belgium	.24	9.9	2.4	11,360

+see note, page 34, Table 10.

TABLE 9

REFUGEES RESETTLED AND PERSONS GRANTED ASYLUM IN RELATION TO INDIGENOUS POPULATION

Top 14 Countries
(in order of refugees-to-population ratio)

Refugees accepted for permanent settlement are no longer regarded as in need of protection or assistance. Hence, individuals below were not included in Table 1.

Resettlement Country	1975–1988 Cumulative	1988 Only	Population in millions	Ratio Refugees/ Population
Sweden	84,354	17,601	8.5	1/100
Australia	161,160	10,301	16.8	1/104
Canada	252,225	28,588	26.3	1/104
Denmark	28,733	2,196	5.1	1/177
United States	1,249,608	83,420	248.8	1/199
Switzerland	20,666	680	6.6	1/319
France	178,246	8,794	56.1	1/314
New Zealand	10,186	931	3.4	1/334
Norway	10,491*	1,350	4.2	1/400*
Austria	18,501	1,785	7.6	1/410
Germany (FRG)	78,969	7,621+	61.5	1/778
Netherlands	17,416	2,301	14.9	1/855
Spain	34,509	3,938	39.2	1/1,135
United Kingdom	12,210*	1,000	57.3	1/4,692*

NOTE ON TABLE 9: The primary source for numbers of refugees resettled or granted asylum was the U.S. State Department. Countries that have established resettlement programs generally provide particularly precise data, but data were not available for all countries for all years. An asterisk (*) denotes that statistics were unavailable for 1975–1981.

+Does not include 242,505 ethnic Germans from GDR and Eastern Europe.

TABLE 10

1989 CONTRIBUTIONS TO SELECTED INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE AID AGENCIES

Top 20 Countries
(In millions of $)



NOTE ON TABLE 8 and GRAPH: Table 8 and this graph report the amounts of financial assistance provided to international agencies by countries. The relative significance of contributions should be considered not only in terms of absolute size, but also in relation to population and gross national product. Included are estimated 1989 contributions to UNHCR, ICM, and UNRWA.

Each country's contributions to the European Community are not reflected. Bilateral aid, some forms of aid that are not exclusively or even primarily designated for refugees, and aid through such agencies as the World Bank, which may benefit refugees, are also not reflected.

AFRICA

Algeria

Prospects for a resolution of the Western Sahara conflict between the Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro) and Morocco raised hopes for the repatriation of the large Sahrawi refugee population residing in Algeria. In January, Polisario representatives met with King Hassan of Morocco for the first time since the conflict began. An agreement was reached to allow a UN-sponsored referendum of the Sahrawis to determine the future of the region. All refugees in the Tindouf area of Algeria who are determined to be eligible to vote were expected to return to the Western Sahara to cast their votes.

When Spain relinquished its colonial rule over the region in 1975, conflicting claims to the land escalated to the conflict that continues today—and that has caused tens of thousands to remain in exile for more than a decade. The exact number of refugees has been difficult to document. The U.S. government estimates 100,000, with only half receiving assistance. The UNHCR cites a figure provided by the Algerian government of 165,000.

The Sahrawis, mostly women and children, live in four camps located in the Tindouf region of southwestern Algeria. Conditions in the camps are difficult. A limited water supply requires that water be trucked to some of the camps. Most of the assistance to the refugees is provided by the Algerian government with a limited amount coming from the international community.

Recent economic hardships could weaken Algeria's ability to offer refuge to the diverse refugee population it has hosted for years. Algeria also hosts some 20,000 victims of the Sahelian drought and 5,000 urban refugees, primarily Palestinians and sub-Saharan Africans.

Angola

Conflict between the Angolan government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has uprooted millions of Angolans. In June, both Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi attended a summit of 18 African heads of state in Gdabolite, Zaire. Following that meeting, a cease-fire was declared and peace talks scheduled. After that, however, the peace process was largely derailed by bickering about who actually agreed to what at Gdabolite, and formal talks had not begun by the end of the year.

More than 438,000 Angolan refugees have fled to neighboring countries. According to government estimates, an additional 638,000 people in the country's rural areas have been displaced from their homes since 1985 (those displaced before April 1985 are no longer counted). Most live with or alongside relatives in safer areas of the country, and are assisted by the government or one of the few international relief agencies operating in Angola. Another 400,000 people in the countryside, the *rural affected* as they are known, have not been displaced from their homes, but are unable to grow their crops and are therefore partly or wholly dependent on food aid.

The number of refugees and displaced people in Africa continued to rise, yet international funding to protect and assist them was at a critical low. USCR/H. Ruiz

An estimated 440,000 other displaced Angolans have migrated to urban centers. Many of them are living in "vertical shantytowns," apartment buildings—often without electricity or running water—in which each unit has been subdivided into individual shanties that serve as homes for one or more families. These groups together total nearly two million Angolans (22 percent of the country's total population) whose lives have been seriously disrupted by the conflict.

In late 1989, the government launched a major appeal for international assistance to help those displaced or affected by the violence, but hampered its own chances of success because the appeal document was sketchy and short on specifics for implementation. The Angolan appeal met little positive response.

Flooding in two northern provinces in April and May left another 140,000 people homeless and caused heavy crop losses. The flooding also led to an outbreak of cholera, which resulted in more than 500 deaths in Benguela and Luanda provinces. By year's end the food shortage in Angola had become critical. Agricultural production in the southern and central provinces was down by 75 percent, more than 100,000 cattle were reportedly dead, and thousands of children were very seriously malnourished.

A small number of Angolan refugees repatriated from Zaire and Zambia during recent years. Some 2,300 who have been unable to go back to their home areas are housed in a returnee center at Bita, some 30 kilometers outside Luanda. The government is now planning to fly them to their home area of Moxico, where it is allocating land for them and is stockpiling food in anticipation of their arrival. In August, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the governments of Angola and Zaire began a new repatriation program. Approximately 3,000 Zairean refugees and 4,500 Angolan refugees repatriated to their respective countries by December. An estimated 9,500 Zairian refugees and 10,000 South African refugees remain in Angola. More than 33,000 Namibians who had been living in Angola repatriated between June and September.

Djibouti

Djibouti's record in the treatment of refugees has been uneven. The government of Djibouti has withheld refugee status from thousands of Somalis who have fled the conflict in northern Somalia, has detained refugees and asylum seekers picked up by the police during round-ups of "illegal immigrants," and during the mid-1980s was often accused of forcibly deporting Ethiopian refugees.

Djibouti, a tiny country of only 400,000 people, views refugees within the context of its national security. The government believes that the presence of refugees may draw Djibouti into the conflicts that have dominated its two large and turbulent neighbors, Somalia and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, many refugees from those conflicts have still fled to Djibouti. More than 45,000 Ethiopians went to Djibouti following the 1977–78 war between Somalia and Ethiopia. During the mid-1980s, most of those refugees repatriated, many by themselves, but others under much-criticized official repatriation programs. Observers claimed that Djibouti forced many of the refugees to return to Ethiopia, while UNHCR was criticized for not carrying out its protection mandate.

The last official repatriation program ended in February, when more than 400 Ethiopian refugees returned home. Dikhil camp, which once housed most of the refugees, was closed in March. Some 1,500 registered Ethiopian refugees remain in Djibouti, mostly living in the capital, Djibouti ville. But there are another 15,000 Ethiopians living in Djibouti whom the Djibouti government does not recognize as refugees. However, USCR—which has made two site visits to Djibouti in the past three years—believes that these people are in need of protection and assistance. USCR estimates the total Ethiopian refugee population in Djibouti is 16,500.

Since mid-1988, a new wave of some 30,000–40,000 Somali refugees have entered Djibouti, fleeing the conflict between the Somali government and the Somali National Movement in northern Somalia. Because the Djibouti government has denied them refugee status, they are not under UNHCR protection. Some 125 Somalis were said to have been forcibly repatriated into an isolated area of Somalia in June, and at least 4 reportedly died of thirst.

USCR was present in Djibouti in August to document the Somali refugees' plight. USCR director Roger Winter said that, without any form of international assistance, the Somali refugees "survive in an underground existence as bad as anything I've ever seen." In December, UNHCR and the World Food Program agreed to make some food available to the Somalis in Djibouti, even though they do not have refugee status. It is doubtful, however, if many of the refugees will want to identify themselves in order to receive this assistance since they continue to be regarded as being in Djibouti illegally.

Hostility towards the refugees, which a number of the refugees believe is fomented by the Somali embassy, has led to a number of violent incidents between refugees and local citizens in the capital.

Egypt

Egypt has a generally tolerant attitude toward refugees and people in refugee-like circumstances on her soil, although several incidents of *refoulement* in recent years have marred that reputation. While Egypt grants no formal refugee status to large numbers of Sudanese and more than 70,000 Palestinians, their presence is tolerated as long as they renew their residence permits periodically.

Aside from the masses of Sudanese and Palestinians finding unofficial refuge in Egypt, a relatively few well-known refugees came into prominence in 1989. They included several members of the Ethiopian national soccer team who had been in Egypt playing a match and a Libyan pilot who defected. Also prominent, was a former Sudanese head of state, Jaafar Nimeiry, whom the government had to warn on several occasions during the year to desist from political and media activities that were causing strains with the Sudanese government.

Some 1,620 refugees were registered with UNHCR at the beginning of the

Key to abbreviations throughout the country report section:

USCR:	*U.S. Committee for Refugees*
UNHCR:	*United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*
UNRWA:	*United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinè Refugees in the Near East*
UNBRO:	*United Nations Border Relief Operation*
ICRC:	*International Committee of the Red Cross*

year, 600 of whom were refugees from northern Somalia. Ethiopians, Romanians, Iranians, and Iraqis are also among the refugees hosted by Egypt.

Starting in March, in cooperation with UNHCR, the government began adjudicating asylum claims directly. Those granted asylum are given refugee identification cards and residence permits for travel and work authorization, but are not eligible to adjust their status to become Egyptian citizens.

The first of some 5,800 Palestinian refugees who had been stranded in the Sinai in 1982, when it was returned to Egypt as part of the Camp David agreement, were allowed to cross into the Gaza Strip in 1989. The first two families were allowed to enter the occupied territories at the end of June. Protests by Israeli settlers caused a suspension of further repatriations until December, however. Budget considerations were also cited as a reason for the suspension.

The repatriations are to be spaced out during the next five years. Those remaining in the Sinai continue to be assisted by the UN Relief and Works Agency.

Ethiopia

Despite its own reputation for human rights abuses, Ethiopia continued to receive refugees from neighboring Sudan and Somalia during 1989 and, by the end of the year, was host to one of the world's largest refugee populations.

According to official UNHCR figures, approximately 740,000 refugees—385,000 Sudanese and 355,000 Somalis—were registered in Ethiopia in 1989. Of those, 45,000 of the Sudanese and 6,000 of the Somalis entered during the course of the year. As in other areas of the Horn of Africa, accurate figures for refugees—which health professionals in particular argue are necessary to monitor refugee health—have been difficult to establish.

For the most part, Somali refugees are members of the Issak clan who entered Ethiopia in a sudden and massive influx during May and June 1988, following the outbreak of open warfare in northern Somalia between the Issak-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) and Somali government forces. Many in the initial refugee influx were former urban dwellers—residents of Hargeisa, Somalia's second largest city, which suffered severe damage during the first month of fighting, and of Burao, an important livestock trading center. Subsequent arrivals included those initially displaced from these cities to rural areas as well as traditional pastoralists who fled Somalia as the civil conflict spread beyond the larger towns and as civilians continued to be targets of Somali Army assaults.

An uncertain future: Eritreans again faced the threat of famine. By year's end, drought and war left hundreds of thousands dependent on food aid. USCR/H. Ruiz

A report released by the U.S. Department of State in August 1989 concluded that "at least 5,000 unarmed civilian Issaks were purposefully murdered by the Somali Armed Forces between May 1988 and March 1989, in the absence of resistance and in contexts which presented no immediate danger to these forces." In light of their experiences, most Somali refugees in Ethiopia are unlikely to return to their homes until the conflict in northern Somalia has been resolved.

The areas of Ethiopia into which the Somali refugees fled were devoid of the basic infrastructure and natural resources necessary to sustain them. Lack of water sources and problems related to transport and logistics severely constrain the ability of UNHCR and the government of Ethiopia to respond to the refugees' basic needs. Water has to be trucked to the camps from Jijiga, a city 60 kilometers from the main camps. The Somali refugees are therefore only receiving 3 liters of water per person per day, well below the 10–15 liters per day generally recommended by UNHCR. Because of difficulties in getting food to the camps,

food distribution to the refugees has also been below the usual daily minimum, with some refugees only receiving half the recommended rations. Some refugees have reportedly returned to Somalia to live with nomadic kinsmen because of severely poor conditions in the camps and a lessening of violence in some areas of Somalia as the SNM established increased control.

Beyond the logistical problems involved in getting aid to the refugees, the response of the Ethiopian government and UNHCR to the refugee crisis has been widely criticized as tardy and irresolute. Despite their having arrived in relatively good health, the refugees' nutritional level decreased significantly in the months after their arrival, reaching alarming levels between February and April of 1989. In September 1988, for example, acute malnutrition among the Somali refugee children was 10 percent. In March, however, that figure had risen to 25 percent. By August, seasonal factors and the efforts of voluntary agencies had succeeded in substantially improving the health and nutritional status of the refugees. Nevertheless, the long-term prospects for Somali refugees in eastern Ethiopia—where self-sufficiency is virtually impossible—are not encouraging.

Refugees fleeing civil war and war-induced famine in southern Sudan began arriving in Ethiopia in 1983. Beginning in 1987, however, the influx of refugees from Sudan increased dramatically after the Sudanese government armed and enlisted the support of poorly disciplined and ethnically motivated militia units in the government's campaign against the forces of the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). A disproportionate number of the arrivals in 1987 and 1988 were young boys and adolescent males—mainly from the Dinka, Nuer, and Uduk ethnic groups—who had suffered severe physical and emotional trauma before and during their long trek to Ethiopia. In 1989, however, refugee flows from Sudan represented a more demographically typical refugee population.

In addition to the special problems associated with large numbers of unaccompanied minors, the Sudanese refugees were further disadvantaged by their relative isolation in western Ethiopia. Poor roads, seasonal flooding, and inadequate planning combined to create periodic food shortages in the Sudanese refugee camps. Overcrowding in the camps and contaminated water sources also had a deleterious effect on the refugees' health. In 1989, however, UNHCR and the Ethiopian government began to deal more effectively with these problems. New camps in more fertile areas were being established to relieve overcrowding and to enable the refugees to grow more of their own food. UNHCR and the Ethiopian government also agreed to accept the assistance offered by one relief group in the transport and logistics sector.

In August, U.S. Congressman Mickey Leland (D-Tex), who was a member of the House Select Committee on Hunger and a well-known advocate for refugees, was killed along with other U.S. and Ethiopian government officials in an airplane crash in Ethiopia while en route to visit the camps for Sudanese refugees.

The failure of the main rains in June and July caused widespread drought and crop loss in much of northern Ethiopia. The drought, together with intense fighting between government forces and Tigrayan and Eritrean insurgents, once again raised the specter of famine in that region, mostly in Eritrean People's Liberation Front and Tigray People's Liberation Front-held areas of Eritrea, Tigray, and Wollo. Although the severity of the food shortage was known since late summer, the international community—again embroiled in a debate about whether food aid should be channeled primarily through the Ethiopian government or through the main Eritrean and Tigrayan relief groups—was slow to respond. Consequently, by late December, food warehouses were empty and the first shipments of food aid were not scheduled to arrive until late January 1990. This raised concern that it might not be possible to get food to people in their villages and prevent their migrating in search of food.

Several hundred Ethiopian Jews were permitted to emigrate to Israel during the year.

Guinea

A coup attempt in Liberia in late December caused the flight of an estimated 13,000 Liberians into neighboring Guinea. Reports of continued conflict between Liberian government troops and the rebels raised concern that even more people would seek refuge in Guinea and the Ivory Coast in early 1990. According to reports from an international medical aid group present in Guinea, the Liberian refugees are in good physical condition and have been accommodated by the local population.

More than 12,000 Guineans who had been living in Liberia also returned to Guinea because of the conflict.

[As of March 1, 1990, the number of Liberian refugees in Guinea had increased to an estimated 66,000–80,000.]

Ivory Coast

At the end of 1989, Ivory Coast officials reported an influx of refugees from Liberia. The country already hosted a small, established population of some 500 refugees from several African countries.

As many as 55,000 Liberian refugees reportedly entered the Ivory Coast during the last week of December and first weeks of 1990, in the wake of a failed coup in Liberia. The refugees, mostly from the northeastern Liberian province of Nimba, reported that soldiers set fire to their villages. The Liberian government accused rebel forces of destroying two towns and blamed them for more than 200 deaths.

In March, 100 Liberian refugees (also from the Nimba region) who had lived in the Ivory Coast since 1985, had responded to an appeal by Liberian President Samuel Doe for exiles to return home.

Kenya

Increasing civil conflict and human rights abuses in Somalia led thousands of Somalis to flee to Kenya during 1989. Rather than finding refuge, however, they met a harsh response from the Kenyan authorities. Their treatment reflects a general deterioration in human rights practices in Kenya and in what was, until recently, a more hospitable Kenyan policy towards refugees.

Somalis began entering Kenya in March and continued to arrive throughout most of the year. More than 2,500 arrived in September alone. The refugees reportedly suffered beatings, arrests, and other forms of harassment by Kenyan security forces. Throughout the year, groups of refugees were reportedly forced back across the border into Somalia. Some of those who were returned were reportedly killed by Somali soldiers, while others were said to have been imprisoned.

The Kenyan authorities have denied assistance to the Somali refugees, some of whom may have died of starvation.

Others who had been wounded in Somalia have gone without medical attention. The refugees staged a hunger strike to protest the Kenyan government's refusal of assistance and continued forced repatriations. They also demanded to be allowed to speak with UNHCR, which along with other international relief groups was denied access to the refugees by the Kenyan authorities. Because the international community was denied access to the Somali refugees throughout the year, it has been difficult to establish their numbers.

In October, USCR wrote to the Kenyan ambassador in Washington expressing concern about reports that "Kenyan authorities have forcibly returned refugees to Somalia, are now in the process of rounding up many others for forcible return, and have prevented the office of the UNHCR from having access to the Somali refugees." USCR stated its concern over these apparent violations of the 1951 UN and 1969 OAU Conventions on refugees, to which Kenya is a party.

In late December, the Kenyan government finally agreed to allow UNHCR access to the refugees, though by year's end a visit had not taken place.

Kenyans of Somali descent have also suffered arrest and detention by the Kenyan authorities. In November, the government began a "screening" program under which all ethnic Somalis had to register and prove their Kenyan citizenship. The purpose of the screening was reportedly to identify Somalis who were in Kenya without documentation. Those acknowledged as citizens were issued pink identity cards that distinguish them from other Kenyans. There were reports, however, that even ethnic Somalis who could prove their citizenship were refused identity cards. Some were arrested (about 185 in Nairobi alone). More than 500 ethnic Somalis were reportedly forcibly deported to Somalia in December, including at least a few individuals who claimed that they could prove their Kenyan citizenship. Hundreds of ethnic Somali Kenyans (as well as Somalis who had sought refuge in Kenya) have fled to Tanzania and Uganda in order to avoid being deported to Somalia.

In April, Kenyan authorities forcibly repatriated some 237 of the 600 Ugandan refugees living at Thika refugee camp. The repatriations followed rioting at the camp that was apparently instigated by Alice Lakwena, leader of the Holy Spirit Movement in Uganda and now living as a refugee in Kenya.

There are also refugees from Ethiopia (2,800), Rwanda (2,000), and other countries (1,300) living in Kenya. In early 1989, the denial rate for new asylum applicants was 90 percent, though denials later dropped to 50 percent. UNHCR, in an effort to provide at least a limited measure of security, has declared some 1,400 people to be *mandate refugees*, of concern to UNHCR.

Lesotho

An estimated 4,000 refugees, mainly from South Africa, are spontaneously settled in Lesotho. However, only some 250–300 are officially recognized and assisted by UNHCR.

Since 1986, when a military government took power in Lesotho, newly arrived South African refugees have only been allowed to use Lesotho as a point of transit to other, safer countries of asylum. Lesotho offers them temporary asylum while preparations are made for their transfer or resettlement.

The repatriation of Basotho exiles—who had mostly fled Lesotho to South Africa and Botswana during the 1970s—continued during the year. Between January and March, more than 600 Basothos returned from Botswana. The repatriation began in 1986, when the new government offered an amnesty to the exiles.

Malawi

An average of 15,000 Mozambican refugees continued to enter Malawi every month during 1989, with more than twice that number arriving during the latter months of the year. By late December, the Mozambican refugee population in Malawi stood at a staggering 812,000.

Malawi is one of Africa's smallest, poorest, most overcrowded countries. It is roughly the size of Louisiana and, with 7.7 million inhabitants, twice as populous. The World Bank lists Malawi as the fourth poorest country in the world; UNICEF estimates that 50 percent of the country's children are undernourished; the infant mortality rate is the fourth highest in the world. Given these grim statistics, Malawi's response to a massive influx of Mozambican refugees has been no less than heroic.

Between 1976 and mid-1986, an estimated 20,000–50,000 Mozambicans sought refuge in Malawi. Since September 1986, however, Malawi has received wave after wave of refugees. By way of comparison, it is as if 25 million refugees had entered the United States during the past three years. Malawi now has one of the highest ratios of refugees to nationals in the world—there is one Mozambican refugee for every eleven Malawians. In some districts, refugees outnumber Malawians three to two.

A December USCR issue paper on refugees in southern Africa found that the massive influx of Mozambican refugees "has severely taxed Malawi's social services, caused major deforestation problems, drained food reserves, and strained the nation's road and transportation network." Nevertheless, the refugees, many of whom have ethnic ties with Malawians, have been—and continue to be—welcomed by the Malawian government and people. Initially, the Malawi government—wary of foreign interference in its domestic affairs—tried to assist the refugees by itself. However, by late 1986, as numbers skyrocketed and it became evident that the refugees would not be returning home anytime soon, Malawi allowed UNHCR to establish a presence. The early refugees were allowed to settle in and around Malawian villages, and, in the few areas where it was possible, Malawi made land available for them to cultivate. By 1988, however, the numbers were too large for this to be feasible, and special refugee camps had to be established.

Despite Malawi's generous welcome, the refugees' situation is far from ideal. Most live at a subsistence level. Nutritional surveys among the refugee population have shown that the level of malnutrition rose from five percent in 1988, to 10–15 percent in 1989.

Distributing food and providing essential services such as water, health, education, and sanitation is also difficult, not only due to the large numbers, but also because the refugees are widely scattered. Wherever possible, the Malawi government has offered services through existing government structures. UNHCR and other international agencies, as well as the Malawi Red Cross, have helped bolster these structures, enabling them to serve refugees as well as locals. This was particularly important following the disastrous floods in early 1989 that left more than 100,000 Malawians homeless.

Malawi has appealed to the European Community for extra trucks and for

(continued on page 43)

CARTAZ PARA LOCALIZAÇÃO DA FAMÍLIA DA CRIANÇA DESAMPARADA



Living in the War Zone

Neil Boothby

The bandits killed my mother. And my brothers too. They took me to their base camp. Yes, I was with the bandits. I had a gun. The chief taught me to use it. He beat me up. I had a gun to kill. I killed people and soldiers. I didn't like it. I killed. I killed.

I first met Alfredo, a ten-year-old Mozambican boy, at the Lhanguene Orphanage on the outskirts of Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. He was one of the thousands of children abducted from their families and villages by the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), taken to military strongholds, trained and, in many cases, forced to kill other human beings. When RENAMO, a rebel movement that has terrorized the Mozambican people, abducted Alfredo, they tied his hands behind his back, put a 50 kilo bag of stolen food on his head, and forced him to march like that for two days to the RENAMO base camp.

When they reached the camp, Alfredo was subjected to several gruesome tests, like being tied head down from a tree, to determine if he would be brave enough to make a good fighter. Then Alfredo's training began: they fired weapons next to his head so that he would get used to the sound of gunfire; they killed animals in front of him to make him used to the sight of blood; finally, Alfredo was told to shoot a prisoner who had tried to escape. Alfredo completed his training so "successfully" that RENAMO made him chief of a gang that attacked and pillaged a number of villages. At one point, Alfredo's youth gang was told to ambush a government military column. The government soldiers encircled the rebel gang, however, and, in the confusion, Alfredo escaped. He had been with RENAMO for seven months—and is pretty sure he killed six people. But there may have been more.

By the time I met Alfredo at the orphanage, he was once again wearing civilian clothes and had put on some of the weight he had lost with RENAMO. But the former child-soldier was suspicious of his new adult caretakers: what were they going to require of him now? A month later, he began suffering flashbacks in which events from the past would come flooding back at unexpected moments to haunt him. "The visions began after I came to Lhanguene," Alfredo finally managed to tell me. "I never had them while I was living with the bandits."

Six-year-old Franisse was kidnapped by RENAMO in 1987. It happened at dawn while he was down by the river. Hands grabbed him, and he was shoved up the path to his village where a man gave him matches and made him set his family's hut ablaze. His mother ran out first, then his father. Franisse was made to watch as the bandits cut his parents'

heads off with machetes. Their bodies were dismembered. Some body parts—ears, fingers, and internal organs—were stirred into a boiling pot with goat's meat. Others were left in the dirt. The bandits then impaled his parents' heads on stakes. A man wrapped a FRELIMO [the party in power in Mozambique] flag around Franisse's mother's staring head. "This," he said, "is what FRELIMO buys you," as RENAMO soldiers dragged Franisse, along with other survivors, back to their armed stronghold.

I have met hundreds of children like Franisse and Alfredo in Mozambique, young boys and girls whose bodies and spirits have been injured by violence, sometimes beyond repair. They can be seen wobbling into government-run refugee centers physically malnourished and psychologically numbed—often speechless, seemingly incapable of showing any kind of emotion other than a kind of unnerving, wait and see, stoicism.

Among child combatants in Cambodia, Guatemala, and in other war-torn countries in Africa, I had seen the same psychological turmoil that accompanies these children's efforts to leave behind a world in which killing was sanctioned, and to re-enter a world in which killing is, once again, condemned. I have come to learn that this re-entry into society is as much a moral struggle as a psychological one: a long, often anguished quest into one's own soul to rediscover the very moral sensibility that was obliterated through having committed what, in nearly every culture, is the gravest sin of all.

A year ago last spring, when the phone rang in my office at Duke University, I had no way of knowing just how involved I would become with the victims of the war in Mozambique. The caller was a State Department official, asking whether I would go to Mozambique to help to establish, with the Save the Children Federation (SCF), a first-ever psychological treatment program for children who had been forced to serve as soldiers.

Despite my past experiences in other countries, Mozambique was a shock. The war has displaced or seriously affected up to six million people, and the violence, coupled with the effects of a devastated economy, has led the International Committee on Crisis Control to rank Mozambique, for the second year running, as the country with the greatest toll of human suffering in the world. Terrorism is widespread in Mozambique—and all too often, children are the victims.

When I arrived in Mozambique, I was stunned by the sheer numbers of children who had lost their families, who had been left to wander the countryside, aimless and alone. Indeed, during my early travels throughout Mozambique, I was continually preoccupied with the question: "What can one do in a place in which hundreds of thousands of children have seen their own parents murdered?"

Because the numbers are so large, and the need so great, we decided to scrap what perhaps is the more usual approach to such calamities: importing more specialists like myself to work directly with children. Rather, we began by learning what we could about the ways in which Mozambican communities might respond on their own to girls and boys who had been victims, as well as victimizers.

The former child-soldier needs to be forgiven by society, sometimes by the very people who have been victimized by his actions. Indeed, much of the initial efforts of the U.S. embassy, SCF, and myself on behalf of child-soldiers in Mozambique focused on helping community members—political leaders, police officers, soldiers, teachers, and other students—to understand that these boys and girls were victims as well. We also worked with the Mozambican government on a national level to establish policy as well as concrete procedures whereby children who were forced to participate with RENAMO would be provided appropriate care and psychological treatment rather than be sent to military prisons, as happened before.

Oral storytelling, dance, theater or sociodrama, and art emerged as traditional community activities most readily adaptable for therapeutic purposes. Under the right circumstances, each can be used to encourage children to express and better come to terms with the terrible things that happened to them. We sought Mozambicans within the government ministries and women's organizations who, though lacking much formal education or previous training, seemed to have an aptitude for this kind of work. After an initial two-month training seminar at Lhanguene, these 30 participants went on to teach 500 more provincial and district workers some of the basic ways of responding to the special needs of war-affected children.

Though the program's methods are simple, the results sometimes have been encouraging. Mozambican staff have come to learn, for example, how most traumatized children retain images or memories of what psychologists refer to as "worst moments." In the midst of a long sequence of terrifying experiences, there will usually be a particular moment or event—the cutting of a throat, the splash of blood, a cry from the victim—that for the child was especially traumatic. But because the event was so horrific, the child feels she cannot discuss it openly. Encouraging her to speak the unspeakable in the presence of another is thus one of the necessary first steps towards recovery.

The worst moment for Franisse, the young boy who was forced to set fire to his family's hut, was the sight of his mother's head stuck on the post, an image that continued to fuel much of his aggressive behavior. Franisse had stopped talking. Through drawing and quiet conversation, an especially gifted Mozambican worker enabled Franisse to share this troubling moment for the first time. This led Franisse to further insight into what was prompting his current struggles at the orphanage: "Every morning I wake up and remember the dreams from the night before. I always see my mother's face and it is looking out at me. When I remember these dreams I get sad. Then I get angry. Then I start to fight with the other boys." It was Franisse's own understanding of how his past was affecting his present that marked the first turning point in what became a slow yet steady return to health.

Franisse's treatment went on to involve a sociodrama, in which the events of his ordeal were re-enacted by children at the orphanage, each assuming the role of either an assailant, or victim or liberator. Another child played the role of Franisse so that Franisse himself would have an opportunity to view these events through the eyes of someone else. At critical moments, we also had the child assuming Franisse's role articulate two troubling refrains that still preoccupied his thoughts: Franisse's own guilt over having failed to protect his parents; and the fear he felt over having been "abandoned" in such an awful world. After the drama, the children talked about their experiences. In this way, Franisse's peers were able to help him understand that he was not responsible for what had happened.

Clearly, psychological treatment is not enough in a country where thousands of children exist in overcrowded orphanages or, more simply, on the steps of burnt-out stores. Often, the first priority is the provision of food, medicine, clothing, and other kinds of basic assistance.

Locating lost family members, however, is one of the most important aspects of the work. We initiated a nationwide tracing program for separated family members. Searching for relatives scattered throughout a nation as large and as troubled as Mozambique is difficult, exhausting work. It entails flying in a small airplane 60 or more hours a month into as many of the war zones as possible to document these girls and boys; converting their biographical information, along with polaroid snapshots of each child, into posters to take to villages or refugee centers where relatives might have fled; and, when matches are made, taking the children to join their families. Despite the logistical nightmares, 3,000 children have been reunited with their families during the program's initial months, though there are still a handful of young people, like Franisse, who remain unclaimed. To be sure, however, bearing witness to children returning to the arms of their parents—who had often already given up hope that they were still alive—helped to sustain us all in Mozambique.

Regionally, we have begun to extend the psychological treatment and family tracing efforts to the hundreds of thousands of Mozambican refugee children who have sought asylum in other countries. Teams of Mozambican trainers are traveling to Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia to look for lost relatives there, and to share their experiences with nationals responsible for refugee children in these neighboring countries. In this way, we hope to encourage more of a comprehensive response to at least some of the needs shared by the Mozambican people in southern Africa.

Neil Boothby, who has spent the past decade working with refugee children in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America, is currently a Visiting Professor of Policy Studies at Duke University. Photo credit: Black Star/P. Turnley

(continued from page 39)

assistance to improve its roads; UNHCR and the World Food Program (WFP) have appealed for a three-month buffer stock of essential food to avert a potential crisis during the rainy season. The absence of such a buffer stock has been cited as one of the reasons for increased malnutrition among refugees, since any delays in food deliveries result in cancellation of scheduled food distributions. Without a positive response to the appeal, many refugees will face severe food shortages. In its recent paper, USCR recommended a positive response to Malawi's appeal, saying, "The international community should ensure that current programs [for refugees] are adequately funded."

In December 1988, Malawi signed a tripartite agreement with Mozambique and UNHCR that provided a framework for repatriating refugees who wished to do so. Although the signing of that agreement raised concerns that Malawi might pressure refugees to return to Mozambique, those concerns generally proved to be unfounded. Malawian officials subsequently asserted that refugees should only return if they wish to do so and if their safety could be guaranteed, and also indicated that, should there be a resolution to the conflict in Mozambique, Malawi would continue to assist the refugees until their government could receive them. Nevertheless, by the end of the year, Malawi was showing signs of concern over the effects on the country of reduced international aid to the refugees. Late in the year, more than 300,000 refugees in the central region were told that they would either have to move to northern Malawi or repatriate to Mozambique. That call was not, however, followed up by action.

During the first year of the official voluntary repatriation program, which began on July 22, 1988 (some months before the tripartite agreement was signed), only 6,893 refugees officially repatriated to Mozambique (though many more returned by their own means).

Mozambique

In Mozambique, fighting continues between the government and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), though steps were taken during the year that could lead to direct peace talks.

More than 100,000 Mozambicans have been purposely killed, and almost 500,000 children are also said to have died as a result of the decade-old conflict. Thousands of civilians have been tortured or maimed, and many others—particularly women and children—have been kidnapped by RENAMO. An estimated 1.7 million Mozambicans are internally displaced, and another 2.9 million are partly or wholly dependent on food aid; 1.3 million Mozambicans have fled to neighboring countries; during 1989, 15,000 fled each month to Malawi alone. Many of the country's schools, hospitals, and other public buildings have been destroyed. Although government troops are not without blame, RENAMO is held responsible for most of the killings and atrocities committed against civilians. In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in February, USCR characterized RENAMO as "the Khmer Rouge of Africa" based on its "utter disregard for the dignity and integrity of the human person."

While Mozambicans who have fled to neighboring countries receive assistance through established international channels, internally displaced Mozambicans must rely on the stretched resources of the Mozambican government and whatever international aid it has been able to secure. In 1989, the international community responded to Mozambique's appeal for help in assisting its internally displaced and affected populations, though the amount of food aid pledged was well below the amount required to meet the need. In November, the World Food Program expressed serious concern over "lack of donor response to ... genuine, urgent food aid requirements," and warned that there could be tragic consequences if more food aid did not arrive.

Mozambican refugee girl in Malawi.
USCR/H. Ruiz

Providing assistance to Mozambique's 1.7 million internally displaced citizens is a formidable undertaking. Delivering food to those in need is difficult due to RENAMO attacks and because of the destruction of trucks, roads, and bridges. In areas that are completely inaccessible by road, food has to be transported by air, a very expensive undertaking that the government can ill afford.

The government tries to help the displaced become quickly self-reliant. But many obstacles prevent them from achieving that goal. Not enough food reaches the centers. Overcrowding, poor soils, and lack of water make it impossible for each family to be allocated enough land to grow the food they need.

According to Mozambican government estimates, more than 87,700 refugees have returned to Mozambique from surrounding countries in recent years. Only a small percentage of them have repatriated through official, UNHCR-sponsored returnee programs. Most have returned on their own. Assistance to the returnees comes from UNHCR, although food distribution and other services are provided through government agencies. USCR, on a site visit to Mozambique in August, interviewed returned refugees at various sites in Tete province. Most of the returnees were aware that security in their home areas would still be a problem, but, as one elderly woman told USCR, "Here, we can cultivate, even if it is only a small plot. In Malawi, we were always waiting to be given something. Besides, this is my country."

Significant groundwork—including preliminary talks through mediators in Nairobi—has helped to pave the way for direct negotiations. In December 1987, Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano declared an amnesty for RENAMO combatants. More than 3,000 of RENAMO's estimated 10,000–15,000 guerrillas have since laid down their arms. In August 1988, Chissano sanctioned talks between Mozambican church leaders and RENAMO. Following indications from the church leaders that RENAMO had indeed expressed a willingness to negotiate, in March the Mozambican government drafted a 12-point position paper that the leaders presented to RENAMO.

It is difficult to assess what the outcome of direct negotiations might be. However, the Mozambican government—which is unlikely to be able to achieve a military victory—appears to want an end to the violence, and

RENAMO at least claims to want peace. The U.S. and British governments—both of which are providing considerable aid to Mozambique—also support the peace process, as does the Soviet Union, Mozambique's primary military supplier.

In December, USCR issued a report that urged an end to the violence in Mozambique and called upon the international community to encourage the peace process. The report also concluded that, if and when peace comes to Mozambique, the sudden return of millions of uprooted people to their homes could cause a major "returnee emergency," and urged the international community and the government of Mozambique to start planning now their response to that eventuality.

Namibia

On December 22, 1988, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed an historic, U.S.-brokered agreement paving the way for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, a measure originally approved in 1978 that provided for the safe return of Namibian exiles, free elections in Namibia, and full independence for Namibia in 1990.

On June 12, 1989, UNHCR began the repatriation of Namibian refugees. It was a mammoth—and costly—operation, but also one which offered hope to many refugees in exile around the world. At its height, as many as six flights a day were leaving Angola bound for Namibia. When the airlift ended in September (USCR accompanied one of the last repatriation flights from Luanda to Windhoek), 41,088 Namibian exiles had returned home. Of those, 33,258 had been living in Angola, 3,760 in Zambia, and 1,621 in Cuba. The remainder returned to Namibia from 40 other countries worldwide, primarily in Eastern Europe and Africa, but as far afield as India and Australia. More than 800 refugees living in other countries who were unable to repatriate by September must now wait to do so because of the lack of additional UNHCR funds to continue repatriation activities.

A majority of the returnees are supporters of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), a group that for more than 23 years has opposed South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, and which is expected to form Namibia's first post-independence government. SWAPO won a 57 percent majority in Namibia's first free elections, held in November.



After so many years: Namibians return home. During 1989, as their country headed towards independence, 41,088 Namibian refugees repatriated from Angola, Zambia, Cuba, and 40 other countries. Their repatriation offered hope to refugees throughout Africa. UNHCR/L. Astrom

Former refugees arriving in Namibia were first taken to primary reception centers, where they were registered and given one month's food rations and various household items. Those able to easily trace relatives or friends who could shelter them left the centers and received a ration card for a further six months' food aid. The others were moved to secondary reception centers around the country operated by the Council of Churches in Namibia, a local agency that also helped the returnees trace their relatives. Returnees at secondary centers stayed until they too could locate their families or make other plans.

Some of the returnees have faced problems. Many who returned to rural areas in northern Namibia were harassed by South African-controlled security forces. Others found that reintegration is not an easy process. An estimated 37 percent of those returning from Angola and Zambia are considered to be urban or semi-urban. While the most skilled of those may be easily absorbed into the economy, with an unemployment rate of 20 percent in Namibia, the remainder are likely to have trouble finding work and making a new start.

Some 25,000–40,000 Angolans have entered Namibia to escape the conflict in their country. They have not been granted refugee status by the South African administration and are not receiving international assistance.

Rwanda

In 1988, Rwanda offered refuge to more than 50,000 Burundians of the Hutu ethnic group who fled their country following the massacre of more than 5,000 Hutus in Burundi. Hutus make up 85 percent of the population of Burundi, but live under the rule of the Tutsi minority. For decades, this relationship has spawned conflicts in which thousands of Burundians, both Hutu and Tutsi, have been killed.

Beginning in late 1988, in response to improved conditions and government policies towards Hutus in Burundi, all but 1,000 of the refugees returned home. UNHCR assisted 8,000 to repatriate through an official program, while more than 40,000 returned independently.

More than 19,500 other Burundian refugees, also Hutus, have lived in Rwanda since 1972 and are integrated into the local society and economy. They fled Burundi after a Hutu revolt that year in which thousands of Tutsis were killed. The Tutsis retaliated, killing more than 100,000 Hutus.

An estimated 118,000 Rwandan refugees, mostly Tutsi, who have mostly lived in Uganda since 1959 were the subject of discussions between the presidents of Rwanda and Uganda aimed at permanently resolving their situation. Large numbers of Rwandan refugees also remain in Burundi and Tanzania. The Rwandan government has often indicated that it would not welcome a massive return of these Rwandan refugee groups.

Somalia

Ethiopian refugees and internally displaced people in Somalia are in a particularly precarious position. Many Ethiopian refugees were caught up in a conflict between the Somali government and the Somali National Movement (SNM), a northern Somalia-based insurgent group, which escalated into a full-scale civil war in May 1988. During 1989, the conflict spread to much of the rest of Somalia, as other insurgent groups also battled the Somali government. Several hundred thousand Somalis have been uprooted by the conflict. Many remain in Somalia. They are mostly living in remote, SNM-controlled areas, and are not receiving any systematic assistance.

In addition, more than 385,000 Somali refugees have fled to neighboring countries, including Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. The 355,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia live in harsh conditions, but are under UNHCR protection. Those in Djibouti have been denied refugee status, while Kenya has forcibly deported many (see related country reports).

UNHCR, whose representative in Mogadishu was expelled by the Somali government in August, is planning to phase out assistance to the Ethiopian refugees in Somalia. The agency believes that most can safely return home as Somalia and Ethiopia officially ended their hostilities and reestablished diplomatic relations in 1988.

Ethiopian refugees—a majority of whom are ethnic Somalis—began arriving in Somalia at the time of Somalia's defeat by Ethiopia in the 1978–79 Ogaden war. Others arrived in 1984–86 escaping the Ethiopian government's much-criticized resettlement and villagization programs, and drought in their home areas. The Somali government insisted that UNHCR provide assistance for 840,000 Ethiopian refugees, a figure that was arbitrarily agreed upon by the government and UNHCR, but which others have always considered far too high. Although some 400,000 Ethiopians spontaneously repatriated during the mid-1980s, Somalia refused to accept any reduced estimate of the number of refugees needing assistance in Somalia. UNHCR reluctantly continued to provide assistance for the supposed 840,000 refugees, but in the past year the agency has publicly refuted that figure, saying that the actual number is less than half that.

In 1988, USCR estimated the refugee population in Somalia at 365,000. It is believed that a significant number of Ethiopian refugees who had been living in camps in northern Somalia have continued to return to Ethiopia since the conflict in that region began. There are, however, no reliable statistics on how many refugees actually left. Therefore, to reflect the fact that some number did leave the north, and that a smaller number from the south also repatriated during the year under UNHCR's official repatriation program, USCR has reduced its estimate of the Ethiopian refugee population in Somalia to 350,000.

According to a U.S. State Department report issued in August, for many years Ethiopian refugees have been systematically conscripted by the Somali Armed Forces. Following SNM attacks on major towns and on refugee camps in May 1988, many refugees living in camps in northern Somalia were armed by the Somali government and induced to become active in self-defense and in paramilitary operations on behalf of the government.

In December 1988, UNHCR refused to provide further assistance to refugees who had became involved in the conflict, but agreed to continue aid for those refugees who moved out of the conflict zones and into camps where their civilian status could be established and distribution of aid monitored. Local residents in areas to which refugees were to be moved demonstrated against the proposed relocation, however, and the plan was abandoned. UNHCR then agreed to continue assistance to existing refugee camps provided that the Somali government assured the civilian nature of the camps and provided secure access to them for international personnel. However, because of continued SNM activity in the region, UNHCR and the World Food Program (WFP) decided that security was inadequate to permit proper monitoring of food distribution to the refugee camps and terminated assistance to the camps. According to some reports, serious health problems among the refugees followed.

The UN Secretary General then proposed that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) take over the feeding operation in the north within six months and that UNHCR and WFP resume feeding operations in the northern refugee camps on an interim basis. At year's end, negotiations among the various concerned parties, including the Somali government, continued. Meanwhile, the refugee camps in the north remained without international assistance.

Another finding of the State Department's report was that at a minimum the Somali army purposely murdered more than 5,000 unarmed civilians of the Issak clan (from which the SNM draws most of its support) who were not at all involved in the fighting and who presented absolutely no threat, in what the report termed "a widespread, systematic and extremely violent assault on the unarmed civilian Issak population of northern Somalia." Substantial additional numbers of civilians were killed in military actions. These actions are blamed, in large part, for the exodus of several hundred thousand Somalis to Ethiopia and Djibouti in mid-1988. The United States has suspended military and economic aid to Somalia, largely because of these human rights abuses.

In August, a tripartite commission composed of UNHCR and the governments of Somalia and Ethiopia met to discuss voluntary repatriation of Ethiopian refugees. The refugees were to be given the option of repatriating or settling permanently in Somalia. In November, UNHCR began re-registering all Ethiopian refugees and asking them whether they planned to repatriate or settle in Somalia. A small-scale repatriation program has existed for several years.

South Africa

South Africa, which refuses to allow UNHCR to monitor the situation of refugees there, considers *all* Mozambicans who do not have work permits to be "illegal immigrants" subject to deportation. According to a USCR report on refugees in southern Africa issued in

(continued on page 47)

MAURITANIA AND SENEGAL: Conflict and Displacement

By Hiram A. Ruiz
Policy Analyst, U.S. Committee for Refugees

A minor incident on the border between Mauritania and Senegal in April escalated into violent conflict between Mauritanians and Senegalese and a diplomatic confrontation involving their two nations. Racial, cultural, and economic tensions fueled the violence, which uprooted more than 255,000 people, 65,000 of whom are considered refugees (43,000 Mauritanians in Senegal, and 22,000 Senegalese in Mauritania). These tensions are not unique to Mauritania and Senegal, which were both French colonies under a single administration. They exist along much of the Sahel, where black, sub-Saharan Africa meets arabized, Islamic northern Africa (in Sudan, similar tensions play a major role in that country's civil war).

Senegal's primarily black population is comprised of different ethnic groups. Although an estimated 90 percent of the population is Muslim, Senegal is a secular state, which prides itself on its democratic political system. Since early 1988, however, the country has experienced economic decline and political upheaval. Before the violence that erupted in April, more than 300,000 Mauritanians lived in Senegal, many of them traders and shopkeepers who owned 80 percent of the nation's small shops.

Mauritania, an Islamic state, is a large, sparsely populated country of some two million people. It is politically dominated by Moors, descendants of Arabs and Berbers, who are lighter-skinned than black Africans. According to government estimates, Moors make up more than 75 percent of the population and blacks only 17 percent. However, the government has not made public the results of censuses in 1977 and 1988, and other sources claim that blacks comprise anywhere from one-third to more than half the population. An estimated 100,000 Senegalese also lived in Mauritania prior to April, working in a variety of occupations ranging from fishermen to executives.

The Moors strongly identify with Arab north Africa, and in recent years, as part of a policy of arabization, have tried to enforce the use of Arabic (as opposed to French) as the country's official language. Discrimination against blacks has been widespread, and Moors have reportedly been taking over lands in southern Mauritania that traditionally belonged to blacks. Mauritania only abolished legal slavery in 1980—the last country in the world to do so—though it is commonly believed that slavery continues to this day.

The incident that triggered the flare-up between Mauritanians and Senegalese took place along the Senegal River, which forms the border between the two countries. Although accounts of the incident differ widely, most include a dispute between Mauritanian pastoralists and Senegalese farmers, and the killing of two of the Senegalese by Mauritanian border guards. As news of the incident spread, groups of Senegalese began looting Mauritanian-owned shops in Dakar, Senegal's capital. Events then escalated dramatically, as Mauritanians in Nouakchott, that country's capital, began systematically slaughtering Senegalese living there—some 200 were reportedly clubbed to death within a few days, and a number of others wounded or mutilated. When reports of those killings reached Senegal, thousands of Senegalese went on the rampage, killing up to 60 Mauritanians in Dakar and other cities.

Each government blamed the other for the violence, the two countries severed diplomatic relations, and for much of the year observers feared that Mauritania and Senegal might go to war. Because of the escalating violence, the Mauritanian and Senegalese governments agreed to a large-scale evacuation of their citizens from the other country. More than 90,000 Senegalese living in Mauritania were returned to Senegal, while about 100,000 Mauritanians living in Senegal were returned to Mauritania. Many of those who were repatriated had lived for years in the country they were obliged to leave; some had never even seen their supposed homelands. While many of those repatriated were able to settle with relatives, others—in both countries—remain dependent on the government for assistance.

The two-way repatriations did not end the uprooting of people, however. After the repatriations began, it was discovered that Mauritania was forcibly deporting black Mauritanians who had no link to Senegal. According to some reports, as many as 43,000 black Mauritanians were forced into Senegal, where they are now refugees. Many were put on the repatriation flights, but others were—and reportedly continue to be—forced across the border by the Mauritanian authorities. Mauritania denies that it has deported its own citizens, claiming that those it has forced out are Senegalese nationals who are "confused" about their citizenship.

Also, some 22,000 people who claim that they are not Mauritanian were forced to leave Senegal, though less is known about this group.

Both groups of refugees—Mauritanians in Senegal and Senegalese in Mauritania—are being assisted by UNHCR and local relief groups. Besides receiving food and medical care, they are helped to locate family members, as many families became separated when being deported. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, more than 4,000 tracing requests—from both refugees and those repatriated—were registered with their offices in Dakar and Nouakchott. Photo credit: UNHCR

(continued from page 45)

December. "Every month, South Africa forcibly repatriates about 2,800 Mozambicans, including many who went there seeking refuge. Without UNHCR protection, the refugees have no safeguards."

At present, some 50,000 Mozambicans are working in South Africa legally, primarily in mines. Another 80,000–130,000 Mozambicans are thought to work in South Africa illegally, mostly on white-owned farms. Many in this group have possibly had mixed motives for going to South Africa—partly to seek work, but also to escape the conflict in Mozambique. Since 1984, however, many other Mozambicans have gone to South Africa *primarily* to flee the war and violence. Approximately 70,000 are concentrated in two of South Africa's so-called "homelands," Gazankulu and KaNgwane, where they are marginally safer than in other parts of South Africa. USCR therefore estimates that up to 200,000 Mozambicans in South Africa could be considered refugees.

Getting into South Africa as a refugee is a difficult—and dangerous—process. First, the refugees must cross minefields on the Mozambican side of the border. Then, they must get past a ten-foot high electrified fence erected by South Africa. More than 70 Mozambicans are known to have been killed—electrocuted—on the fence. Once across the border, the refugees must still evade the South African authorities.

The plight of Mozambican refugees in South Africa is little known in the international community, even among those who are generally familiar with refugee issues. Many are living in direst poverty. On top of that, they live in constant fear of forced repatriation. Yet, more refugees—including a disproportionate number of orphaned children—continue to arrive.

In early 1989, there were reports that South Africa intended to forcibly repatriate more than 40,000 Mozambicans living in Gazankulu and KaNgwane. In April, USCR wrote to the South African Ambassador to the United States, saying, "If this were to happen, it would violate all international refugee protection principles." South Africa's plan met resistance from leaders in those homelands and has not been carried out.

Several voluntary agencies and religious organizations assist refugees in Gazankulu and KaNgwane. However, in general, aid for refugees in South Africa is more limited and less systematic than that available to refugees in UNHCR-assisted programs.

Mozambique believes that the refugees would like to repatriate, but does not think that they should be forced to do so. However, Mozambique apparently feels that it cannot prevent South Africa from carrying out forced repatriations.

Some 1,000 refugees from Lesotho live a precarious existence in South Africa. Most fled their country following a coup in 1986 due to uncertainty regarding the nature of the military regime that came into power. Most of the refugees live among the local population without any form of assistance or protection.

Millions of black South Africans have been uprooted or have lost their South African citizenship as a result of the South African government's policy of forcing blacks into the impoverished homelands. Some have been relocated to the homelands; others have found themselves living there when the South African government redrew the homeland boundaries to incorporate more areas where blacks live. The South African government has thereby rationalized its abrogation of responsibility for these people.

Sudan

For the people of Sudan, 1989 was a turbulent year: civil war continued to ravage the country; militias armed by the government massacred civilians; more than three million southern Sudanese remained uprooted; the elected government was toppled by a military junta that appears to sympathize with Islamic fundamentalists; trucks carrying food aid were attacked; and thousands more Ethiopian refugees entered Sudan fleeing conflict and drought in their home areas. The newly arrived refugees bring the total number of Ethiopian refugees living in Sudan to more than 663,200.

The civil war in Sudan is between the military forces of the Khartoum government, seen as representing the interests of the arabized, Muslim population of the north, and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), backed primarily by African southern Sudanese who are mostly Christians or followers of traditional religions. The SPLA seeks an end to the north's cultural, economic, and religious domination of southern Sudan.

The war has cost hundreds of thousands of lives, has displaced more than 2.8 million people within Sudan, and caused more than 425,000 Sudanese refugees to flee to neighboring Ethiopia and Uganda. The government has also given arms to nomadic groups that live in areas bordering southern Sudan and who are traditionally hostile to other groups, particularly the Dinka. During recent years, members of these groups have on several occasions perpetrated massacres against southern Sudanese civilians. Other reports claim that southern Sudanese have been taken as slaves by these groups. A December Africa Watch report said that the government has, in effect, given these groups "*carte blanche* to ... act outside the law and commit gross abuses of human rights."

In western Sudan, nomadic groups known as "Arabs"—who have also been armed by the government but who may have also received arms from Libya—have terrorized the Fur, a people who are mostly Muslim African agriculturalists. According to relief workers based in western Sudan, armed "Arabs" looted and burned a number of Fur villages and massacred unarmed villagers. Thousands of Fur were displaced by the violence, abandoning their homes and fields and moving to more secure towns.

A cease-fire in the war in the south was declared in May, which brought a brief respite to the civilian populations of that region. However, on June 30 the elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq El Mahdi was overthrown by a military junta, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), led by Lieutenant-General Omer el Bashir. The junta, which is sympathetic to hard-line Islamic fundamentalists, initially agreed to extend the May cease-fire, and indicated that pursuing a settlement to the conflict would be one of its priorities. But no progress was made towards peace and, in October, the cease-fire was broken. The resumed fighting led to further displacements of civilians at the end of the year. Although peace talks mediated by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter began in Nairobi in late November, little progress resulted.

There was one significant, positive development in 1989, however. In January, the Mahdi government and leaders of the SPLA agreed to permit a UN-sponsored relief effort aimed at assisting more than 100,000 people at risk of starvation in southern Sudan. During 1988, an estimated 300,000 southern Sudanese had starved—not because of drought, but as a result of man-made famine, brought about by both sides in the civil war using food as a weapon. USCR made two site visits to southern Sudan in the early months of 1989 to assess the needs of displaced people in the region and—in a meeting with

SPLA leader John Garang—to urge the SPLA to agree to safe passage of food to civilians.

The UN relief effort, known as "Operation Lifeline," began in April, and involved movement of relief supplies from the north, and cross-border by air and truck from Kenya and Uganda. Numerous attacks by "bandits" took place during the year, and a number of truck drivers were killed. In December alone, 20 Kenyan truck drivers were killed. Also in December, a plane carrying relief workers from Medicins sans Frontieres was shot down over southern Sudan, killing all four on board. Both sides denied responsibility.

In November, the government "temporarily" suspended Operation Lifeline relief flights; at year's end, the Lifeline relief effort was essentially moribund, and there were few indications that it would be revived in 1990. Despite the attacks on food convoys, other setbacks, delays, and numerous, sometimes justified criticisms of the program, Operation Lifeline did get some much-needed relief into southern Sudan.

The estimated two million southern Sudanese who have fled to Khartoum, Sudan's capital, did not, however, benefit from the relief effort. In testimony before the House of Representatives Select Committee on Hunger in March, USCR said that displaced southerners in and around Khartoum live "the most wretched existence conceivable ... and are the ultimate indicator of the Sudan government's intentions towards its displaced southern citizens."

The displaced in Khartoum do not receive government assistance or international food aid. Most survive—barely—by working as laborers, house cleaners, and petty traders, or by brewing and selling alcoholic beverages (which are banned under Sharia law). A few local and international groups attempt to offer some basic medical care and to feed the most malnourished children, but they, like other groups involved in relief work in Sudan (both with displaced Sudanese and with refugees), find it increasingly difficult to function in the country. Since the June military coup, relief groups have had radio equipment confiscated (further isolating their workers in remote and often insecure areas), faced longer delays obtaining permits to travel within Sudan, and found government officials increasingly unresponsive to them. As a result, several relief groups have ended their operations in Sudan, and others plan to do so in 1990.

Before Sudan became a major refugee-producing country and the plight of its own citizens attracted world attention, the country was known primarily for its role in hosting what was for many years Africa's largest refugee population.

The first Ethiopian refugees arrived in Sudan in 1967, when the conflict between Eritrean separatists and the Ethiopian government began. Over the years, hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian refugees have fled to Sudan to escape not only the Eritrean conflict, but also conflicts between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan and Oromo liberation groups, as well as drought-induced but man-assisted famines that have killed more than a million Ethiopians in recent years. At present, there are some 663,200 Ethiopian refugees in Sudan, of whom 349,000 are assisted by UNHCR in settlements and reception centers, while the remainder are self-settled in border areas or major towns and cities. UNHCR, which faced a major funding problem during the year, reported that malnutrition among the assisted refugee population rose to 10–20 percent.

The new military government dismissed the Sudan Commissioner for Refugees, replacing him with a former security officer with a hard-line approach to refugees. Many Ethiopian refugees (as well as displaced southern Sudanese) living in poor, shantytown suburbs of Khartoum were among 2,000 people made homeless in July when the new government ordered the demolition of houses belonging to alleged "beer brewers and prostitutes."

During 1989, there was a steady flow of new arrivals, most fleeing the continuing (and escalating) conflicts in Ethiopia, but some seeking relief from a major famine that threatened Eritrea and Tigray at the end of the year. More than 6,000 Tigrayans reportedly entered Sudan in the early months of 1989, while in November, 1,300 Eritreans also sought refuge in Sudan. In December, Sudanese authorities announced that 2,600 Ethiopians had entered Sudan as a result of the drought in northern Ethiopia. By the end of the year, it was not known whether international efforts to get food to famine-hit areas in northern Ethiopia would prove sufficient to prevent large-scale migrations of famine victims to Sudan in 1990.

An estimated 24,100 Chadians live in two settlements and one reception center in western Sudan. Many of the 120,000 Chadian refugees who sought refuge in Sudan in 1984–85 have now returned home, while others have left UNHCR camps and settled in the border areas. The repatriation of more than 83,500 Ugandan refugees who once lived in southern Sudan was formally completed in March. However, some 2,000 Ugandans who are unlikely to repatriate remain in southern Sudan and are assisted by UNHCR.

An estimated 385,000 southern Sudanese now live in refugee camps in Ethiopia, and another 50,000 Sudanese refugees live in Uganda.

Swaziland

Swaziland hosts refugees from both of its much larger neighbors, Mozambique and South Africa. A small and overpopulated country, Swaziland has one of the world's highest ratios of refugees to locals: there is one refugee for every eleven Swazis. Some 200 Mozambican refugees, primarily women and children, continue to arrive in Swaziland every month.

At the end of 1988, the number of registered Mozambican refugees in Swaziland was 28,000. Following a re-registration exercise carried out in April, that number was reduced almost by half, to 15,500. It is possible, however, that some of the refugees may not have been counted. In addition, an estimated 40,000–60,000 Mozambicans have settled spontaneously along the border area.

Registered refugees are assisted at one of two refugee centers. One center houses 3,200 Mozambicans; the other accommodates approximately 5,100 people who are dependent on food aid and a more established group of some 6,700 Swazi refugees who left South Africa when their home area was put under Zulu administration. The Swazi refugees are largely self-sufficient.

Conditions for Mozambican refugees at both centers are poor, particularly in sanitation, but refugees there receive assistance from UNHCR and other agencies. Teachers are being trained in Portuguese to provide education to Mozambican refugee children in their national language. The spontaneously settled refugees, who do not receive regular assistance, experience hardship, but are also a drain on the area's resources. During the past year, local people have increasingly blamed the refugees for rising social problems, particularly the increase in thefts.

Swaziland continues to seek a tripartite agreement with Mozambique and UNHCR to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of Mozambicans. However, conditions in that country do not yet

allow for major repatriations. Although in 1988 there were a few isolated reports of Mozambicans being forcibly repatriated, these reports have not persisted, and the government of Swaziland has indicated that it will not return refugees against their will.

Fearing retalitation by South Africa, Swaziland has been reluctant to offer refuge to persons believed to be affiliated with the African National Congress (ANC). Even the number of ANC members using Swaziland as a transit point to reach other countries of asylum has decreased.

Tanzania

Tanzania has enjoyed a favorable reputation as host to an established refugee population of more than 265,000 refugees from Burundi, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zaire, and South Africa. It has generally maintained an open-door policy and extended refugees generous assistance. Sub-Saharan Africa's first institute for research and training about refugees may be established in Tanzania.

Recently, however, Tanzania's record has been tarnished by reports that it has detained or deported Somali refugees who were attempting to enter Tanzania after being denied asylum in Kenya, and ethnic Somali Kenyans who have fled their country fearing that they may be deported to Somalia as a result of a Kenyan government crackdown on Somalis in that country (see Kenya).

Some 72,000 refugees from Mozambique have settled in the southern regions since 1985, though new arrivals have slowed considerably during the last two years. The Mozambican refugees have been moved into settlements, where they are assisted, but are also encouraged to become self-sufficient in developing the settlements' infrastructures.

The largest group of refugees in Tanzania is 156,000 Hutus from Burundi, most of whom fled following a 1972 massacre in Burundi of more than 100,000 Hutus. They are mostly living in settlements in western Tanzania. In April, Tanzania expelled 15 Burundian refugees after charging them with plotting clandestine activities against the government of Burundi.

Many of the 1,200 refugees living in Dar es Salaam have been moved to the Kigwa camp in Tabora region. At Kigwa, the refugees are being given a 3.5 acre plot of farmland and will receive food assistance from the government for the first three years.

USCR/H. Ruiz

Uganda

Struggling with more than 300,000 internally displaced people, and the repatriation of some 320,000 of its citizens from other countries in recent years, Uganda—once one of the world's largest refugee-producing countries—has become a country of asylum for approximately 50,000 Sudanese refugees fleeing the conflict in the south of that country. UNHCR has established camps to address the needs of these refugees.

Most of these Sudanese arrived in February and March, although in July there was still a daily influx of 30 to 60 people, 90 percent of whom were women and children. Other Sudanese refugees are living in Uganda but have not registered, so are not receiving assistance.

In May, 4,000 Sudanese soldiers and their families, who had fled Sudan as Torit and other towns held by the Sudanese government fell to the rebels of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), were repatriated to Sudan in cooperation with the Sudanese government.

The Sudanese join an existing refugee population in Uganda of 118,000 Rwandese, many of whom have been in Uganda since 1959, and 1,000 Zairians.

The number of internally displaced fluctuates as people respond to changing security conditions. Several rebel groups and widespread lawlessness in some areas of the north and east continue to challenge the National Resistance Movement goverment headed by President Museveni. Reports of army abuses of human rights increased in 1989.

In the Gulu area, there were more than 100,000 internally displaced early in the year. Food shortages were severe, but improved by December. Numbers of ethnic Acholi, primarily from the Kampala area, sought asylum in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

The West Nile region is also being affected by famine resulting from the combination of prolonged drought, the influx of refugees from southern Sudan, crop destruction by pests, and the added pressure put on the land by the many Ugandans who have returned home. Many of the returnees did not receive UNHCR support, and the majority did not arrive in time to plant crops. Rebel activities have also been complicating factors, as they lead to diminished road access, making it dangerous for food aid personnel to be in the regions and causing insecurity for the refugees and local population alike.

Kenya forcibly repatriated 237 Ugandan refugees in April following an outbreak of violence at a refugee camp. The incident resulted in many injuries and greatly strained relations between Kenyan authorities and the refugees. A number of ethnic Somalis from Kenya have also sought refuge in Uganda due to their fear of deportation to Somalia by the government of Kenya.

Uganda's President Museveni has engaged in talks with the governments of Sudan, Rwanda, and Kenya to discuss repatriation and to improve cooperation in light of regional instability. Uganda and Rwanda have established a committee to address long-term plans for the Rwandan refugees in Uganda.

Relations between Uganda and Zaire declined after Uganda offered asylum to 23 Zairean rebels. The two countries broke diplomatic ties for a brief period and have since reestablished formal relations.

Zaire

An estimated 311,500 Angolan refugees live in Zaire, a country whose president has played a significant role in the multinational effort to promote peace talks between the Angolan government and the rebel group, UNITA. Zaire also hosts 12,000 Rwandans, 4,000 Ugandans, 10,000 Burundians, and some 1,300 refugees from other countries. Some 3,000 of these refugees reside in urban centers, primarily in Kinshasa, but most are living in rural areas of eastern Zaire.

Many of the Angolan refugees have been in Zaire for up to twenty years and are considered permanently settled. Some 80,000, however, have entered since 1985

in response to continuing civil conflict and food shortages in Angola.

The Angolan refugees live primarily in southern Zaire, a majority in the Shaba region (40,000), but with substantial numbers also in the Bas Zaire and Bandundu regions. During late 1989, Zaire and Angola participated in a mutual voluntary repatriation exercise. By the end of the year, 3,000 Zairians had returned to Zaire, and 4,500 Angolans had repatriated to Angola. The repatriation process is expected to continue into 1990.

Zaire and Uganda agreed to set up a commission to address the status of Ugandan refugees in Zaire and Zairian refugees in Uganda. Some 4,000 Ugandans remained in Zaire after a major repatriation effort in 1987–88 in which 50,000 refugees repatriated to Uganda.

In March, USCR wrote to Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko expressing concern over reports that several thousand Sudanese seeking refuge in Zaire were turned away at the border. Noting that "Zaire traditionally has had an exemplary record of refugee protection," USCR called upon President Mobutu to continue to uphold the principles that Zaire accepted when it became a signatory to the UN Convention and Protocol Relating to Refugees.

Zambia

Zambia hosts an estimated 97,000 Angolan refugees, most of whom have been spontaneously settled or living in settlements in western Zambia since the late 1970s. Settlements for Angolan refugees are considered moderately successful. Their food production continues to be good, although when UNHCR handed over administration of the settlement to the Zambian government (which is UNHCR's policy once settlements become self-supporting), the government was unable to meet the high maintenance costs of some of the programs created by the international community. For example, agricultural equipment and grinding mills donated to the Angolan settlements now sit idle because the government does not have the foreign currency needed to buy spare parts.

Although some Mozambican refugees have also lived in Zambia for many years, most have arrived since 1985. Initially, they settled among relatives and clansmen in the sparsely populated border areas. In mid-1986, however, the government decreed that Mozambican refugees should be moved away from the border areas for security reasons and asked UNHCR for help in setting up a refugee settlement—not a camp—at Ukwimi, a site some distance from the border. Refugees were to be given enough land to become self-sufficient and not have to rely on international aid. By September 1989, almost all of the estimated 20,000 Mozambican refugees in Zambia were living at Ukwimi.

UNHCR considers Ukwimi a model refugee settlement, and Zambia's land-grant policy has been widely praised. Until recently, UNHCR believed that all the refugees at Ukwimi could be self-sufficient within two years of their arrival at the settlement. However, a major UNHCR funding crisis has forced cutbacks that have seriously retarded development of the settlement, and that goal is no longer feasible.

Zambia also hosts 9,000 Zairean, 3,200 South African, and 2,500 other refugees, for a total refugee population of 131,700. Following the repatriation of 3,760 Namibian refugees to their country during the year, only few Namibians enrolled in training programs remain in Zambia.

Zimbabwe

Some 78,000 Mozambicans live in refugee camps in Zimbabwe. The government of Zimbabwe estimates that another 100,000 live outside the camps, though some observers consider that figure high. The camps are among the best run in Africa. They are administered by social workers who are sensitive to the need for social services such as day care and supervised foster care. However, on other—significant—levels, the camp residents are among the worst off refugees in the region.

The camps are overcrowded, and the refugees do not have land that they can cultivate; they are forbidden to work; and the camps are surrounded by high fences that the government asserts were built to protect the refugees, though others say that the security argument is not justified. The major problem that Mozambicans continue to face in Zimbabwe, however, is continuing forced repatriations, though it is predominantly the spontaneously settled refugees who are vulnerable to that.

In 1987, following numerous cross-border attacks by RENAMO guerrillas, Zimbabwe vented its anger by forcing more than 10,000 Mozambicans back across the border. Following a wave of international protest, Zimbabwe agreed to end the pushbacks and, in November of that year, granted Mozambicans refugee status. Despite government denials, however, the *refoulement* continued. An estimated 9,000 were said to have been forced back during 1988. In 1989, the numbers have been lower: 3,000 during the year. Some observers believe that the pushbacks are not official government policy, but that they are carried out by local officials or military units who resent the presence of the refugees or who suspect them of sympathizing with RENAMO. In *Peace or Terror*, a December issue paper on refugees in southern Africa, USCR stated, "The number of refugees forcibly repatriated from Zimbabwe to Mozambique or pushed back at the border has diminished considerably this year. That, however, is not good enough. It must stop completely."

Zimbabwe's security problems along its border with Mozambique are at the root of many of these problems. RENAMO has not confined its terrorism to Mozambique. It regularly makes incursions into Zimbabwe. RENAMO claims that these attacks are in retaliation for Zimbabwe's military aid to Mozambique. Zimbabwe maintains more than 10,000 troops in Mozambique. They guard the Beira corridor, the road and rail line that connects Zimbabwe with the Mozambican port of Beira, and protect convoys traveling through the Tete corridor, the road link between Zimbabwe and Malawi.

During the six-month period between January 25 and July 24, the Zimbabwean government recorded 80 murders and 78 abductions of Zimbabweans by RENAMO.

To protect its borders from RENAMO, Zimbabwe has created a no-man's land stretching 10 kilometers on either side of the border. Many Zimbabweans who lived in these areas have been moved into protected villages farther away, and some of the Mozambicans who had been spontaneously settled along the border were moved into refugee camps. Although the clearing of the border was intended to help prevent RENAMO attacks, it has also discouraged Mozambican refugees from trying to enter Zimbabwe, as they are liable to be shot in the attempt.

In July, the government of Botswana terminated the refugee status of the remaining Zimbabwean refugees in that country.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Australia

Australia resettled 11,309 refugees in 1989 under its refugee and special humanitarian programs, the majority from Indochina.

Under the terms of the regional "Comprehensive Plan of Action" to address the 15-year-old Indochinese refugee crisis, Australia has made a commitment to resettle 11,000 "longstayers" in the next three years.

The balance of Australia's refugee admissions came from Eastern Europe, Central and South America, West Asia, and Africa.

Australia is also the destination of a relatively small but growing number of asylum seekers, with 488 applications lodged at ports of entry in 1987, 521 in 1988, and 920 in 1989. The largest groups of asylum seekers in 1989 were Fijians (289), Chinese (245), Bangladeshis (110), Sri Lankans (88), Indians (66), Somalis (58), and Iranians (45).

In 1989, about 9 percent of asylum seekers were granted refugee status, while another 15 percent were approved to remain permanently in Australia under other humanitarian provisions in Australian law.

Burma (Myanmar)

Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced in Burma in more than forty years of continuous civil war. Most of the recently displaced have been from ethnic minority groups such as the Kachin, the Shan, the Wa, the Karen, the Mon, and the Karenni, who have been carrying on armed campaigns for self-determination.

In a July visit to the Thai-Burmese border, USCR obtained figures estimating that the numbers of recently displaced included 32,000 Karen, 6,400 Mon, 4,000 Karenni, and about 52,000 Kachin.

The vast majority of the displaced are poor villagers. Some are cared for by local insurgent groups, who are usually able to provide temporary food, shelter, and medical assistance. Often, however, people displaced by Burmese army offensives, having moved to remote or mountainous areas, are forced to engage in opium cultivation to survive. The dynamics of displacement in Burma, in large part, have led the country to become the largest producer of opium in the world.

More than 55,000 Vietnamese asylum seekers in Hong Kong, many of them women and children, are forced to live in crowded and unsanitary camps. UNHCR/A. Hollmann

Army roundups of ordinary citizens in both rural and urban areas to use as porters for counter-insurgency campaigns have also compelled many people to move away from their homes.

Seven to nine thousand Burmese dissidents, mainly high school and university students, fled to Thai, Indian, and Chinese border areas following the government's brutal repression of a nationwide pro-democracy uprising in 1988 that left up to ten thousand people dead.

Many of the five to seven thousand students who arrived at the Thai border returned to Burma after suffering from lack of food and medical care. An estimated 2,000 remained at the border in makeshift camps in territory belonging to ethnic insurgent groups, until Bur-

mese army attacks drove virtually all of them into Thailand.

At least one thousand students were forcefully repatriated from Thailand in 1989. Perhaps as many as five hundred returnees have been jailed, tortured, or executed.

Although the Thai government has given temporary refuge to 22,000 Karen refugees, it has been less willing to accommodate new arrivals. Burmese army offensives in late 1989 sent as many as 5,000 Karen and 10,000 Mon across the border into Thailand.

At the end of December, 200 Karens, including women and children, fleeing a Burmese army attack were handed over directly to Burmese security forces. All the men in the group reportedly were taken by the Burmese army to use as forced labor.

In addition, Thailand deported several thousand Burmese workers back to Burma as illegal immigrants. Many have been kept in Thai jails for several months without trial and generally no attempt is made to determine whether any of these people are fleeing forced labor or other types of persecution.

Students who fled to the Chinese border live in territory belonging to the Kachin insurgents. Those who crossed into India have been placed in refugee camps and have been assisted by the state governments of Manipur and Mizoram.

More than 250,000 Burmese refugees, mainly Muslims of mixed Burman and Indian ancestry, fled to Bangladesh in late 1978, after large-scale Burmese army persecution of Muslims in Arakan State. Though some were repatriated shortly afterwards, an undetermined number still remain.

Many Burmese Moslems of Indian ancestry as well as Bangladeshis have been jailed in Burma for extremely long periods without trial on illegal immigration charges. Similarly, a number of Vietnamese, Lao, and Chinese refugees have been jailed without any access to outside legal assistance.

A small community of Tibetan refugees has lived in Burma since the 1950s. Several Tibetan villages have been established in the very northernmost area of the country near Fort Hertz, but have not received any international assistance.

Cambodia

On paper, prospects for the safe repatriation of more than 300,000 Cambodian refugees and displaced persons in Thailand seemed more encouraging in 1989 than ever before. In January UNHCR and the government of Cambodia signed an agreement establishing humanitarian and logistical conditions for voluntary return to Cambodia.

Since 1979, UNHCR, in cooperation with the Cambodian Red Cross, has facilitated the reintegration of 400,000 Cambodians returning home from Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. Most of these, however, returned between 1979 and 1983, before the fighting escalated between the Vietnamese-backed government of Cambodia and Cambodian resistance forces based along the border with Thailand.

At an international conference held in Paris in August, the four Cambodian factions vying for political and military advantage agreed on some basic principles for repatriation. A conference statement noted that repatriation "should be voluntary and taken in full possession of the facts. Choice of destination within Cambodia should be that of the individual. The unity of the family must be preserved."

But in the wake of a final Vietnamese troop withdrawal and the failure to achieve a political settlement in Paris, civil war has spread throughout the country, spoiling any real hope of a safe, internationally monitored return home for the Cambodians on the border.

Most of the repatriation that is occurring from the border is either spontaneous—thousands of people have risked returning on their own to escape the terrors and indignities of the border camps—or forced. Between July 1988 and the end of 1989, Khmer Rouge leaders are believed to have moved more than 25,000 people from UN-assisted camps in Thailand to sites along what has been called the "hidden border," where an estimated 50,000 people live in satellite villages and military camps beyond the reach of international relief agencies.

A small trickle of people, however, do make their way back into Cambodia under UNHCR auspices. In such cases, UNHCR distributes reintegration kits (which include cloth, tools, domestic utensils, and rice) while working at the village level to rehabilitate schools and health dispensaries, and to promote agricultural production and income generation.

China

In what may be remembered as one of the most tumultuous years in recent Chinese history, the military brutally repressed popular dissent in the heart of the capital city and at the far reaches of the western frontier. While surprisingly few refugees resulted from these crackdowns, China's move was in sad contrast to the dramatic political reforms in Eastern Europe and left little optimism for the future of human rights in the most populous country on earth.

Cambodian women walk home through the mud of

On March 8, Chinese authorities imposed martial law in Tibet, following three days of violent clashes between unarmed anti-government demonstrators and local security forces. Tibetan exile groups in India accused the Chinese of killing 1,000 Tibetans and arresting 10,000 during and after the demonstrations.

Then in the early morning of June 4, army tanks rumbled into Tiananmen Square, scattering tens of thousands of students and workers who had gathered

there in support of democratic reform. Conservative estimates suggest that 1,000 people were killed and more than 6,000 arrested in the Tiananmen massacre and its aftermath.

Immediately after the Tiananmen killings, USCR issued a press release, urging the U.S. government to grant extended voluntary departure (EVD) to Chinese nationals in the United States.

EVD is a discretionary status granted by the Attorney General to groups of aliens in the United States who are temporarily unable to return home due to dangerous or unstable conditions there.

About two-thirds of the 280,000 Vietnamese who fled their country in 1979 and settled in southern China have achieved economic self-sufficiency, thanks in part to $60 million contributed by UNHCR in the past nine years. The Chinese government has contributed roughly $600 million in that same period.

Since 1979, more than 22,000 Vietnamese have continued on to Hong Kong in search of resettlement in other countries, although fewer than 200 made this trip in 1989. Most were repatriated to China.

Fewer than 50 Vietnamese are estimated to be in Fangcheng camp in China, awaiting offers of resettlement.

Site 2 camp on the Thai-Cambodian border, carrying a week's ration of rice.

Bryan McGowan

Hong Kong

Despite the threat of forced repatriation, overcrowded and squalid living conditions, increasing violence within the camps and hostility without, a sluggish and still suspect screening program, and prospects for resettlement that are at best remote, Vietnamese boat people poured into Hong Kong in 1989. In a three-month period from May through July, more than 23,000 arrived, nearly doubling the Vietnamese population.

Nearly 35,000 Vietnamese arrived in the British colony in 1989, bringing the total boat people population to 57,000, the highest figure in ten years.

Already pressed for space, the Hong Kong government responded by housing new arrivals on outlying islands, harbor ferries, and even the landing strip of a military airfield. In their search for new locations, the authorities encountered increasingly vocal, and sometimes hostile, opposition from Hong Kong residents.

Tensions inside the Vietnamese camps also rose, particularly when it was reported in July that Britain and Vietnam were nearing agreement on a program to return, voluntarily or otherwise, all Vietnamese screened out by Hong Kong immigration officials as nonrefugees.

On the evening of July 31, fighting broke out between rival Vietnamese factions in Shamshuipo detention center. Before 160 riot police intervened, eight people had been injured, including three young boys.

Less than one month later, on August 27, more than 1,000 northern and southern Vietnamese attacked one another on the island of Tai A Chau. This time, 350 riot policemen were called in, following a night of robberies, assaults, and five reported rapes.

Then, on September 2, a Vietnamese man was killed and 11 others injured as violence erupted in Sek Kong detention center, a tent city of more than 7,000 people, pitched on a British Air Force runway.

In the first year since Hong Kong instituted refugee screening procedures for new Vietnamese boat arrivals last June 16, the program has been criticized by a wide range of human rights groups and refugee organizations. Critics pointed to its low approval rates (out of 7,278 people interviewed as of the end of the year, 818 have been screened in), inadequate training of interviewers and translators, intimidation of applicants, inordinate delays, and a host of other problems.

In an effort to ease local concerns at the massive influx of asylum seekers, resettlement countries offered about 4,000 Vietnamese new lives abroad in 1989, nearly doubling the figure of the previous year. But these numbers still came nowhere close to offsetting the recent influx, and resettlement appears to be out of reach for most of the recent arrivals.

Under the terms of the regional "Comprehensive Plan of Action" (CPA) agreed to at the Geneva conference in June, the international community agreed to resettle the nearly 13,000 Vietnamese who arrived in Hong Kong before a cut-off date was imposed on June 16, 1988.

Of the 44,000 who reached Hong Kong after that date, the terms of the CPA provide for the continued resettlement of the screened-in. Those who are screened out as nonrefugees, on the other hand, "should return to their country of origin in accordance with international practices." The agreement also stipulated that, "In the first instance, every effort will be made to encourage voluntary return."

On December 29, a group of 111 Vietnamese voluntarily returned home, bringing the total of voluntary repatriations in 1989 to 867. Another 1,000 people had expressed an interest in going back to Vietnam.

But Hong Kong and Britain have remained dissatisfied at the pace of voluntary returns and have pushed hard for the "mandatory" return of the screened-out. Despite opposition from the United States and human rights groups, on December 12, Hong Kong officials removed 51 Vietnamese asylum seekers from Phoenix House detention center, forced them aboard a chartered jet, and flew them back to Hanoi. This marked the first time in 15 years of Vietnamese boat flows that any have been involuntarily repatriated.

On that same day, USCR sent a letter to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher calling for a one-year moratorium on involuntary returns until screening has been fairly and fully implemented regionwide, and adequate international monitoring is in place in Vietnam to verify safe and humane treatment of the returnees.

Following the Tiananmen Square killings on June 4, and the subsequent Chinese government crackdown on prodemocracy activists, a number of students reportedly fled to Hong Kong. Government officials in Hong Kong stated that asylum seekers would not be sent back automatically. In late September, Amnesty International reported that one asylum seeker, Yang Yang, had been rejected by Hong Kong authorities and faced deportation and possible imprisonment.

Indonesia

Indonesia managed to stay out of the headlines in 1989, despite a significant increase in refugee arrivals, which has so often spelled trouble. Through October, more than 5,800 Vietnamese boat people sought asylum in Indonesia, nearly tripling its refugee population and far outpacing the 1,600 resettled during the same period. The camp population on Galang Island was 7,000, the highest it has been in four years. But, unlike last year, there were no reports of pushbacks or substantial mistreatment.

Nearly 7,000 Vietnamese arrived after the March 14 regional cut-off date, and are thus subject to local screening to determine their status. Although Indonesia reportedly has interviewed more than 1,000 people, the results of the screening have not been made public.

As part of its controversial "transmigration" program, Indonesia continued to move Javanese migrants into Irian Jaya, formerly called West New Guinea, displacing numbers of native Melanesians and fueling ethnic tensions. So far, an estimated 300,000 migrants have moved to Irian Jaya, out of a projected four million. (See Papua New Guinea.)

Japan

During the past decade, Vietnamese boat people have trickled into Japan. Rarely numbering more than a few hundred per year, the Vietnamese were given automatic right of residence by the government. Some sought resettlement in other countries; others settled locally.

Since May 1989, however, 3,100 asylum seekers landed in Japan, prompting the government to institute a screening program. Now, only those who can establish a claim to refugee status are granted residence. The rest, Japan insists, must return home.

But in screening the new arrivals, Japanese authorities are faced with a challenging question: where is home for the asylum seekers, and can they be returned there safely? Some are Vietnamese nationals of Chinese ethnicity who fled Vietnam in 1979 and were permanently resettled in China. Others are mainland Chinese who have claimed to be Vietnamese in hopes that this would improve their chances for asylum. Still others are, in fact, Vietnamese fleeing directly from their country.

In early December, Japan announced that it had completed arrangements with China to return about 300 Chinese citizens who were judged, after screening, to be economic migrants. China's laws impose lengthy jail terms for illegal departure, and Japanese officials admit that they have received no guarantees of nonreprisal from the Chinese government.

USCR wrote the Japanese government calling for restraint on return of screened-out Chinese and Vietnamese until their safety can be adequately guaranteed.

On December 21, Japan deported 301 Chinese nationals, and indicated that another 1,668 would be repatriated shortly.

Japanese screening of non-Chinese cases was expected to begin in February or March 1990, with UNHCR playing an observer role.

In 1985, Japan made an open-ended pledge to resettle 10,000 Indochinese refugees, and has admitted 6,200 so far.

Laos

About 1,700 Laotians in Thailand volunteered to return home under UNHCR auspices in 1989, the largest single-year total since the program began in 1980 (another 17,000 to 18,000 are estimated to have returned home spontaneously in that same period). By the end of the year, more than 300 highland and lowland Lao were choosing to repatriate each month, and Thai and Lao government officials were optimistic that the numbers would go still higher.

The recent success of the voluntary repatriation program generally is attributed to improved Thai-Lao relations, economic and political reforms in Laos, and to a growing confidence on the part of refugees in the camps that they will not fall victim to government reprisals.

UNHCR continued to assist returnees to Laos with initial reception and transportation to their villages; distribution of farming tools, household utensils, and rice until the next harvest; and various educational and development projects.

Since September 1988, Laos has released 160 political prisoners from reeducation camps, according to Amnesty International, but continues to hold several hundred without trial.

Malaysia

In tragic imitation of its northern neighbor Thailand's behavior the previous year, Malaysia responded to a surge in Vietnamese boat arrivals in early 1989 with a series of pushbacks that forced

Prospects of repatriation have improved dramatically for lowland Lao in Thailand but remain problematic for hilltribe people. Credit: UNHCR/A. Hollmann

several thousand people back out to sea, left at least five dead, and threatened to undermine, perhaps fatally, a new international agreement to resolve the long-running Vietnamese refugee crisis.

For nearly a decade, Malaysia had maintained a creditable record of generosity, granting temporary asylum to more than 250,000 Vietnamese boat people, all but 20,000 of whom have gone on to resettlement in other countries. But after a six-year decline, boat arrivals increased modestly in 1987, then more dramatically in 1988, and patience began to wear thin.

By early 1989, nearly 2,000 Vietnamese were arriving per month, the highest rate since 1981. On March 14, in conjunction with other Southeast Asian nations, Malaysia issued a statement that all Vietnamese who arrived after that cut-off date would be required to clear a regional determination of refugee status before they could seek resettlement elsewhere.

Intended as a deterrent, the cut-off date inspired what one international refugee official called a "last-chance mentality," and boat outflows surged. The month of March saw 2,800 new arrivals; in April there were 3,400.

Some time around May 25, Malaysian authorities began to turn some Vietnamese boats away. By mid-July, according to UNHCR, at least 16 boats carrying about 900 people had turned up in Indonesia, after having tried to land in Malaysia.

UNHCR's representative in Malaysia said he was "surprised and disappointed" at the pushbacks, particularly since Malaysia had chaired an international conference in June, at which all participants pledged that "temporary refuge will be given to all asylum seekers."

Malaysian officials at first denied knowledge of the pushbacks, then later insisted they were necessary since resettlement assurances were faltering.

On October 20, a Greek ship rescued a boatload of Vietnamese 75 miles off the coast of Borneo and took them to Singapore. The group told refugee officials there that about one week earlier a Malaysian vessel had provided them with food and water, but then towed them for 19 hours back out to sea, and cut the boat adrift. In all, four people died of dehydration, starvation, and exposure.

From May to December, at least 3,200 Vietnamese were pushed back by Malaysian officials. USCR wrote to the Malaysian government calling for an

immediate end to the pushbacks in compliance with the "Comprehensive Plan of Action" agreed to at the conference in Geneva. USCR also wrote to Secretary of State James Baker, urging the United States to take a "strong stand" on the pushback problem.

Papua New Guinea

Very few refugees from Irian Jaya have crossed into Papua New Guinea since 1984, when clashes between the Indonesian military and guerrillas of the separatist Free Papua Movement (OPM) contributed to the flight of 10,000 ethnic Melanesians from their homeland. Of these, about 8,100 Irian Jayans remained in Papua New Guinea (PNG) at the end of 1989.

Since UNHCR was invited by the PNG government to assist in 1986, the agency has facilitated movement of Irian Jayans in two directions from 12 original border camps. More than 1,700 have voluntarily returned to Irian Jaya under UNHCR auspices since 1984, although only 11 people returned in the first half of 1989.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has opened an office in Jayapura, Irian Jaya, to monitor the reintegration of returnees.

About 4,300 refugees, including 3,000 in East Awin, are assisted by UNHCR in five locations.

Another 3,800 Irian Jayan refugees living in seven closed border camps are being encouraged to return voluntarily or to move to East Awin.

Philippines

The Philippines continued to serve as country of first asylum for Vietnamese boat people, with nearly 7,000 arrivals in 1989. More than 9,500 Vietnamese were in Palawan at the end of the year, by far the highest number in the history of the camp.

In late June, two weeks after the Tiananmen Square massacre, 21 Chinese "boat people" arrived in the Philippines. Immigration authorities granted them temporary asylum, pending UNHCR verification of their status. A statement from two members of the group said that their intent had been to reach Taiwan.

From January 1988 to August 1989, more than 450,000 people were internally displaced by counterinsurgency efforts in the Philippine countryside. Most of the the people fleeing military operations and vigilante harassment are peasants from the regions of Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. President Corazon Aquino's controversial "total war policy" against communist rebels of the New People's Army has led to bombings and massive forced relocations of civilians in contested areas.

Thailand

For refugees in Thailand, 1989 lacked the dramatic headlines of the previous year, which included massive pushbacks of Vietnamese, and the flight of Burmese refugees from a military crackdown. Instead, refugee prospects, and current predicaments, rode an unsteady see-saw through the year.

Opportunities for voluntary repatriation increased for the lowland Lao, but so did the forced return of Cambodians and Burmese. The systematic pushback of Vietnamese boats ended, but sporadic incidents still occurred. Pirate attacks in the Gulf of Thailand, meanwhile, grew more and more savage.

Hope for a settlement of the Cambodian conflict seemed to grow more distant in 1989, and with it the prospects of a safe and speedy return home for more than 300,000 Cambodian refugees and displaced persons on the Thai border. Instead, in the wake of a final Vietnamese troop withdrawal, Cambodia was plunged into an all-out civil war between four rival Cambodian factions.

The Khmer Rouge, whose bloody four-year rule cost the lives of more than one million Cambodians, consolidated their military gains by forcibly removing thousands of people living in UN-supervised camps in Thailand and relocating them to "repatriation villages" along the border and inside Cambodia. Since July 1988, the Khmer Rouge have isolated an estimated 30,000 people, most of them noncombatants, from international access and protection.

With official avenues of return so unpromising, many Cambodians on the border—perhaps 30,000 or more—found their own way home in 1989, despite the risk of minefields, bandit ambush, or attack by any of the rival military groups. The population at Site 2, previously assessed at 180,000, stood at 143,000 after a July headcount. UN officials attributed the decline to more accurate census-taking and substantial spontaneous repatriation.

But for the dangerous road home, there was no way out for border Cambodians. About 4,800 Cambodians were resettled as refugees in 1989, with 1,916 going to the United States. Virtually all of the U.S. approvals went to Cambodians previously denied admission, some as long ago as 1983, whose cases were reconsidered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

On May 31, the Thai government announced, perhaps for the final time, that Khao I Dang refugee camp would be closed for resettlement processing. At year's end, 11,580 Cambodians remained in the camp, facing an uncertain future.

Even the much more limited option of migration to the United States with an immigrant visa or humanitarian parole status was closed off for most of the year.

From January to September, Thai officials prohibited U.S. access to interview approximately 750 HP/IV cases in Site 2 and other border camps. When access finally was granted, and consular officers began to interview cases, new problems arose in gaining Thai permission to move cases off the border.

Under terms unanimously endorsed at the Paris conference on Cambodia in August, UNHCR has been given the task of coordinating repatriation efforts on both sides of the border. Eventually, it is expected to replace the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) as the chief administrative agency for border Cambodians. There was talk of converting Khao I Dang into a vocational training center to prepare the long-time camp residents for repatriation.

In July and August, 6,800 Vietnamese asylum seekers in Ban That camp, adjacent to Site 2, were moved to Phanat Nikhom, a holding camp and processing center near Bangkok. This group had arrived in Thailand before a March 14 cut-off date, and were permitted to seek resettlement in a third country.

Vietnamese who arrived after the cut-off were required to undergo screening by Thai immigration officials. Under the terms of the "Comprehensive Plan of Action" that was drafted at a June international conference in Geneva, the screened-in would be allowed to seek resettlement; the screened-out must wait in Thailand until they agree to go back to Vietnam.

Although the CPA dealt primarily with Vietnamese asylum seekers, it also provided for full access by all Laotian

asylum seekers, both highland and lowland, to the Laotian border screening program, which was established in July 1985.

At the end of June, Thai officials announced the temporary cessation of Laotian screening in order to incorporate new interview guidelines consistent with the CPA and to centralize screening sites. When the program resumed again in September, lowland Lao were told to go to Nong Saeng detention center in Nakorn Phanom. The hilltribe groups, principally the Hmong, were to report to Chiang Kham camp in northern Thailand.

The new system worked better for the lowland Lao than for the Hmong, but problems persisted for both groups. The situation for lowland Lao was complicated by Thai roundups of about 2,500 undocumented Lao, who had been living in Thailand for some years. Most of these so-called "free-livers" were sent to Nong Saeng, worsening the already overcrowded and unsanitary conditions. On a July visit to Nong Saeng, USCR found 2,300 people living in the facility.

About 90 percent of the lowland Lao who were interviewed in 1989 were screened in and allowed to enter Na Pho camp, where they were eligible to apply for resettlement.

Since 1980, a total of 5,357 Laotians have returned home voluntarily under UNHCR auspices, including 4,086 lowland Lao and 1,271 highlanders. About 1,700 Laotians went home in 1989, the highest annual total since the program began.

While the number of lowland Lao repatriations increased to the point that they consistently outpaced arrivals in 1989, returning Hmong numbered only about 300. Despite the centralization of screening in Chiang Kham, virtually all Hmong preferred to enter Ban Vinai without registering with Thai authorities.

Part of this may be due to the continued Hmong mistrust of Thai border officials, given the persistent problems of pushbacks. Ban Vinai is, in addition, a far more appealing environment for the Hmong than the isolated and overcrowded Chiang Kham. It is also the case that Hmong perceive the border screening program as a track for resettlement, and new arrivals as well as longstayers remain ambivalent about that option.

Although few reports of Hmong pushbacks surfaced from the Thai side in 1989, the problem has not disappeared. On September 23, according to a relief worker, a group of seven unregistered Hmong living in Ban Vinai were removed from the camp. One man reportedly died in jail in the Thai town of Loei; the rest were sent back to Laos.

The Lao government reported that, from March until the end of the year, Thailand had pushed back 3,000 people, but this figure could not be substantiated.

Following the Burmese army's bloody crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in September, thousands of students and other activists fled to the Thai-Burma border. About 7,000 sought sanctuary with the ethnic minority groups waging their own battle with the Rangoon government. Another 1,000 crossed the border into Thailand.

In December 1988 and January 1989, the Thai government cooperated with the Burmese government, led by Gen. Saw Maung, to repatriate about 300 Burmese students to Rangoon. Amnesty International charged that force and coercion were being used in the repatriation effort.

In the face of domestic and international protest, Thailand scrapped the program, but announced that as of March 31, all Burmese in Thailand without proper documentation would be treated as illegal immigrants subject to arrest and deportation. Most of the students arrested after that date were detained briefly, fined, and then returned to camps in minority-held areas on the Burmese side of the border.

Student camp populations, which totalled around 3,000 at mid-year, have been depleted by malaria, malnutrition, and Burmese army attack.

Following a visit to the Burmese border in July, USCR presented testimony to Congress, calling for an enhanced U.S. and international role in providing aid to students and ethnic minorities displaced or forced to flee the country as a result of government repression.

In November, Congress passed legislation that provided $250,000 in humanitarian assistance to Burmese students at the border, but at the end of the year, the money had not been spent.

The United States also considered about 20 Burmese students for refugee status. Four Burmese were admitted with "humanitarian parole" status in 1989, which provides no federal assistance.

[In the first two months of 1990, Burmese army attacks forced students to flee their camps along the border and seek sanctuary in Thailand. Camps at Ye Kyaw, Wang Ka, Thay Baw Bo, Three Pagodas Pass, and Moe Taung fell, and an unknown number of students died or were captured.

More than 2,000 fled into Thailand, some to border towns, most to Bangkok, where they are living without legal status and with little international assistance.

The Burmese army offensive also sent about 15,000 ethnic minority civilians into Thailand. An estimated 8,000 Mon crossed the border in January, and about 7,000 Karen fled into Tak province, joining a population of 20,000 Karen refugees who have been living in Thailand since 1985.]

Vietnam

In terms of migration from Vietnam, 1989 was a record-setting year. On the positive side of the ledger, more than 39,000 Vietnamese refugees and immigrants departed the country safely and legally through the Orderly Departure Program (ODP). Of these, nearly 29,000 came to the United States.

Both the U.S. and worldwide figures are the highest annual totals since the ODP was established in July 1979 as an alternative to clandestine escape.

In July 1989, the U.S. and Vietnamese governments finally reached an agreement that eventually may allow up to 50,000 former reeducation camp prisoners and accompanying family members to emigrate. The first group of 190 people entered the United States just at the turn of the year.

On the other hand, 1989 saw the flight of more than 71,000 Vietnamese in 1989, the largest number in ten years. More than half of the recent asylum seekers are from the northern and central regions of Vietnam.

Any number of reasons have been proposed for the continued exodus, ranging from political and economic to sociological and personal.

Along with the continued, often involuntary, movement of people to "new economic zones" (the government has relocated more than 3.5 million people within Vietnam since 1975), there was a new crackdown on dissent late in the year, as hardliners in the government struck preemptively to discourage the sort of pro-democracy movements that swept Eastern Europe and, closer to home, were swept away in China and Burma.

The Vietnamese economy remained in desperate shape. Inflation has averaged about 700 percent in recent years,

(continued on page 59)

PIRATE ATTACKS ON VIETNAMESE REFUGEES GROW MORE VICIOUS

By Court Robinson
Policy Analyst, U.S. Committee for Refugees

All hell has broken loose on the South China Sea. Thugs and murderers, too kindly called "pirates," are butchering Vietnamese refugees off the coastlines of Thailand and Malaysia. Many of the victims are relatives of Vietnamese-Americans; the grief in the community is boundless. The numbers of dead and missing have been climbing for the last two years, but even more appalling is the way people are dying.

On January 15, the naked bodies of 11 Vietnamese women washed up on a southern Thai beach. Each had a nylon rope tied about her neck. It appears that the women, who ranged in age from 19 to 26, were raped, bound, pushed overboard, then towed in the water until they drowned, whereupon their killers cut the bodies adrift.

In August last year, survivors of an attack told how Thai pirates had seized and plundered their boat, abducting some refugees and throwing the rest in the hold. They still weren't done. "The fishermen-pirates," said one account, "brought up men singly from the hold, clubbed them and then killed them with axes ... Ramming, sinking and killing of Vietnamese in the water followed." In all, 71 people died, including 15 women and 11 children.

In another incident, 130 people were beaten, raped, shot, or thrown into the sea. Their boats were burned. One man survived.

In the first nine months of 1989, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 647 Vietnamese were dead or missing as a result of pirate attacks near Thailand and Malaysia. In 1988, the total was 449.

What is going so gruesomely wrong out there? Boat flows have increased in the region in the last three years, likewise the percentage of boats attacked. Still, simple mathematics cannot explain the logarithmic leap in violence.

Part of the answer lies, paradoxically, in the very successes of the internationally funded anti-piracy effort. In 1981, when the U.S. government provided $2 million to launch a Thai-American operation of air and sea surveillance, 77 percent of refugee boats arriving in Thailand had been attacked, 600 women and girls were raped, and nearly 900 people were dead or missing. The following year, the UNHCR, with support from the United States and 11 other countries, launched an international program, which continues today.

As efforts to catch pirates on the open sea proved largely fruitless, the program turned more to land-based initiatives to arrest and prosecute offenders, register and monitor fishing boats, and promote local crime-watch efforts along the eastern and southern coastlines. Gradually, attack rates dropped to 53 percent in 1983, 35 percent in 1984, and down to 8 percent by 1987. The numbers of dead and missing also declined. By 1987, fewer than 100 people were reported missing, and two dead, due to piracy. Although these figures undoubtedly were incomplete, there was good cause for optimism.

These grim statistics began to rise again in 1988 and 1989, however, and with that came a horrifying new discovery: more of the pirate attacks than ever before seemed intent, not just on robbery and mayhem, but total massacre. Anti-piracy experts suggest that with the growing sophistication of investigative techniques, coupled with higher rates of arrests and convictions, pirates try to be sure to leave no witnesses.

But the governments of Thailand and Malaysia, for all the credit they deserve in combatting piracy, have also contributed to the surge of violence in the gulf. First Thailand in 1988, then Malaysia in 1989, reintroduced systematic boat pushbacks as an instrument of state practice, if not policy. Two years ago, Thailand pushed back out to sea an estimated 3,000 Vietnamese asylum seekers, and hundreds of people died. From May to December 1989, Malaysian authorities have driven away 3,200 boat people. Five deaths are known, and the practice shows no sign of being ended.

(continued from page 57)

and unemployment stood at 20 percent in most urban areas. The country's infrastructure is in shambles, and poverty is widespread.

The desire to reunite with family members and friends overseas also remained a strong incentive to leave Vietnam.

Still, for all too many Vietnamese the trip was disastrous. More than 800 people were reported dead or missing due to pirate in the Gulf of Thailand in 1989. Statistics on the missing and the murdered kept on a vicious spiral upward, an apparent result of increased "professionalism" on the part of both pirates and police—as land-based arrests and prosecutions grow more numerous, attacks leave fewer witnesses.

Of those who headed for Malaysia, in the last eight months of 1989, at least 3,200 people were met by Malaysian coastal patrols and escorted, or towed, back to sea. At least five people died from starvation, dehydration, and exposure.

A majority of clandestine departures now take a northern route, skirting China's seacoast or travelling its southern roads to Hong Kong. More than 50,000 Vietnamese, 90 percent northerners, reached Hong Kong in 1989, most to find a cold welcome, crowded camps, and the only real offer a ticket back. Nearly 900 Vietnamese in first-asylum camps returned home voluntarily last year, the highest number to do so since 1975. Most have left Hong Kong since March, where, at the end of the year, another 1,000 volunteers waited to return.

But certainly the most dubious record in 1989 was set on December 12 by, and at the expense of, just 51 men, women, and children who—for the first time in the history of the Vietnamese exodus—were forcibly returned by an asylum country, in this case Hong Kong.

There is little question that such state-sponsored abuse erodes public sympathy and public order, and gives license to private adventurism.

If this piracy is to be stopped, the first order of business must be to halt the pushbacks. A key international agreement that was crafted in Geneva last summer established a set of interlocking commitments on the treatment of Vietnamese boat people. One fundamental pledge on the part of the countries of asylum was that "temporary refuge will be given to all asylum seekers."

Both the United States and UNHCR must press vigorously for Malaysia and Thailand to reaffirm this commitment in the context of the "Comprehensive Plan of Action," or CPA, as the Geneva agreement is called. UNHCR must be given prompt, initial access to all boat arrivals, to interview victims of violence and ensure they receive necessary treatment. Access is another pledge in the CPA that has been frequently disregarded. Rescue-at-sea efforts must also be reinvigorated, and a vital counselling program for rape and trauma victims that is in danger of ending must be refunded.

It would be an important signal of his regard for protection for the new UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Thorvald Stoltenberg, to give this issue high priority. But strong support from the United States will be essential. Vietnamese-American communities across the country are grieving. Our government should respond.

A total of 867 Vietnamese in Hong Kong returned home voluntarily in 1989, but protests were mounted in the camps against forced repatriation. NYT/Mark Fallander

EUROPE

Austria

World attention focused on Austria in 1989 as the site of the first breach in the fortifications dividing East and West. The first dismantling of barbed wire fences on East European borders took place May 2 on the Hungarian side of the Austrian border. By the close of a year that saw one wall after another fall, the dismantling of the barbed wire fence dividing Czechoslovakia and Austria in December almost came as an anticlimax.

Hungary's actions, though, led the way. Because this was the first Warsaw Pact nation to ratify the UN refugee Convention in March, the summer months saw a build up of East Germans seeking to cross into the West via the now open border between Hungary and Austria. For several months, however, Hungarian border guards continued to arrest East Germans attempting to cross, but were reluctant—in part because of new international obligations—to return them to East Germany. On September 11, Budapest decided to allow East Germans free passage across Hungary's western border into Austria. Within 36 hours of that decision, about 10,000 East Germans had crossed from Hungary into Austria. Most spent little time in Austria, and transited quickly into West Germany. By November, before the complete opening of East German borders, some 30,000 refugees from the GDR filed through such Austrian border towns as Nickelsdorf and Mannersdorf on their way to West Germany.

In 1989, Austria probably saw more refugees and emigrants pass through its borders than at any time since the Hungarian uprising of 1956. Most of these were in transit: East Germans on their way to West Germany via Hungary; about 74,000 Soviet Jews and another 1,573 Iranian Jews hoping for resettlement in the United States or Israel; even the first hundreds of ethnic Turks expelled from Bulgaria destined for Turkey.

Yet many refugees have now had to remain in Austria, finding fewer opportunities for third-country resettlement. One local official has spoken of the danger of Austria becoming "a giant waiting room." At the beginning of 1989, some 15,239 refugees and asylum seekers were living in refugee camps, hostels, and other accommodations in Austria. The largest camp, Traiskirchen, was holding an average of 1,800 persons, many of whom were Poles and Hungarians.

The lessening of passport and travel restrictions in Poland and Hungary, combined with Austria's dropping of visa requirements for travelers from those countries at the beginning of 1988, led to a quadrupling of asylum requests from those two nationalities in the first four months of that year. Consequently, in May 1988, Austria imposed what it called a "summary procedure" for Hungarian and Polish asylum applicants, involving the elimination of waiting periods for refugee status interviews and appeals. The summary procedure was extended to Romanians and Yugoslavs, as well. The government gives asylum applicants from these countries an information sheet telling them that their chances of being recognized as refugees are remote and that, if denied, they can "return to their native country without suffering any economic or social problems there."

In the first 10 months of 1989, 16,230 persons applied for asylum in Austria, of whom 2,262 were recognized as refugees, an approval rate of about 14 percent. The figure for the first ten months of 89 already exceeds the total for all of 1988—15,790.

The largest number of applicants, 6,140, were Romanians, of whom 1,404, or 23 percent, were recognized as refugees. Only 16 percent of Czechoslovaks, 8 percent of Hungarians, 5 percent of Poles, and 2 percent of Yugoslavs were recognized as refugees.

Nationals of Turkey, representing the fourth highest number of applicants, had a recognition rate of 1.5 percent.

At the end of 1989, the government estimated a total of 21,000 asylum seekers in Austria, of whom about 10,000 were waiting initial decisions on their claims and of whom about 11,000 were appealing negative decisions. Except for those nationalities covered by the summary procedure, who are cut off from government assistance, other asylum seekers are assisted by the government during appeal of their cases, but are not authorized to work.

Cyprus

The situation of some 200,000 Greek Cypriots and 65,000 Turkish Cypriots displaced in 1974 was still not resolved in 1989. In both April and June, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and Cypriot President George Vassiliou met under the auspices of the UN to resolve the issue. Both meetings ended in failure, however. Among other things, the Greek Cypriots were angered by Denktash's offers to Ankara to resettle Bulgarian Turkish refugees in northern Cyprus. Some 30,000 settlers are believed to have immigrated to the northern sector from Turkey since 1974. In addition, 20,000 Turkish troops occupy the northern sector.

In September, a Greek Cypriot government official wrote to USCR to say that given the many problems facing Cyprus, including displacement of one-third of its population, occupation by foreign troops, and the "danger of further trouble," that it is "manifestly true" that Cyprus is unable to accept refugees from other countries for resettlement "at least until the national problem is resolved."

Nevertheless, beginning in March, the southern Cypriot city of Larnaca became a major destination of some 40,000 refugees (mainly Christian) fleeing the war in Lebanon. A smaller number of Lebanese Muslims leaving via Tripoli was also reported. As most embassies' consular sections have been closed in Beirut, those seeking to leave Lebanon had little choice but to go to either Cyprus or Syria to seek visas. Because of its own refugee situation, the Cypriot government would not grant asylum to the Lebanese refugees, but offered to help in their resettlement. Many moved on to France and Canada, and some to the United States and other destinations. In October, with a cease-fire in effect in southern Lebanon and Beirut, many of the Christian refugees opted to return to their homeland.

Czechoslovakia

Before the fall of its own hard-line communist government late in the year, Czechoslovakia had become a key transit point for East Germans migrating to the West. By fate of geography, Czechoslovakia lay along the route from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to reformist Hungary and an easy crossing to Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany.

As the human tide from the GDR confronted the hard-line authorities in Prague, Czech leader Gustav Husak chose to tighten Czechoslovakia's frontiers by strengthening security forces at key border crossings. Hungarian border patrols reported witnessing Czech border guards chasing and beating East Germans attempting to flee into Hungary. There were also reports of three East Germans having drowned attempting to swim across the Danube. As a result of this clampdown by Czech officials, thousands of East Germans poured into the West German embassy in Prague. By the time the West German government closed the embassy to refugees on October 4, the numbers in the crowded compound had swelled to 5,000. On that same day, East Berlin announced that the 11,000 East Germans in Czechoslovakia were free to travel to the West aboard special trains established by the East German government. However, all border crossings between East Germany and Czechoslovakia were to be closed, sealing off the last escape route for many East Germans.

On November 4, East Germany and Czechoslovakia reached a further agreement on East German emigration. East German citizens would only have to present an internal identity document to Czech authorities to enable them to cross from Czechoslovakia into West Germany. Accordingly, some 5,000 East Germans left Czechoslovakia, some aboard special West German trains.

With the downfall of the Husak regime in December, Prague declared open borders and began dismantling fortifications along the Austrian frontier. Some of the more prominent exiles among the 100,000 persons who had left the country for political reasons since 1968 began to return and renew their participation in a reformed Czechoslovakia.

Denmark

Despite the imposition of sanctions against airline carriers bringing undocumented aliens, which went into effect January 1, 1989, the number of asylum seekers arriving at Danish airports did not appreciably decrease in 1989 from previous years. As of November 26, a total of 4,128 persons had applied for asylum in Denmark in 1989. In all of 1988, about 4,700 people had applied for asylum in Denmark. Through the end of November, 3,919 had been granted asylum during 1989.

The new year also saw the imposition of visas for Romanians. Asylum applications from that nationality dropped precipitously. There was also a decrease in the number of Polish asylum seekers following the introduction of a rapid procedure to adjudicate their refugee claims in late 1988.

One of 14 centers for asylum seekers run by the German Red Cross in Berlin. UNHCR/A. Holmann

Other measures to restrict entry of asylum seekers in recent years have not taken hold. A policy of returning asylum seekers who had come to Denmark via "safe countries," which had resulted in the return of about 300 persons in 1988, was modified to consider those who had only passed through safe third countries in transit. As of the end of the year, plans to construct a detention facility for certain asylum seekers had not yet been implemented.

Palestinians represent the largest group of asylum seekers. Palestinians from Lebanon are generally granted refugee status; others receive permission to stay on humanitarian grounds. Iranians and Iraqis, the second and third largest groups, are not returned to their home countries.

As of January 1, 1989, Denmark doubled its quota of refugee admissions from 250 to 500.

France

A year that began with the government welcoming foreigners ended with a French declaration that the doors to outsiders would be closed.

In his 1989 New Year's address, French President François Mitterand said that summary expulsion procedures would be ended and residency requirements liberalized. However, in December, following a year of controversy involving, among other things, the expulsion from school of expatriate Muslim girls for insisting on wearing their veils to class, and electoral gains by the anti-immigrant National Front party, the Prime Minister announced that France "can no longer be a land of immigration." The government announced "a real interdiction policy" to keep out undocumented aliens and the introduction of measures to reduce the number of requests for political asylum.

In unveiling its plans, the government reported 60,000 pending asylum applications, of which, the Interior Minister said, only 2 or 3 percent would likely be approved.

In the first half of the year, 25,896 asylum applications were received. For that period, France's approval rate stood at 36 percent. About 60,000 asylum applicants were estimated for all of 1989.

On August 2, the "Joxe Law" (named after Interior Minister Pierre Joxe) was passed by parliament to ease the issuance of residence permits. The new law also limited grounds for the emergency expulsion procedure, which had been promulgated under the restrictive Pasqua Law in 1986, and created a procedure for judicial review of expulsions.

Federal Republic of Germany

The images of November 9—thousands of East Germans pouring through the newly opened Berlin Wall by foot, bicycle, and in hundreds of distinctive Trabant automobiles—defined the refugee situation for world public opinion in 1989.

Ironically, however, the estimated 720,000 ethnic Germans who crossed into West Germany in 1989 are *not* considered to be refugees by either the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) or as defined by international refugee law.

According to the German constitution, ethnic Germans have the "right of return" and receive automatic citizenship on arrival without restriction.

In actuality, less than half of the ethnic Germans entering the FRG in 1989 were East Germans. More than 250,000 emigrated legally from Poland, more than 93,000 from the USSR, and in excess of 23,000 from Romania. Of the 255,000 ethnic German arrivals in 1988, some 200,000 were from countries other than East Germany.

The series of events culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall began during the summer months as thousands of East Germans traveled to Hungary, which, in May, began dismantling the barbed wire fence on its border with Austria. Although several thousand East Germans managed to cross the Hungarian border illegally during the summer, Hungarian border patrols continued to apprehend those seeking to flee. Thousands remained in Hungary, some of whom sought refuge in the West German embassy in Budapest. Soon West German diplomatic posts in Prague and East Berlin were besieged by East Germans seeking sanctuary. On August 8, the West German government closed its East Berlin mission; later in the month, it did the same in Budapest and Prague.

A break in the impasse came on August 24 when the Hungarian government allowed 108 East Germans camped at the Budapest embassy to fly to the FRG.

Bonn announced on August 30 that four tent camps were being set up in southeastern Bavaria to house an expected wave of East Germans coming from Hungary. The mass migration of East Germans finally came on September 10 when Hungary announced that the more than 7,000 East Germans in Hungary refusing to return home would be allowed passage to West Germany. In less than five days, 13,000 East Germans crossed into Austria, and then travelled to the refugee camps in Bavaria.

In late September, Czechoslovakia tightened its borders to refugees attempting to pass through that country en route from East Germany to Hungary. This action caused thousands of East Germans to seek sanctuary at the West German embassy in Prague. A compromise to the latest crisis was reached on October 4 when 11,000 East Germans were shuttled out of Czechoslovakia and into FRG on ten special trains established by the East German government. East Germany also allowed 18 of its citizens who had taken refuge at the U.S. embassy in East Berlin to pass safely into West Germany. At the same time, however, East Germany introduced strict travel restrictions to prevent its citizens from traveling to Czechoslovakia in a futile attempt to stem the migratory tide.

By early October, the West German Red Cross said that it was being stretched to the limit and requested help from Bonn. The Red Cross reported that 50,000 East Germans had arrived in West Germany since September 10, some 15,000 on trains from Prague and more than 35,000 via Hungary and Austria. The Red Cross also stated that it expected more refugees from Romania and the Soviet Union whose German language skills would be weak and thus would have a more difficult time assimilating into West German society.

The situation changed after the removal of German Democratic Republic (GDR) leader Erich Honecker, October 18, and the announcement by his successor, Egon Krenz, five days later that travel restrictions would be eased for all East German citizens and amnesty would be granted to those arrested trying to leave the country. Two weeks later, the Czechoslovak government announced that all remaining East Germans in Czechoslovakia, including the 5,000 at the West German Embassy, would be free to leave for West Germany.

Many refugee service providers in Germany worried that the large numbers of ethnic German new arrivals would effectively squeeze out other asylum seekers in need of assistance. The changed relationship with East Germany also caused a reassessment of the West German government's commitment to a unified European Community in 1992, which

The trickle before the flood: East German dashes across Hungarian border into Austria shortly after the border fence was torn down. Associated Press

was to have done away with border checks within the region. In December, the FRG pulled out of the Schengen Treaty, which had been aiming for visa-free travel between France, the Benelux countries, and the FRG. Many had thought the Schengen agreement would determine the future stance of the entire European Community to asylum seekers from outside Europe.

Although East German emigration dominated coverage of the Federal Republic in 1989, West Germany was also faced with significant numbers of non-German asylum seekers.

In the first half of the year, 57,812 asylum applications were received, and a total of 121,000 were estimated for the entire year. About 103,000 applied for asylum in 1988. Nearly two-thirds of the total were non-German Europeans, including large numbers from Poland, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. Observers anticipated a decrease in East European applicants in the last half of the year, however, with the cancellation of "Eastern-bloc decrees," which had eased refugee-determination standards for that region. As of April 14, applicants of all nationalities were to be judged according to a single standard. The Conference of Interior Ministers of the Federal Republic and of the Lander also decided to set up an accelerated procedure for "simple" cases, a term widely interpreted as referring to nationals from these countries and Hungary.

In another step interpreted as restricting entry of asylum seekers, the government announced on May 1 the imposition of visa requirements for 16 new countries, including Yugoslavia. In announcing the new visas, the Minister of Interior said that the number of Yugoslavian asylum seekers in Germany (20,000 in 1988) had reached intolerable proportions.

For the first six months of 1989, the asylum approval rate of cases decided was 8 percent. This continues a downward trend of the past several years from nearly 30 percent in 1985, to 16 percent in 1986, 9.4 percent in 1987, and 8.6 percent in 1988.

Some 4,500 unaccompanied refugee children have arrived at Frankfurt International Airport in the past several years. The lack of a visa requirement for children under the age of 16 accounts for this special population. Many come from war-torn parts of the Third World, such as Sri Lanka (the majority in 1989—comprised mostly of Tamil boys), Iran, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia. Those who arrive legally as child refugees are eligible for West German citizenship when they reach age 18.

On June 12, the government introduced legislation to require foreign children to apply for residence permits.

Greece

Prior to 1989, asylum seekers entering Greece were referred to UNHCR for determination of refugee status, but Greece itself initiated a new procedure at the beginning of the year to make status determinations for asylum seekers.

This did not mean, however, that Greece would move further in the direction of providing permanent refuge; the country still sees itself essentially as a transit point for third-country resettlement.

However, increasing numbers of asylum seekers entering Greece and decreasing offers to resettle them elsewhere have left Greece with a growing

population of asylum seekers with little prospect of onward movement.

As yet, with the exception of about 200 Vietnamese, and a small number of other exceptional cases, refugees and asylum seekers are not granted work authorization in Greece. Since many are in the country for long periods, they tend to find unauthorized employment at substandard wages. Greece's accession to the refugee Convention includes a reservation limiting refugees' right to work.

The number of new arrivals in 1988, 3,992, was almost double the figure for 1987, 2,223, and triple that of 1986, 1,307. Statistics for 1989 were not available. The total number of persons in the caseload at the beginning of 1989, 5,560, was more than double the number at the beginning of the previous year, 2,050.

Poles accounted for 65 percent of the new arrivals, with Iranians and Iraqis providing the bulk of the remainder. Most Poles came legally on tourist visas before applying for asylum. The rejection rate for Poles stood at 82 percent, as opposed to an average rejection rate of 54 percent for all nationalities. Registrations and interviews for refugee determination were suspended for Poles during the year.

Most of the Iraqis and many of the Iranians arrive without proper travel documents via the Turkish border. Refugees in Turkey have told of being bound, blindfolded, and dumped back into Turkey after Greek soldiers caught them trying to cross the border without authorization.

In November, 28 Iraqis were sentenced from 8 to 10 months imprisonment for crossing into Greece without authorization, according to Greek press accounts.

In October, USCR wrote to the Greek authorities about a Turkish political prisoner who had escaped from a Turkish prison, fled to Greece, and reportedly applied for political asylum. The following day he was summarily returned to Turkey, whereupon he was arrested. The Greek government responded that the man in question had failed to ask for political asylum, but said that a special report on his deportation was being prepared. The government noted that 129 Turks had crossed the border in a one-month period from mid-August to mid-September, of whom 78 had requested political asylum.

Turkish asylum seekers are transferred to the Lavrion refugee center outside Athens, which only has a capacity for 350 persons. UNHCR has said that, in practice, Turkish asylum seekers in Greece do not have the option of applying to UNHCR for refugee status.

Hungary

On March 14, Hungary became the first Warsaw Pact country to sign the 1951 UN Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. This event helped set the stage for the drama that unfolded in Central Europe later in 1989.

The signing of the Convention grew out of protests in Hungary about the treatment of many Romanian asylum seekers who had been returned as illegal aliens in 1988. Reports of persecution of returned would-be refugees began filtering out of Romania, and fears of ill-treatment were confirmed by eyewitness accounts of severe beatings of returnees by Romanian border guards.

By signing the Convention, the Hungarian government obligated itself not to return any refugee who crossed into Hungary to his or her country of origin. This lessened considerably the uncertainty of the situation for the large Romanian refugee population in Hungary (the majority of whom are ethnic Hungarians), which by May had reached 20,000, according to unofficial estimates. After Hungary signed the Convention, UNHCR announced that a branch office would be opened in Budapest before the end of the year, the first in the Eastern Bloc. On October 4, two agreements were signed between Hungary and UNHCR involving the opening of the branch office and the establishment of an assistance program for refugees in Hungary.

The Hungarian government announced that asylum seekers would now only be sent back to their country of origin if they were deemed to be criminals, insane, or unaccompanied minors. In the first quarter of the year, the number returned dropped to about 3 percent; prior to the change in procedure, about one-quarter of those attempting to cross had been returned.

The profile of asylum seekers from Romania also changed in 1989. In 1988, the overwhelming majority of new arrivals from Romania were ethnic Hungarians, and only 9 percent were ethnic Romanians. However, through October of 1989, the percentage of ethnic Romanians had risen to 21 percent (and in May, represented 45 percent). Ethnic Germans constituted 9 percent of the Romanian total for the first ten months of 1989, the majority of whom proceeded on to the Federal Republic of Germany.

In response to a USCR inquiry about the treatment of ethnic Romanians relative to ethnic Hungarians, the government responded that in investigating the applicants for refugee status, "We do not differentiate!" If ethnic Hungarians do not meet the Convention standard for refugee status, however, they are given the option of settling as immigrants.

In the first ten months of the year, 24,000 persons sought asylum in Hungary, 95 percent of whom came from Romania. Of the 14,000 issued resident permits, 2,500 proceeded to third countries and 600 returned to Romania.

The first visible break in the fortified border dividing East and West came on May 2 with the dismantling of sections of the barbed wire fence dividing the frontier of Hungary and Austria.

The response of its East European neighbors to the decision was decidedly cold. In June, Romania began constructing a fence on its border with Hungary, but dismantled it following criticism from the Soviet Union and others. At the end of the year, in the turmoil preceding the overthrow of Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu in December, Romania sealed its borders completely as part of the attempted crackdown on protests in that country.

After the overthrow of Ceausescu, one of the first acts of the provisional government was to promise that Romanian citizens would be permitted to travel freely to the West.

Another consequence of the dismantling of the fence dividing Hungary and Austria in May was the arrival of thousands of East Germans seeking a safer route of escape to the West. It was still illegal to cross the border, however, and throughout the summer, Hungarian border guards deterred East Germans from crossing into Austria and threatened to return repeat attempters to East Germany, as per a 1968 bilateral treaty between Hungary and East Germany.

On August 21, Kurt-Werner Schulz was shot and killed by Hungarian border guards about 30 feet inside the Austrian border after he made the crossing from Hungary with his wife and six-year-old daughter. In all likelihood, Schulz will be remembered as the last person to have lost his life attempting to escape from Eastern Europe. Since the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, at least 77 persons have been killed trying to traverse the Wall and 114 have been recorded as having been killed attempting to cross the border at other points.

The Hungarian news agency described the shooting as an accident, and the Hungarian authorities seemed genuinely embarrassed and regretful of the incident. Clearly, the Hungarian leadership no longer had the stomach to enforce the divide, nor to return East Germans to their home country. As a result, Hungary found itself needing to set up refugee camps to accommodate the thousands of East Germans who were not permitted to cross into Austria, yet who refused to return home.

Although East Germany demanded their return, the Hungarian government made the decision to break the 1968 treaty and to abide instead with its new obligations under the refugee Convention. Foreign Minister Gyula Horn commented, "The agreement that we signed in 1968 was an anti-human agreement." On September 10, he announced that all East Germans then in Hungary were free to cross into Austria and continue to West Germany. After accusations from East Berlin that Hungary was participating in the "smuggling of human beings," the Hungarian government declared in an official communique that Hungary "could not be responsible for the situation" and that "passing judgment on the roots of the problem is not the responsibility of the Hungarian government."

In early November, just days before the opening of the Berlin Wall and the free flow of East Germans directly to West Germany, the Hungarian government informed USCR that about 30,000 East German citizens had transited through Hungary on their way to the West, and that, as of that date, they were still arriving and several hundred were still being housed at the refugee camp of Csilleberc near Budapest.

In January, Hungary signed a 35-nation human rights agreement by which it pledged not to interfere with the right of its citizens to travel abroad. In late 1989, Hungary continued the loosening of travel restrictions on its own citizens that began in 1988 with the liberalizing of passport laws that allowed hundreds of thousands of Hungarians to travel abroad. Parliament has reviewed legislation that will now allow Hungarian citizens free emigration to "virtually anywhere." Yet while Hungarians are continuing to request asylum in the West, many find it increasingly difficult to establish a well-founded fear of persecution to the satisfaction of Western asylum adjudicators. Neighboring Austria has instituted accelerated procedures for asylum applicants, which have reduced the approval rate for Hungarians to eight percent; and, on November 22, the United States announced that it would no longer register Hungarian refugee applicants in Western Europe.

Italy

On October 18, the Italian government announced that it was ending its geographical reservation to the 1951 refugee Convention, thus extending the recognition of refugee status to non-Europeans.

USCR had earlier written to the Italian authorities calling upon Italy to withdraw its geographical reservation. "With the overwhelming majority of the world's 14 million refugees originating outside Europe," USCR said, "Italy's reservation seems to be a political anachronism as we approach the 1990s."

Although it has offered permanent asylum to very few refugees (only 200 in 1988, about 3 percent of the applicants), Italy has always played an important role as a country of temporary refuge pending resettlement in a third country.

Thousands of Poles and Soviets and hundreds of Iranians, Ethiopians, and Somalis have been temporarily admitted to Italy under UNHCR auspices for onward processing to third countries. The majority remain near Rome, especially in the seaside suburb of Ladispoli. In February, the mayor of Ladispoli complained that the local population of 16,000 was being overwhelmed by the presence of some 8,500 Soviets awaiting resettlement in the United States. Ladispoli also has Iranian, Ethiopian, Afghan, and Iraqi refugees among its population.

Prior to October 18, none of these refugees was eligible to apply for asylum in Italy. Responding to complaints from local officials about strains on social services, the Italian government has agreed to resettle many refugees in several seaside towns of the Rome province, particularly Ostia. It was expected that the number of Soviet Jews who would transit through Italy in 1989 would almost double the 1988 figure of 21,400. Soviet Jews in Italy experienced a degree of uncertainty and confusion as the U.S. government began individual determinations of refugee status early in the year and started denying refugee status to some (though the door was not closed to parole and other possibilities for admission). Some of the denied refugee applicants looked towards other third countries such as Canada or Australia, while others decided to wait and see how policy developments in Washington would affect their prospects. By the end of the year, virtually all Soviet Jews in Italy were again being accepted as refugees by the United States.

To decrease the large number of Poles applying for asylum in recent years after entering the country legally on tourist visas (9,000 such requests in 1987), the Italian embassy in Warsaw began issuing special visas as of January 1, 1988 prohibiting application for refugee status upon arrival. Consequently, Polish asylum applications fell to about 100 in 1988, and were expected to remain at a low level in 1989. Italy also refused to accept Eastern European asylum seekers transiting overland from Yugoslavia, maintaining that Yugoslavia is a country of first asylum that bears responsibility for considering the asylum claims.

In January, European press reports said that Italy was considering imposing visas for Turks, as a result of pressure from other Western European nations to stem the flow of Turks into Western Europe via Italy.

Soviet Union

Nationalities conflicts within the Soviet Union have left about half a million persons homeless in 1988 and 1989. The largest internal displacements have occurred as a result of violence between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Some 10,000 Armenians fled Azerbaijan following a pogrom in February 1988 in the city of Sumgait, in which at least 30 Armenians were killed. Several thousand more fled directly to Moscow. Nine months later, another round of anti-Armenian violence broke out in Baku, Kirovabad, and elsewhere in Azerbaijan, uprooting more than 220,000 Armenians. Immediately thereafter, some 160,000 Azerbaijanis fled from Armenia to Azerbaijan in a forced exchange of populations. Periods of escalating violence since that time, most recently the pogroms of December 1989 and January 1990, reduced the pre-conflict Armenian population in the Azerbaijan capital city of Baku from about 225,000 to almost none. By the end of the January 1990 spate of violence, as many as 300,000 Armenians in total had been displaced by the two-year period of civil strife in Azerbaijan.

In 1989, ethnic violence directed against the ethnic Turkish Meskhetian minority in Uzbekistan required more than 16,000

of the Meskhetian Turks to evacuate the Central Asian republic of Uzbekistan.

A total of 71,509 Jews left the Soviet Union in 1989, the highest number in two decades. About 100 "refusenik" families remained, held for purported possession of "state secrets." Although the emigration law still requires letters of invitation from "first degree" relatives, in practice this requirement was laxly enforced for Jewish emigres to Israel and ethnic Germans to the Federal Republic of Germany.

In addition to Jews, ethnic Germans, Armenians, and others emigrated in large numbers during the year. In all, about 200,000 Soviet citizens emigrated in 1989.

Sweden

Sweden introduced a number of measures in 1989 to reduce the access of asylum seekers to refugee determination procedures. Despite these efforts, the number of asylum seekers rose from 19,500 in 1988 to 32,000 in 1989. In March, the government proposed a new Aliens Act to parliament. The new law would limit the legal right to remain in Sweden during the asylum determination procedure and would expand the government's authority to detain adult asylum seekers.

The imposition of visa requirements for Chileans on January 1, 1989, reduced the number of asylum seekers from that country. The 43 Chileans who entered in the first two months of 1989 represented a considerable drop from the 494 who had applied in the first two months of the previous year.

Increasing numbers of asylum seekers who transited through other Nordic countries were returned to those countries in 1989. As of the end of August, about 300 had been returned to Denmark, a figure comparable to the total for all of 1988 and almost twice the total for 1987.

About 5,000 ethnic Turks from Bulgaria sought asylum in Sweden in 1989. In December, as part of a more restrictive approach toward asylum seekers, and due to changes in Bulgaria, the government announced its intention to return ethnic Turkish asylum seekers to Bulgaria. However, as the situation concerning ethnic Turks continued to be controversial and their future within Bulgaria uncertain, the Swedish authorities backed down from its earlier announcement.

The government admitted under 1,500 refugees for resettlement in both 1988 and 1987. In 1988, the largest group of both "quota" refugees and spontaneous arrivals were Iranians.

Switzerland

In 1989, Switzerland saw a record number of asylum seekers cross its borders. A total of 24,425 asylum requests were registered, 38 percent of these being Turks, 20 percent Tamil, and most of the remainder Lebanese, Pakistani, and Yugoslavian. Yet in April, the number of positive asylum decisions was at an all time low, with only 680 granted asylum, 227 of those due to family reunification.

In October 1988, Switze..and passed a comprehensive series of new laws pertaining to asylum seekers known as the Verfahren 88. Under the Verfahren, asylum seekers entering Switzerland without proper documents, whom the authorities determined to have an unfounded asylum request, were subjected to an accelerated new process. The asylum seeker had thirty days to file an appeal and, in the event of a negative decision on appeal, had five days to leave the country. Verfahren also limited asylum seekers' right to work. Making use of the new asylum law's "first country of asylum" clause, Swiss authorities have returned a number of asylum seekers to Austria in order to await the decision on their asylum request in Switzerland.

On July 7, the Swiss Federal Court reconfirmed a 1988 decision that an asylum seeker whose negative asylum decision has become final can still apply for a humanitarian permit to remain in the country. In July, the Service de Recours of the Federal Justice Department decided that denied asylum seekers would be able to remain if the Delegate for Refugee Affairs determines that they cannot return to their country of origin, and travel to a third country is impossible.

Turkey

Turkey, already reluctant host to hundreds of thousands of Iranians and tens of thousands of Iraqi Kurds, found itself faced with a sudden, new influx of 320,000 Bulgarians during the summer.

Having suffered a forced assimilation campaign since 1984 intended to suppress their ethnic Turkish identity, Bulgarian Muslims in the spring began a series of hunger strikes and street demonstrations to protest the repression of their culture. As part of a crackdown, the Bulgarian authorities expelled several hundred activists from mid-May through the first week of June. These refugees reported having been given a few hours notice before being forced out and having to leave behind all their money and any belongings they couldn't carry. Many, but not all, of this first group of refugees had been active in protesting against the assimilation campaign.

Within weeks, whole villages emptied out, and soon the world was witnessing one of the largest European mass exoduses since the close of World War II.

Bulgaria and Turkey dispute the nature of the flow. Bulgaria took the stance that hundreds of thousands decided to vacation in Turkey following the liberalization of exit permission. According to Bulgaria, with the exception of those who were expelled initially, most carried passports, allowing them to return without any fear of reprisal. Their rights and property as Bulgarian citizens would be respected, they said.

Turkey, on the other hand, pointed out that large numbers were herded into "trains of shame," held in border staging areas for days at a time, and often forced to leave their valuables behind. More importantly, the newly mass-produced passports, valid only for travel to Turkey, were issued selectively in a way that split families. As the tide grew, the new arrivals reported that the authorities kept behind young, able-bodied men and women for forced labor in factories and tobacco fields or for conscription in the armed forces.

At the beginning of the crisis, Turkey's Prime Minister Turgut Ozal promised to take every Turk expelled from Bulgaria. "Our border is open and will stay open until all the Turks in Bulgaria come home to Turkey," he said.

Much to Turkey's embarrassment, however, the numbers overwhelmed its immediate absorptive capacity, and, on August 22, Turkey imposed strict visa requirements that cut the flow from about 4,000 to about 35 per day.

With shortages of jobs and housing in Turkey, about 10,000 of the recent arrivals did, in fact, return to Bulgaria by mid-September. After the ouster of Todor Zhivkov, the architect of the forced assimilation campaign, in November, as many as 90,000 additional ethnic Turks returned to Bulgaria. Many, however, only stayed temporarily to put their affairs in order or to discover a popular anti-Muslim backlash against the reformist regime's efforts to stop discrimination and assimilation against ethnic Turks.

By year's end, an estimated 250,000 remained in Turkey.

The ethnic Turks from Bulgaria were not classified as "refugees" by the Turkish government, but were given legal status derived from provisions in Turkish law for the entry and stay of ethnic Turks from neighboring countries. UNHCR was not requested to provide assistance on their behalf. The U.S. Congress did, however, appropriate $10 million in "assistance for shelter, food, and other basic needs to ethnic Turkish refugees fleeing Bulgaria." The final appropriation for State Department foreign operations did not, however, include another $5 million that the Senate had earmarked for Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Turkey.

In August, before the visa restrictions were imposed, USCR wrote to the Turkish government praising its receptivity toward the ethnic Turks from Bulgaria. At the same time, USCR expressed concern about the two other major refugee groups in the country—Iraqi Kurds and Iranians—who are not recognized officially as refugees by the Turkish government.

USCR wrote, "While understanding that Turkey's accession to the 1951 refugee Convention includes a geographical reservation recognizing as refugees only those persons fleeing from Europe, the fact remains that the Iraqis and Iranians who have sought refuge in your country are no less refugees than their counterparts from Bulgaria."

About half of the Kurdish refugees from Iraq who had fled to Turkey in 1988 also left the country in 1988 and 1989, although most of them went on to Iran rather than return to Iraq. Only about 4,500 have repatriated, although the Iraqi government claims that 92,000 have returned from Iran and Turkey. The camps are surrounded by barbed wire and Turkish soldiers, and the residents are not permitted to work. They are only allowed out in small groups for short periods. Although the Diyarbakur and Mus camps have concrete block housing—with people crowded 9 and 10 to a room—the 16,000 inhabitants of the of the Kiziltepe camp near Mardin were still living in tents a year after their arrival, despite extreme cold temperatures in winter and heat in summer. Visitors to the camp reported virtually nonfunctioning sanitation in the camp, stagnant water, and rats.

The government of Turkey had requested $80 million from the international community to build permanent housing, but UNHCR received only $8.5 million in pledges. Turkey turned down that money citing both the inadequacy of the amount as well as conditions attached to it by the UNHCR.

USCR had suggested to the Turkish government in May that it accept the disappointingly small amount pledged as a "first installment" that could help to generate good faith among donors and UNHCR for further assistance. USCR added that Turkey's rejection of a role for UNHCR was not helping to make Western donors more responsive. USCR said, "While we can understand and sympathize with the frustration your government must be feeling to have had only $8 million pledged on behalf of the Iraqi refugees, we do not feel that the rejection of that amount, however inadequate it may be, is in the best interests of the refugees. We understand that they do have pressing, immediate needs that cannot wait for lengthy negotiations among donors and potential donors."

Turkey responded that UNHCR was "unable to comprehend the needs of Iraqis living in temporary resettlement centers in Turkey and understanding the underlying concept of our resettlement project."

On December 20, UNHCR again appealed to donors for money to cover construction of a 13,500 capacity facility to replace the Mardin camp and to cover infrastructural improvements at the other two camps. The appeal was for $13.2 million.

Fears among the Kurdish refugees were exacerbated in June when hundreds of refugees in the Mardin camp became ill. Turkish authorities said that unhygienic bread caused the illness, but many of the Kurds believed that Iraqi agents had poisoned the bread. Two British scientists found toxins in blood samples, but laboratory tests taken in Turkey did not reveal toxins.

In December, Iraq reportedly demanded the extradition of 138 Kurds from the Turkish refugee camps, calling them criminal fugitives. By year's end, it was unclear how Turkey would respond.

Although Iranians probably comprise the largest refugee population in Turkey, little is known about them since their refugee status, with a relative few exceptions, is not recognized and they are not provided shelter or other services. The number of Iranians in the country is estimated at between several hundred thousand and a million. USCR estimates that about 200,000 of the population have a fear of persecution in their homeland.

Those with passports are allowed to enter Turkey without a visa and are able to renew permission to stay as tourists every three months by crossing back and forth between Bulgaria or Cyprus and Turkey. Those who overstay are fined, but generally not expelled. Iranians who enter Turkey without valid passports are required to register with the Turkish police before being allowed to make claims with the UNHCR. Hundreds of cases of *refoulement* of Iranians have been reported in recent years, leading to fear on the part of most undocumented Iranians to come forward at all.

In July, Amnesty International reported that seven Iranian asylum seekers—including four who had been recognized as refugees by UNHCR and who held valid Turkish residence permits—were executed by firing squad upon being summarily returned to Iran in November 1988.

UNHCR reports that 5,522 people sought its protection in 1988, double the number for 1987, and that 2,264 had been resettled in third countries during that year. The number resettled in third countries in 1989 stood at 2,350. UNHCR assists 300–400 mostly East European refugees in the Acibadem center in Istanbul.

Some 5,200 Turkish-speaking Afghan refugees have been permanently resettled in Turkey. The presence of Turkmen from northern Iraq has also been reported.

In May, a Soviet pilot defected by flying a MiG-29 to Turkey. He was later granted asylum by the United States.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom experienced an increase in the number of asylum seekers in 1989 with 4,846 arriving in Great Britain in the first six months, compared with 5,100 in all of 1988. An estimated 10,000 arrived for all of 1989.

Early in the year, there was a notable increase in the number of Kurdish asylum seekers arriving in Britain from Turkey. In May alone, some 1,500 Turkish Kurds arrived. On June 6, Home Secretary Douglas Hurd announced the introduction of visa requirements for citizens of Turkey. By November, about 3,700 were believed to have arrived during the year.

In 1989, for the first time ever, a group of aliens was met by British immigration officers while still aboard a plane that had just landed and were turned back right away. The group of 13 Kurds who had

been returned to Turkey were granted the right to contest the deportation decision by the High Court, which said that they had not been given an opportunity to apply for asylum. The government contests the charge. Some 200 Kurdish asylum seekers were reportedly being held in prisons and detention centers.

Another case that drew a great deal of public attention in Britain involved the deportation of a Sri Lankan who had been given church sanctuary in Manchester. Viaj Mendis, a Sinhalese, had supported the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka and said that he faced persecution as a result of that stance. Police broke down the doors of the church where Mendis had been staying since 1986 in order to arrest him. In January, he was deported, causing a storm of protest from both the Labour Party and the Anglican church.

In response to a letter from USCR on the subject, the British government wrote that Mendis's case "was fully reviewed on several occasions by ministers and both the independent appellate authorities, and the courts endorsed the decision that he should be deported." The controversy centered, in part, on whether adequate efforts had been made to give Mendis the opportunity to seek asylum in another country. In another case involving five Sri Lankans who were deported, an appellate court upheld an immigration tribunal's decision that the five were, in fact, refugees and should be returned to Britain at London's cost.

Only 52 Vietnamese refugees were allowed to enter Britain between January 1 and April 30, 1989, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announced in early June that Britain had no intention of offering refuge to significantly larger numbers of Vietnamese.

The fate of about 38,500 Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong was also a hot political issue in Britain in 1989. Calling the situation "intolerable," British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe demanded the forcible repatriation of screened-out Vietnamese asylum seekers on the occasion of the UN-sponsored International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in June.

Following the forced repatriation of 51 Vietnamese asylum seekers on December 12, USCR wrote to Prime Minister Thatcher charging the U.K. with undermining the Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed upon at the UN-sponsored conference in June, which had called for regionwide screening programs consistent with UN guidelines and the promotion of voluntary repatriation of the screened out. "Now before the ink is scarcely dry on that document, Britain is rushing headlong to carry out forced repatriation. In so doing, it is trampling on some fundamental human rights of asylum seekers." USCR called upon Great Britain to halt any further involuntary returns for at least one year in order to give time for full implementation of the Comprehensive Plan of Action. "The region is on the brink of chaos," wrote USCR. "The first step back belongs to Britain."

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia saw nearly double the number of asylum seekers crossing its borders in 1989 from the previous year. According to the government, 8,000 asylum seekers were registered during 1989, of whom about 7,000 were Romanians.

For much of the post-war era Yugoslavia has served as a country of temporary asylum for thousands of Eastern European refugees. Permanent asylum in Yugoslavia is rare but has been granted to small numbers of Armenians, Chileans, and recently to Romanians of ethnic Serbian origin. Although Yugoslavia has signed the 1951 UN Convention relating to refugees and the 1967 Protocol, there is no national mechanism for determining refugee claims. Therefore, cases are presented to UNHCR for status determination. UNHCR considered 7,112 cases in 1989. UNHCR also attempts to find opportunities for third country resettlement, though the pace of new arrivals in recent years has outstripped the availability of resettlement options.

Those entering Yugoslavia without a valid passport can be sentenced to up to a month in prison. A government spokesman says that the maximum prescribed sentence is seldomly carried out. Refugee sources, however, consistently report being imprisoned from 15 to 20 days. From there, many are transferred to the Padinska Skela refugee camp, which is described by some as worse than Yugoslavian jails. Refugees report bare minimum accommodations, inadequate food, overcrowding, and beatings by guards. In fact, the description of barred windows, locked doors, and guards escorting inmates to and from meals has a distinctly prison-like character.

Refugees also claim that Romanian asylum seekers were routinely returned to Romania, many before having their refugee status determined by UNHCR. This is alleged to happen both on the border and also from jails and the Padinska camp.

As events in Romania leading to the overthrow of President Ceausescu escalated, Yugoslavia suspended the deportation of asylum seekers who had been denied refugee status. Prior to those recent developments, however, the return of denied asylum seekers was usually automatic.

The U.S. State Department has reported that one-third of those interviewed by UNHCR in the first eleven months of 1989 were denied refugee status and returned to their countries of origin.

Pre-screening of asylum seekers is also acknowledged by the government. A Yugoslavian official explained that "law enforcement organs who discover a defector, or to which such a person reports, talk to the person. If they suspect that adventurers, mentally defective persons, perpetrators of classical crimes, or minors are in question, law enforcement bodies in the field consult with the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, which informs the Representative of the HCR of the case, whereafter a decision is jointly taken on whether that person will be returned to the country it came from [sic] or referred for further procedure to the Representative of the HCR." The government says that the UNHCR is allowed direct contact with asylum seekers in 90 percent of the cases.

Although Romanian refugees who have made their way to the West via Yugoslavia in recent years have alleged that frontier border guards have killed significant numbers of people, the Yugoslav government denied in September that any shots had been fired on the border for the past two years.

About 700,000 Yugoslavs live in Western Europe as "guest workers." In recent years, increasing numbers have applied for asylum. A total of 20,812 Yugoslavs sought asylum in West Germany in 1988 (although only 0.24 percent were recognized as refugees), and another 11,351 applied for asylum there in the first six months of 1989. However, the numbers applying began to drop after the FRG imposed a visa requirement for Yugoslavs on May 1. Yugoslavia itself began denying passports to gypsies and ethnic Albanians in 1989 to prevent them from seeking asylum in Western Europe. However, as events at the end of the year unfolded, these same groups appeared to be those most likely to face persecution in the coming year.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Belize

There are 5,100 officially registered refugees in Belize, 4,000 Salvadorans and 1,100 Guatemalans. But there are also another 25,000 undocumented Central Americans living in Belize, and they represent 14 percent of the country's population of 176,000. Belize is not a signatory to the UN Convention and Protocol on refugees. While the government has considered drafting a code to regulate its response to refugees, it has not yet done so.

Belize is the only English-speaking country in Central America, and the government is concerned that the presence of a large Spanish-speaking refugee population will upset the balance between the country's ethnic and cultural groups. Creoles, descendants of Africans and Europeans who settled in Belize beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, still represent the largest group in the population.

Registered refugees are eligible to receive government health care and other social services. However, only newly arrived and vulnerable refugees receive direct UNHCR assistance. Various governmental and nongovernmental agencies assist refugees to integrate into the local economy through agricultural and other employment projects. More than 2,000 of the registered refugees, mostly Salvadorans, live alongside a smaller number of Belizeans in a UNHCR-assisted agricultural settlement known as the Valley of Peace.

In its document for the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) held in Guatemala City May 29–31, 1989, the government of Belize said that while it considered the 25,000 undocumented Central Americans to be economic migrants, it recognized that UNHCR viewed them as "displaced" people. The government said that it would "make every effort to integrate [them] into the society." At present, most of the undocumented Central Americans find employment on Belize's large banana and sugar cane plantations.

Costa Rica

The number of refugees fleeing to Costa Rica continued to increase during 1989, placing considerable strain on that country. According to the Costa Rican government, the growing refugee population's need for services and a decline in international economic assistance "have caused a gradual deterioration in Costa Rican standards of living." There are more than 33,400 officially recognized refugees in Costa Rica, of whom approximately 26,500 are Nicaraguans and 4,000 are from El Salvador. The remainder are mostly Cuban. The government says that another 250,000 Central Americans live in Costa Rica without legal status or documentation, though other sources estimate that number is between 80,000 and 100,000.

Generally considered the most politically stable country in Central America, Costa Rica has a long tradition of grant-

Young Nicaraguan refugee in Costa Rica—a country whose people have long welcomed refugees, but that now also complain about the economic burden refugees pose.
UNHCR/A. Hollmann

ing asylum to refugees. In the late 1970s, thousands of Nicaraguans entered Costa Rica fleeing the Somoza regime. After the Sandinista victory in 1979, thousands more arrived, either because of opposition to the new government or in fear of growing conflict between the government and Contra forces. By the mid-1980s, many of the newest arrivals were young men and their families escaping forced conscription by the government or the Contras. The European Economic Community has helped the Costa Rican government with projects designed to help registered refugees, especially those outside the UNHCR camps, to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency.

In response to growing public complaints about the burden that hosting a large refugee population has placed on the economy, in late 1988 the Costa Rican authorities reached an agreement with Nicaragua calling for joint border patrols to prevent the entry of undocumented Nicaraguans. In July, 111 Nicaraguans were turned away at the border. In April, 70 Nicaraguans determined to be economic migrants had been deported to Nicaragua.

In 1987, the Nicaraguan and Costa Rican governments, along with UNHCR, signed a tripartite agreement that provides a framework for the voluntary repatriation of Nicaraguan refugees. During 1989, some 1,100 Nicaraguans repatriated. Some observers attribute the reluctance of other Nicaraguans to repatriate to uncertainty about the political and economic climate in Nicaragua, the availability of UNHCR assistance, and economic opportunities in Costa Rica that make it possible for the refugees to support themselves until they can go home.

Cuba

During 1989, UNHCR assisted approximately 3,000 Central Americans and Haitians in Cuba. More than 1,600 Namibians who had been living in Cuba repatriated to their homeland between July and September.

Since 1959, more than a million Cubans have left their country and sought asylum abroad, mostly in the United States, but also in Europe and Latin America. Most are socially and economically integrated, but a small number, particularly those living in Spain, Panama, and Peru, have found local integration difficult. During 1989, 890 Cubans in that category (including 449 from Spain and 263 from Panama) were resettled in the United States through a private sponsorship program funded and implemented by the Cuban-American National Foundation.

According to press reports, some 350 Cubans fled to the United States by boat or raft during the year. Leaving Cuba without authorization is considered a crime. According to the U.S. State Department, the number of Cubans convicted of attempting to leave Cuba without authorization rose sharply in 1989.

A United Nations Human Rights Commission report on Cuba issued in February found that some 200 political prisoners remained in Cuban jails, and that their treatment had improved over previous years. However, the UN report also found that basic political liberties are still widely denied in Cuba.

Another 1989 report on human rights in Cuba found that freedom of expression, association, and movement, and the right to due process of law "are denied systematically in both law and practice." The report, by America's Watch, said, "Almost every aspect of the lives of Cubans is subject to a pervasive system of political surveillance."

A number of Haitians who flee their country by boat stop over in Cuba en route to the United States. The Cuban government reportedly offers the Haitians assistance while they are in Cuba. Few Haitians stay in Cuba, however. After repairing their boats, most continue towards the United States, despite the fact that they may be interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard and returned to Haiti.

El Salvador

A decade of fighting between successive Salvadoran governments and rebels of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) ended with yet more death and displacement. A November FMLN military offensive in San Salvador and other towns left thousands of civilians dead or wounded, and more than 40,000 homeless. Among the dead were six Jesuit priests, including two who were well known in the United States for their work on behalf of Salvadoran refugees in the United States. The president of El Salvador acknowledged that the priests were murdered by members of the Salvadoran military.

The war in El Salvador, a small nation of 5.2 million people, has been a major factor in the exodus of more than 1.2 million of the country's citizens. A large majority of those who fled now live in the United States, though mostly without documentation and thus in constant fear of deportation. A quarter-of-a-million live in Mexico under similar circumstances, while 10,900 live in UNHCR-assisted refugee camps in Honduras. Thousands more are scattered throughout Central America, and some 5,000 have been resettled in Australia and Sweden. The Salvadoran government estimates that 397,000 Salvadorans are displaced within the country as a result of the conflict and a 1986 hurricane.

According to a United Nations study issued in November, both the government and the FMLN executed hundreds of civilians during the year. In an article on the UN report, the *Washington Post* said that "accounts of murder and torture are so plentiful that he [the author] was unable to determine the true number of victims." El Salvador was described as "a society descended to near lawlessness, with government and guerrilla groups doing little to stop the bloodshed."

These continued human rights abuses, and the fear and upheaval caused by the end-of-year offensive, led even more Salvadorans to seek to leave the country. In December, officials at immigration offices in San Salvador said that more than 2,000 people a day were applying for passports. UNHCR officials in Guatemala also reported a significant increase in the number of Salvadorans requesting interviews for determination of refugee status in that country. USCR wrote to U.S. Attorney General Dick Thornburgh in November, asking that deportations of Salvadorans be temporarily suspended due to the sharply escalating violence in that country. "Let us not now put additional lives at risk by returning people into the maelstrom of contemporary El Salvador," USCR told the Attorney General.

Despite the continuing conflict in El Salvador, and increased exodus of refugees from that country, most of the Salvadoran refugees living in refugee camps in Honduras sought to repatriate—but only a minority were actually able to do so (see Honduras). Former refugees who returned to El Salvador in past years have faced various forms of harassment. However, for the most part, they have been able to remain in their original home areas, despite the fact that these are often in conflict zones.

El Salvador hosts a small refugee population of some 500 Nicaraguans.

El Salvador: returnees from Honduras. Despite continuing violence in their homeland, most Salvadoran refugees living in Honduras decided to repatriate, but only a minority were able to do so during 1989. UNHCR/D. Bregnard

French Guiana

The likelihood that the 10,000 Surinamese Maroon refugees in French Guiana would repatriate any time soon became even more remote in 1989.

UNHCR opened an office in St. Laurent, in western French Guiana, and began plans for a pilot repatriation project for 1,500 refugees. That effort stalled, however, when the agency was unable to obtain access to the refugees' home areas in Suriname. Those areas have been sealed off by the Surinamese authorities, and more than 50,000 Maroons living there are said to be suffering serious food shortages.

The Surinamese refugees, descendants of African slaves known as Maroons, fled to French Guiana in 1986, following the outbreak of civil war in Suriname. Their status in French Guiana is precarious. The French authorities there do not officially recognize the Surinamese as refugees, and have made it difficult for UNHCR to assist them. UNHCR continues to press the authorities to grant the Surinamese official refugee status, but has so far been unsuccessful.

The refugees reportedly do not want to repatriate because they fear the forces of Lt. Col. Desi Bouterse, the former ruler of Suriname, who retains control of the Surinamese military. The refugees are said to believe that Bouterse is antagonistic toward them because he blames Maroons for the civil war and for the movement that ousted him from office.

Guatemala

Though Guatemala has had a democratically elected civilian government since 1986, the military still plays a dominant role in the country's politics, and reports of human rights abuses against civilians continue. During 16 years of military rule prior to the election of President Vinicio Cerezo, there were an estimated 100,000 killings and 40,000 disappearances in Guatemala.

In 1988, the number of killings increased substantially over those that occurred during the first two years that Cerezo was in office, and in 1989, the country's human rights record deteriorated further. In September and October, newspaper reports said that a "climate of terror" had again gripped Guatemala and that the country's infant democracy "was showing alarming signs of regression."

Various human rights organizations reported that the number of disappearances and killings by paramilitary groups, death squads, and police and military forces increased following a failed military coup in May. The authorities, including the President, appeared unable to stop the abuse.

In the early 1980s, the Guatemalan military's counterinsurgency campaign against Indian rebel groups caused many Guatemalans to flee to neighboring countries and hundreds of thousands of others to be internally displaced. While many flocked to the capital and other towns, tens of thousands sought refuge in the mountains surrounding their villages.

Since then, the army has sought to bring these displaced people under its control, either by offering them incentives to move into so-called model villages or by capturing and moving them by force. The model villages have failed

to become self-sufficient, relying on relief from religious organizations, but the military continues to round up people from the mountains and settle them in the villages, its goal being to isolate the guerrillas in the mountains.

The vast majority of Guatemalan refugees in neighboring countries are also from these Maya Indian communities in northwestern Guatemala. It had been expected that during 1989 many Guatemalan refugees would repatriate, but that did not happen. Continuing human rights abuses in Guatemala and the military's counterinsurgency campaign remain deterrents to the refugees' return. Approximately 41,300 officially registered Guatemalan refugees remain in Mexico, although another 110,000 are thought to live in that country without documentation.

Guatemala itself hosts a small official refugee population of some 4,400, who are assisted by UNHCR. Of these, 3,300 are Nicaraguans, and 1,100 are Salvadoran. The Guatemalan government estimates, however, that there are as many as 220,000 Central Americans (mostly Salvadorans and Nicaraguans) in Guatemala without documentation. An indeterminate number of those may be people who are seeking to reach Mexico or the United States. Between January and August, the Mexican authorities turned back more than 46,000 people who were attempting to cross the border from Guatemala into Mexico.

Haiti

A year of political instability, wanton violence by undisciplined soldiers and paramilitary forces, and crushing poverty caused people to continue to flee Haiti.

More than one million Haitians, about one sixth of the country's population, are estimated to live in exile. They have fled to many nations—including the United States (450,000), the Dominican Republic (250,000–500,000), Canada (45,000), France (15,000–30,000), the Bahamas (30,000), Venezuela (6,000) and other Caribbean nations (30,000). Few, however, have welcomed them.

Not all Haitian expatriates are refugees. Coming from the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with high illiteracy, chronic unemployment, and serious malnutrition, Haitians have reason enough to leave on socio-economic grounds. However, political repression has been an even more compelling reason for many.

Ex-soldiers—whose army units had been dissolved by the government of Lt. Gen. Prosper Avril following several unsuccessful coup attempts against him during the year—operated as armed, renegade gangs terrorizing, robbing, and extorting the populace.

Strong-arm tactics characterized the officially recognized military forces as well. Soldiers of the Presidential Guard who brought Lt. Gen. Prosper Avril to power had free reign to extort or attack their opponents with impunity.

Through the end of 1989, the United States had interdicted 21,406 Haitians in international waters since the Coast Guard interdiction program began in October 1981. Of these, 3,429 were interdicted in calendar year 1989, one of the highest annual totals since the interdiction operation began. Only six persons have been permitted to enter the United States for the purposes of pursuing asylum claims since 1981. The remainder have been returned to Port-au-Prince.

In June, the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees presented affidavits to a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee from returned Haitians who

Guatemalans in Mexico: There are 41,300 officially registered Guatemalan refugees in Mexico, but the Mexican government estimates that another 110,000 undocumented Guatemalans may also live there. UNHCR/L. Taylor

alleged that they had been beaten aboard U.S. Coast Guard vessels and that their stated fears of political persecution in Haiti were ignored by U.S. immigration authorities. One politically active Haitian, who was interdicted and returned to Haiti in March 1989, told of Haitian soldiers having shot him four times in the legs at the time of his arrest in January 1988. He then spent ten months in prison. Of his interview aboard the Coast Guard cutter, he said, "I told them of my circumstances and specifically said that I preferred to kill myself instead of returning to Haiti. They returned me anyway."

[*Lt. Gen. Prosper Avril resigned on March 10, 1990, in the wake of widespread public protests.*]

Honduras

Human rights abuses escalated in Honduras during the year. A Honduran human rights group announced that in the first seven months of 1989 the number of killings by police and security forces was triple that of the previous year. Nevertheless, Honduras hosts a large refugee population from neighboring El Salvador and Nicaragua.

More than 34,900 refugees are registered and assisted by UNHCR in Honduras. Of these, some 23,600 are Nicaraguan (both Miskito or Sumo Indians and Ladinos—but not including the Nicaraguan Contra fighters present in Honduras), 10,900 are Salvadoran, and 400 are Guatemalan. However, there are also an estimated 200,000 other Central Americans living in Honduras, "a significant number of whom may qualify as refugees," according to UNHCR. Of these, 120,000 are Nicaraguan and 80,000 are Salvadoran.

During the year, many of the Salvadoran refugees living in camps in Honduras sought to repatriate, although only a minority of those who planned to return were able to do so. Previously, many of these same refugees had resisted efforts to urge them to repatriate or to move to new sites farther from the border. A group of 1,127 Salvadorans from Mesa Grande refugee camp returned home at the end of October, accompanied by UNHCR personnel and by members of religious groups invited by the refugees. The repatriation was marred by disputes over whether the refugees would be allowed to return to their areas of origin, and delays in the registration process, which took place at Mesa Grande at the insistence of the Salvadoran government.

More than 8,300 Salvadorans living at Colomoncagua camp, who in July announced their plan to repatriate en masse, were not able to reach an agreement with the Salvadoran government on details for their repatriation and therefore remain in Honduras. However, in November and December, approximately 1,700 of the Colomoncagua refugees walked back to El Salvador. As their repatriation had not been approved by the Salvadoran government and was without UNHCR involvement, they have not received any documentation or assistance in El Salvador. Refugees at San Antonio camp also decided to return home, but for similar reasons they too remain in Honduras.

Salvadoran refugees began entering Honduras in 1980. Because they came from areas in El Salvador dominated by leftist guerrillas, they were immediately considered suspect by the Honduran military, and, in November 1981, 11,000 were forcibly relocated to Mesa Grande camp, 21 miles from the border. Because of strong opposition from the refugees and some international organizations, however, about 9,000 refugees were allowed to remain in two border settlements at Colomoncagua and San Antonio. Another 7,000 Salvadoran refugees chose to repatriate rather than relocate away from the border.

Suspicions that the refugees were supporting guerrilla activities led to the Honduran government sealing the camps and restricting the refugees' movements. Over the years, there have been numerous reports of abuses against the refugees by Honduran military personnel. In 1988, there were two separate incidents in which refugees were killed in or near the camps by Honduran military personnel.

Refugee community health worker at Colomoncagua refugee camp in Honduras.
UNHCR/J. Bruet

Honduras is not a signatory to the UN Convention and Protocol on refugees, but did, in 1987, sign a memorandum of understanding with UNHCR establishing a formal legal agreement regarding cooperation on behalf of refugees in the country. Nevertheless, there has been continuing international concern regarding the refugees' security.

Salvadoran refugee leaders have also been criticized. In February, a *New York Times* article said that the refugee leaders at Colomoncagua camp "wield almost absolute authority over their fellow refugees," and that they allow little dissent or personal freedom in the camps. However, others who have worked closely with the refugees expressed a very different view. One observer described the

refugees' organization and politicization as their major strength.

Nicaraguans have benefited from a long-standing Honduran policy of offering sanctuary to all Nicaraguan refugees, and have enjoyed much greater freedom of movement than have Salvadorans.

The first major influx of Nicaraguan refugees into Honduras was of Indians, mainly Miskitos and Sumos, who fled the Sandinista government's efforts to relocate them by force away from their traditional Coco River villages beginning in 1981, and military recruitment drives by both government and Indian rebel groups.

With UNHCR assistance, Indian refugees were accommodated in more than 60 settlements in sparsely populated regions away from the border. Thousands of other Nicaraguan Indians who lived in the border areas did not choose to present themselves as refugees.

In 1987, the Nicaraguan government agreed to measures giving greater autonomy to its Indian populations, and a number of the Indian refugees began to repatriate—some 7,900 returned home during 1988, and, as of the end of November, another 1,400 Miskito and 400 Sumo Indians had repatriated during 1989. In September, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter met with Nicaraguan government and Indian leaders in an attempt to mediate an end to the conflict between the two groups and to facilitate the repatriation of the remaining Nicaraguan Indian refugees in Honduras (of whom 8,900 still live in UNHCR-assisted camps).

As Indian refugees were repatriating to Nicaragua in 1987 and 1988, Nicaraguan refugees of Spanish descent—Ladinos—were fleeing increased political turmoil, economic problems, and the conflict between the government and the Contra forces in Nicaragua. Between 1986 and the end of 1987, the Ladino refugee population in Honduras nearly doubled (although some of these newly registered refugees may actually have been previously living in border areas without documentation). During 1989, 600 Ladino Nicaraguan refugees repatriated. As of November 30, 14,700 Ladino refugees remained in UNHCR camps.

Honduras has hosted the Contras for years. In 1988, following the cut-off of U.S. military aid to the Contras ("humanitarian" aid continues), most of the Contras were obliged to return to their bases in Honduras. During 1989, the Honduran government became increasingly impatient with the presence of the estimated 7,000–12,000 Contras and their families. In August, Honduras's president was among five Central American leaders who called for the dismantling of the Contras as a fighting force. No steps have been taken to force the Contras out of Honduras, but their future remains uncertain.

Mexico

During 1989, the Mexican government hardened its attitude toward people transiting Mexico in order to enter the United States without documentation, and cooperated more closely with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to apprehend them. As a result, as many as 46,000 Central Americans were turned back at Mexico's border with Guatemala during the first eight months of the year, more than the number turned back in the previous three years combined, while others were intercepted inside Mexico and deported.

Although there are only about 46,300 formally recognized refugees—almost entirely Guatemalans—in Mexico, it is estimated that there are as many as 385,000 other Central Americans living in that country, many of whom may be refugees.

Mexico has historically attracted Central American migrants, some who sought to settle or work in Mexico, while others used the country as a stepping stone en route to the United States. Since 1978, however, many Central Americans have fled to Mexico as refugees, fleeing war and persecution in their homelands.

Although Mexico is not a signatory to the UN Convention and Protocol on refugees, it has traditionally been liberal in its granting of asylum to individual Latin Americans who sought refuge there. With the onset of large-scale influxes of refugees in recent years, however, Mexico has applied differing treatment to the various groups of asylum seekers.

The officially recognized refugee population of some 46,300 consists of 41,300 Guatemalans, 3,700 Salvadorans, and 1,300 refugees of other nationalities. The Guatemalan refugees began entering the Mexican state of Chiapas—where many had extended families—between 1981 and 1983. At that time, the Indian population of Guatemala was being subjected to a brutal campaign of violence by the Guatemalan military, which was engaged in a war against anti-government insurgents.

The influx of Guatemalan refugees alarmed the Mexican authorities, who initially turned many of them back at the border. Following reports that some of those refused entry to Mexico were subsequently killed in Guatemala, international and domestic public opinion led the Mexican government to cease its policy of mass deportations.

To reduce pressures on land and to minimize the potential for border incidents (the Guatemalan army had repeatedly attacked the refugee camps in Mexico, killing both Guatemalan refugees and Mexican citizens), in 1984 the Mexican government relocated about 18,500 Guatemalan refugees from Chiapas and provided them small plots of land in the states of Campeche and Quintana Roo, on the Yucatan peninsula. Many refugees were reluctant to leave Chiapas because of its proximity to Guatemala and because of their family ties there, and the Mexican government reportedly resorted to sometimes heavy-handed methods to move them. Those who refused to leave Chiapas have continued to receive assistance from the Mexican government and UNHCR, though the government has resisted their integration into the local economy.

With the inauguration of a civilian president in Guatemala in 1986, the Mexican government hoped that the refugees would soon return home. But the Guatemalan military's continued grip on power, even under a civilian president, has deterred the large majority of refugees from repatriating. Only some 4,400 Guatemalans have repatriated since 1986. Of those, approximately 1,000 repatriated during 1989.

Although UNHCR considers that many Salvadorans in Mexico may be refugees, they are not formally recognized as such by the Mexican government, except in special cases, and do not receive UNHCR or government assistance. Prior to the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA), which was held in Guatemala City in May, UNHCR estimated that these Salvadorans numbered some 120,000. At CIREFCA, however, the Mexican government said that, according to nongovernmental agencies working with refugees in Mexico, the number of such Salvadorans in Mexico could be as high as 250,000. The government added that, besides the officially recognized Guatemalan refugees, there may be up to 110,000 other Guatemalans, and at least 25,000 Nicaraguans and Hondurans in Mexico City alone, living in the

country in a situation similar to the Salvadorans. In general, the Mexican government informally permits these groups to remain and work in Mexico. However, competition for scarce jobs appears to have eroded the Mexican government's tolerance of unofficial refugees in 1989.

Nicaragua

Although it is difficult to ascertain how many Nicaraguans have fled their country, they could number between 500,000 and as many as one million. Conflict between the government and the Contras, dissatisfaction with government policies, and economic hardship have contributed to the exodus.

The U.S. State Department estimates that between 300,000 and 600,000 Nicaraguans may be living in the United States. In addition to the 23,600 Nicaraguan refugees officially registered in Honduras, another 120,000 may live in that country without documentation. There are also 26,500 officially registered Nicaraguan refugees in Costa Rica, and a significant number of other, undocumented Nicaraguans in that country.

The Nicaraguan government estimates that 390,000 Nicaraguans are internally displaced. Of these, 78,000 live in rural settlements, while the remainder are concentrated on the outskirts of major towns or dispersed throughout the countryside.

Nicaragua also hosts a refugee population of approximately 7,400 Central Americans, mostly Salvadorans who arrived in the early 1980s fleeing political violence in their country. The majority are locally integrated, though UNHCR assists some 750 of the registered refugees.

Miskito Indian Nicaraguans continued to repatriate from Honduras. During 1988, more than 8,500 repatriated. In 1989, 1,432 Miskitos and 398 Sumos repatriated. In September, leaders of Miskito and Sumo Indians, who maintain an armed insurgency against the government, met with Nicaraguan government officials in talks aimed at ending conflict and making possible the return of more of the 20,000 Indian refugees remaining in Honduras. Brooklyn Rivera, a central figure in the leadership of the Indian community, returned to Nicaragua to participate in the elections.

An estimated 10,000 Contras remain in camps in Honduras, while a smaller number are said to operate within Nicaragua. The United States officially halted military aid to the Contras in February 1988, though "humanitarian" aid continues. In August, leaders of five Central American nations called for the voluntary demobilization of the Contras by December 6, a call that the Contras rejected. If the multi-party Nicaraguan elections scheduled for February 1990 are considered fair by the international community, the Honduran government, which has already declared its opposition to the continued Contra presence in that country, may demand that the Contras leave. Some Contras who do not wish to return to Nicaragua may seek to enter the United States, though it is not clear whether they would be granted political asylum.

[In the February 1990 elections, the Sandinistas were decisively defeated. The full impact of that defeat on Nicaraguan refugee populations and on the Contras was not yet clear.]

Miskito returnees in Nicaragua. More than 1,800 Miskito and Sumo Indian refugees repatriated to Nicaragua from Honduras during 1989. UNHCR/A. Hollmann

Peru

An increase in activities by the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas and a government counteroffensive paralyzed much of the Peruvian countryside in 1989. In several areas, the government declared a state of emergency, restricting movement and further isolating civilians caught between the two forces.

No one knows how many of the two-million residents of shanty towns on the outskirts of Lima were displaced by violence in their home regions. Some observers place the number of internally displaced at 80,000.

The Peruvian government's Human Rights Commission documented 3,198 political killings in 1989, and 1,986 during 1988. The violence has claimed more than 17,000 lives since it began in 1980. Amnesty International has documented the disappearance of over 3,000 people taken into government custody during the past seven years, with local human rights groups reporting that as many as 3,000 have disappeared in the Ayucucho department alone. Peruvian officials claim that Shining Path guerrillas killed more than 5,000 people between 1982 and 1988. It is also estimated that they killed more than 1,000 civilians during 1989.

Peru hosts 700 refugees, including a group of elderly Europeans who have been in the country for many years, and a number of Cubans and Central Americans.

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan

While the war in Afghanistan has caused more than five million refugees to flee to Pakistan and Iran, another two million Afghans have been internally displaced by the decade-long conflict. The withdrawal of Soviet troops in February did not, however, lead to an abatement in the fighting, nor in the significant return of refugees to their homes.

In fact, fighting for control of Jalalabad, in the east, caused some 70,000 additional refugees to flee to Pakistan. Intense rocket attacks virtually emptied the city of women and children, many of whom fled to safer areas within Afghanistan.

The capital, Kabul, was also under siege in 1989, including mortar attacks, and food shortages have been reported. With a population that had swelled to more than two million due to an influx of more than a million internally displaced persons since 1978, Kabul saw the first significant reverse migration in 1989.

Insect infestations in the northern provinces caused severe shortfalls in agricultural production, putting hundreds of thousands at risk of malnutrition during the winter months. Food shortages were exacerbated by the rural to urban migration of most of those displaced by the fighting, by war-damage to irrigation, devastation of farms and livestock, abandonment of fields for years, and continuing fighting. Unless food aid became available, international assistance agencies were predicting the displacement of as many as another half million people from the northern provinces during the winter of 1989–1990.

However, the situation was not as bleak in other parts of the country. Thousands of people every month were estimated to have returned to their homes in rural areas. Spontaneous returns of internally displaced persons out of Kabul and other towns were reported to the rural parts of Ghazni, Paktia, Pakteka, Nangarhar, and Logar provinces south of Kabul, areas that had been especially hard hit in the war, resulting in displacement of more than 50 percent of their populations. Many of the returnees were men coming in advance of their families to clear fields and repair damaged homes. Rural areas, for the most part, remain outside government control.

There was much less evidence of repatriation from Pakistan and Iran, though the Kabul government has claimed that about 200,000 have returned to government-controlled areas. Some 80,000 refugees are reported to have repatriated from Pakistan in 1989. Another 16,000 refugees are reported to have repatriated from Iran during the year, principally to Herat province. Herat still is extensively damaged by the war; 600 of 1,300 villages in the province have been seriously or totally destroyed, infrastructure has been severely damaged, and very little land has been cultivated.

An Afghan boy in Rehabilitation Project, Peshawar, Pakistan. UNHCR/J. Crisp

Millions of mines laid during the course of the war are a serious obstacle to repatriation and reconstruction. The Kabul government charges that would-be returnees are prevented from leaving Pakistan by the mujahedeen and Pakistani officials. UNHCR and independent observers discount these charges.

Bangladesh

A year that began on a hopeful note for a resolution of the conflict that had left about 50,000 refugees from the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) stranded in refugee camps in India ended with more bloodshed and the flight of additional undetermined numbers into exile.

The conflict between the largely Buddhist Chakmas and other tribal groups of the CHT and the Muslim Bengali settlers has been vicious, with an escalating cycle of raids provoking reprisal attacks back and forth between the tribal Shanti Bahini and Bengali settlers backed by the army.

Four bills passed the Bangladesh parliament on March 1 that seemed to address many of the root causes of the violence and exile. The measures were intended to set up largely autonomous and directly elected tribal councils in the CHT that would be given the power to prevent the transfer or sale of land to Bengali settlers.

USCR welcomed the legislation as a "constructive and positive step" to pave the way for a dignified return of the CHT refugees. In a letter to the government, USCR said, "Establishing trust after so many years of violence and conflict will be a difficult task. Problems of land ownership remain to be resolved. But we are encouraged by efforts that are being made to resolve these problems." USCR urged the Bangladesh authorities to call upon the UNHCR for assistance should repatriation arise as a result of the new reforms.

President Ershad extended an amnesty offer to the Shanti Bahini in April and announced that elections would be held on June 25 for autonomous councils in the three CHT districts.



Despite these positive signs, hopes were dashed in early May when the Shanti Bahini rejected the amnesty offer and the elections, demanding a separate state and withdrawal of all military units from the region. A number of attacks against Bengali settlers and the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles were reported. The assassination of a government figure touched off a reprisal massacre by Bengali settlers and security personnel in which at least 30 tribal people were allegedly hacked to death and about 400 homes burned to the ground in nine villages.

Although government authorities denied a mass exodus of Chakma and other tribal refugees, the Indian press reported influxes of 3,000 per day at the height of the migration. Some unconfirmed reports claimed as many as 40,000 fled to India, joining the 50,000 CHT refugees already in that country.

In the absence of objective international observers, however, reports on the numbers were impossible to confirm. Also difficult to assess was the degree to which refugee movement was coerced by the Shanti Bahini itself or was a direct result of attacks or fears of attack by Bengali settlers and their supporters in the army. Also unclear was the extent to which the flight of new refugees into India was offset by the spontaneous repatriation of as many as 10,000 refugees back to Bangladesh (as claimed by Bangladesh, but denied by Indian officials). In any case, a degree of cross-border movement in both directions was evident, such that it was difficult to ascertain whether the total number of CHT refugees in India at the end of the year had appreciably changed from the beginning of the year.

In September, following reports that authorities in India's Tripura state were taking measures to block the entry of tribal refugees from Bangladesh, USCR wrote to the Indian government expressing concern about a possible deterioration in the commitment to protect refugees seeking to enter India and called upon the Indian authorities to adhere to international norms for refugee protection.

Bangladesh also has a population of about 258,000 Urdu-speaking Biharis, known as "stranded Pakistanis," who have been living in 66 camps in Bangladesh for 18 years. Having sided with Pakistan when Bangladesh seceded in 1971, their hope is to be transferred to Pakistan. An agreement to that effect was signed in July 1988, and about $300 million was pledged for their transport and resettlement in Pakistan by the Saudi-based World Muslim League.

Biharis held hunger strikes and demonstrations following publication of remarks by Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to the effect that repatriation of the Biharis might have to be delayed because their return could cause "severe strains in the social fabric" of Sind Province, the scene of volatile ethnic tensions.

Bangladesh is also home to about 15,000 families of Muslim refugees from Burma known as Rohingas. As many as 300,000 Rohingas fled the Burmese state of Arakan in 1978, saying that they were fleeing religious persecution. Most are

believed to have repatriated the following year.

Scattered reports have been received of refugees attempting to enter Bangladesh following the repression of the pro-democracy movement in Burma. Bangladesh border guards reportedly arrested 26 Burmese nationals, including ten children, after they crossed the border in early January 1989.

India

India, bordering on nine countries and itself a complex union of numerous peoples, has provided asylum to hundreds of thousands of refugees since Independence and partition more than 40 years ago.

India today hosts refugees from Afghanistan, Iran, Tibet, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Burma. New Delhi has consistently resisted international involvement in what it considers its internal affairs and denies UNHCR access to refugee camps.

In addition, many Sikhs, Nagas, Bodos, Mizos, and other tribal and ethnic minorities continue to be internally displaced as a result of communal and political conflicts. Ethnic conflict has also resulted in significant displacement of Hindus from certain minority-dominated areas.

The largest refugee population in India continues to be the Tibetans, most of whom followed the Dalai Lama into the country after the violent Chinese annexation of their country in 1959. Small numbers of Tibetans continued to transit Nepal to refugee centers in India in 1989, a fact which complicated New Delhi's delicate relationship with Beijing. The unspecified number of new arrivals marginally increased India's more than 100,000 Tibetans. Now resident in India for more than 30 years, most Tibetan refugees are relatively well integrated into local communities, where they enjoy nearly all the rights of Indian citizens. Most Tibetans, however, preserve their language, culture, and religion and continue to prepare for their eventual return to Tibet.

India is also host to a large tribal refugee population from Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts. Dhaka and New Delhi do not agree on the numbers of tribal refugees from Bangladesh who have fled into India. Both deny international press and human rights monitors access to the disturbed areas. The picture is further complicated by the frequent movements back and forth across the border by displaced tribal people.

In May, Chakma tribals were reported to have been massacred by Bangladesh army units and Bengali settlers in reprisal for attacks by the Shanti Bahini, a group of Chakma militants, on ethnic Bengali settlers in the region. By June, undetermined numbers of Chakmas reportedly crossed into Tripura seeking protection from the violence in Bangladesh, joining some 40,000 to 56,000 who were already living there.

In September, the state government of Tripura took steps to prevent further border crossings by refugees from Bangladesh, including a night curfew along the border area. USCR expressed its concern to the Indian ambassador in Washington. USCR called on the Indian government to respect international law prohibiting the forced return of refugees to territories where their lives or freedom would be threatened and recommended that New Delhi invite UNHCR and the international community to assist in monitoring and caring for its refugee population in Tripura.

India has played host to more than 137,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees since 1983 when large numbers of Tamils began to flee government violence aimed at suppressing the Tamil separatist movement in the north and east of the country. Less than one-third of the remaining 103,000 to 105,000 Tamil refugees continued to reside in widely scattered refugee camps near the coastal areas of the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. The bulk of the Sri Lankan Tamil refugee population has integrated into the surrounding Tamil community, with mixed success, according to Western observers who have visited the area.

More than 25,000 Sri Lankan Tamils have repatriated under UNHCR auspices and another 17,000 have returned without UNHCR assistance since the signing of a peace accord in mid-1987 between Colombo and New Delhi. The repatriation program came to a standstill in 1989, however, after about 900 returned in two boats in March and April.

Few Tamil refugees remaining in India's Tamil Nadu state are likely to seek to return to Sri Lanka until a stable political solution is hammered out that would assure their safe return. This includes some 10,000 Tamils who have been registered for repatriation, but for whom at the end of the year no plans were in effect for repatriation in the near future.

Some 800 Burmese refugees crossed into India's Manipur and Mizoram states after the Burmese army crackdown on the country's pro-democracy movement in September 1988 that left thousands of young people—mostly students—dead. Half of the Burmese refugees are ethnic Burmans and the other half Chins, closely related to the dominant ethnic group in Mizoram, the Mizos. Both groups of Burmese refugees were assisted by local state governments and community groups during 1989.

An increase in the number of Afghan refugees seeking asylum in India was noted in 1989. Following the Soviet withdrawal in February and the fighting in and around government strongholds in Kabul and Jalalabad, many of the new arrivals were believed to be more closely identified as sympathizers or relatives of people associated with the Afghan regime, who found India to be more hospitable than Pakistan or Iran, the major refuge centers for opponents of the Kabul regime. UNHCR reported 6,962 persons seeking their assistance in June, of whom 5,472 were Afghans.

Citizens of India displaced within their own country for political reasons continued to challenge the Indian government and society. More than 60,000 tribals from the Bodo ethnic group were internally displaced in northeast India in 1989 following violence between militant Bodo separatist groups and the local population in the Indian state of Assam. Bodos and other Tibeto-Burman ethnic minority groups account for ten percent of the state's population and, led by the All-Bodo Student Union (ABSU) and other militant groups, are seeking to create a separate tribal state. ABSU and its allies launched a series of violent attacks against Assamese villages during the summer months, killing at least 90 people. After a series of violent counterattacks by local security forces, state police, and national security forces sent into the area by New Delhi, more than 60,000 Bodos fled into the neighboring state of Arunachal Pradesh.

Assam itself continued to host a small population of internally displaced Nagas in 1989 who have fled into the state following continued violence in the neighboring state of Nagaland. Members of various Naga tribal liberation groups have attacked border areas, attempting to carve out a Naga state. Reprisals against Naga villages by the Nagaland State security forces caused at least 1,500 Naga civilians to cross the border into Assam seeking political sanctuary.

Communal and ethnic separatist violence in the Indian state of Punjab, as well as Jammu and Kashmir, continued through much of 1989, generating large numbers of internally displaced families. Militant separatists representing several Sikh groups attacked both Hindu and Sikh civilian communities in the Punjab, forcing hundreds of Hindu families to flee the state and many Sikhs to migrate to urban areas to avoid militant violence. Although November's parliamentary elections brought prominent militant Sikh spokespersons into the central government, more militant Sikh groups vowed to continue violent attacks on civilians to highlight their calls for an independent Sikh state.

In Jammu and Kashmir, militant separatists—some calling for an independent Muslim state, others demanding union of the state with Pakistan—assassinated local leaders, disrupted businesses, and destroyed transportation infrastructure. By year's end, an undisclosed number of Kashmiris—both Hindu and Muslim—had fled their homes. Rising dissatisfaction with the new government of Prime Minister V.P. Singh (elected November 1989) suggested even more civil violence in the coming year with the expectation that the number of internally displaced would continue to rise.

Iran

As a result of wars to the east and the west, for the better part of the last decade, Iran has been host to one of the world's largest refugee populations. At the same time, war has caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Iranians internally, and war and revolution combined have engendered the exile of well over a million Iranians worldwide who are unwilling to return to their homeland.

The largest refugee group within Iran is comprised of the estimated 2.35 million Afghan refugees, located predominantly in the eastern border provinces of Khorasan and Sistan-Baluchistan, but also found in significant numbers in cities throughout eastern and central Iran, including about 150,000 in Tehran.

For the most part, the Afghan refugees have settled spontaneously and become self-sufficient, although with few exceptions, they are limited to unskilled jobs at the bottom of the economic ladder. Afghan refugees are eligible for the same social services as Iranian citizens, but have also reportedly been inducted into the armed forces as well.

Because the Afghan refugees have not been confined to camps, they have not been a significant drain on the Iranian economy during a time of war-induced austerity. With some 1.5 million living in urban areas, the Afghans have also been less active in continuing cross-border forays into Afghanistan than their counterparts in Pakistan.

Given the success of the laissez-faire approach towards the Afghan refugees, it was a surprise in December when draft legislation was introduced into the Majles, the Iranian parliament, that would confine all Afghan refugees to special camps. The impetus for the move seemed to be a sweeping campaign to eradicate narcotics trafficking, in which some Afghan refugees had been implicated.

USCR wrote to President Rafsanjani questioning whether the involvement of some individuals in illegal activities justified creating hardships for hundreds of thousands of others innocent of any wrongdoing. USCR praised Iran for the degree of freedom it has accorded Afghan refugees and its support for their self-sufficiency. USCR, warned, however,

Afghan refugees in Khorasan Province, Iran. Afghans in Iran are mostly self-sufficient, but, with few exceptions, remain in low-paying, unskilled jobs. UNHCR/A. Billard

that the proposed legislation could create a "dependency syndrome" whereby "a proud and independent people ... who are able to support themselves and enjoy the dignity that comes with self-support ... [are reduced] to a condition where they are confined and dependent on 'hand-outs' for their existence."

The Islamic Republic says that it hosts another 500,000 refugees of other origins, mostly from Iraq. These refugees, as well, are for the most part self-sufficient and not living in camps. UNHCR provides assistance to about 90,000 Iraqi Kurds in Iran. Many of the Kurdish refugees in Iran fled crackdowns in Iraq in 1970–71 and 1975. During the war with Iraq, additional numbers of Kurds fled, as well as large numbers of Iraqis with Iranian ancestry who were expelled from Iraq. The Iranian press continued to report the expulsion of hundreds of Iraqis of Iranian descent from Iran during 1989, after the cessation of hostilities between the two countries.

In August, the deputy governor of West Azerbaijan, in northwest Iran, announced that an additional 54,500 Iraqi Kurds had fled to Iran after the July 1989 ceasefire, some directly from Iraq, others via Turkey. He charged that Turkey had "expelled" the Kurdish refugees "in defiance of international regulations." The official said that 94,500 Kurdish refugees were living in refugee camps.

USCR's estimate of the number of Iraqi refugees in Iran takes as its baseline the 400,000 Iraqi refugees reported by the Islamic Republic as being in Iran prior to the end of the war. Tracking the movement of Iraqi Kurdish refugees both directly from Iraq and via Turkey since the end of the war, USCR estimates a total of 475,000 Iraqi refugees in Iran at the end of 1989. This number is of necessity a rough estimate, and international observers have not had sufficient access to this population to make a more accurate assessment.

Iran began efforts to reconstruct war-damaged cities in Khuzestan province on the border with Iraq to pave the way for the return of hundreds of thousands who had been rendered homeless by the war. In April, the government announced its intention to return 200,000 displaced people from the cities of Abadan and Khorranshahr by the end of the year. By December, some 3,000 families had returned to Abadan. Rafsanjani announced that reconstruction had not proceeded "to the extent expected by the people" and called for "acceleration" of reconstruction in Khuzestan province.

Throughout a year marked by the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the election of Rafsanjani to the presidency, Iranian exiles looked for signs of political change that might enable safe return. Hopes that were raised on the tenth anniversary of the revolution in February with the announcement of an amnesty and a speech by then-heir designate to Khomeini, Ayatollah Montazeri, calling for human rights reforms that would enable the return of millions of Iranians abroad "who long to come to Iran but are scared," were dashed when Khomeini cut off Montazeri's political inheritance.

Another unwelcome development to large numbers of draft-age exiles was the announcement by the Armed Forces General Staff Headquarters that "severe punishment is envisaged to deal seriously and legally with those individuals who have evaded the sacred duty of being conscripts, under various excuses, during the 8-year holy defense." All eligible conscripts in exile were ordered to return home by March 8 "or they will be considered as deserters and become liable to new disciplinary laws." Those found and arrested, the communique warned, "will not find any leniency nor will they qualify under the 4-month amnesty law."

The assassinations of three prominent exiles abroad, in Vienna, Cyprus, and the United Arab Emirates, appeared circumstantially to be the work of the Iranian government. In all three cases, the government denied any involvement.

Amnesty International reported in July that seven Iranians, including four UNHCR-recognized refugees, were shot by firing squad upon their forced return from Turkey in November 1988.

Iraq

In the aftermath of the eight-year war with Iran, the Iraqi government's campaign against its Kurdish population along the border with Iran and Turkey continued in 1989.

Shortly after the ceasefire with Iran, in August 1988, Iraqi forces made a sweep of the Kurdish strongholds in the mountainous north, using chemical weapons, and causing tens of thousands to flee the country.

Efforts that have been underway since the 1970s to remove Kurds from mountain villages near the borders became a central part of the Iraqi government's post-war plans. In April, the government announced the creation of a 20-mile depopulated *cordon sanitaire* along its borders with Iran and Turkey. More than 100,000 residents of the city of Qala Diza were notified that they would be moved in 17 days and the city razed. The message was underscored when the city was surrounded by Iraqi troops. The leader of a Kurdish delegation that met with President Saddam Hussein, asking him to countermand the order, was arrested.

Another 100,000 or more Kurds in border areas were believed to be affected by the relocation order.

USCR wrote to President Hussein urging him to cease the forced relocation of Iraqi Kurds. The letter cited Articles 12 and 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which forbid arbitrary interference with a person's home or privacy and guarantee freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

Iraqi government officials say that the Kurdish people of northern Iraq "enjoy peace and live their ordinary life" and that the decision to empty the border strip affects Arab as well as Kurdish citizens. The government says that the decision to empty border regions is not a matter of human rights, but "of protecting Iraq's national security to prevent sabotage and the use of these border and remote areas as gateways to sabotage in Iraq." The government denies that the Kurds will be resettled in remote desert areas in the south—as occurred in 1975—but would be relocated within the Kurdish region to "cities and residential settlements with all public services." Western diplomats indeed found some of the relocated Kurds within the Kurdish region, but on isolated, barren land. They were reportedly not able to take livestock with them, and found it impossible to pursue their traditional occupations.

By year's end, the number of Kurds who had been forcibly transferred was unclear. Numbers of refugees and displaced people in Iraq generally are unreliable. That being said, estimates of the number of Kurds displaced since the 1970s range from the hundreds of thousands to a million. By some estimates, 3,000 of 4,000 Kurdish villages have been destroyed—burned and bulldozed to the ground.

The number of Iranian refugees in Iraq is unknown, though the government claims a figure of 60,000. For the duration of the war, military communiques reported almost daily on refugees fleeing Iran and seeking asylum in

Iraqi Kurds in the Mardin refugee camp in Turkey. After a year, refugees are still living in tents. Visitors to the camp report nonfunctioning sanitation, stagnant water, and rats. J. Hippler

Iraq. Yet, these refugees do not appear to have been registered with any international agencies. UNHCR resettled 152 Iranian refugees in 1988; another 350 refugees remained in the Shomali camp at the end of 1989 waiting for opportunities for third-country resettlement.

About 30,000 Iranian Kurds are believed to reside in the Al-Tash camp west of Baghdad, most of whom are reported to have entered Iraq prior to the outbreak of the war.

Several amnesties for political "fugitives" were declared in late 1988 and the spring of 1989. The government claims that 92,000 Kurds have returned to Iraq from Turkey and Iran in response to the amnesties, but these numbers could not be independently confirmed. Press reports from Iran, which could not be independently substantiated, indicate that more than 100 who surrendered according to the amnesty, including 37 army deserters, were executed upon return, including a senior Iraqi communist, 'Abd al-Salam Ibrahim, who returned from exile in Sweden. The Iranian press also reported the expulsion of hundreds of Kurds from Iraq who had sought to repatriate in response to amnesty offers.

Israel

Changes occurring in the Soviet Union and Ethiopia held the promise of increased numbers of Jews from these lands having the opportunity to start their lives anew in Israel. Increases were noted in 1989, but not as dramatic as some had anticipated. The truly dramatic changes looked as though they would start in 1990.

Although some 71,509 Jews exited the Soviet Union in 1989, the highest annual total in more than two decades, only 16.8 percent chose Israel as their destination, a total of 11,994 persons. The majority preferred to resettle in the United States. However, a U.S. policy change under which resettlement processing will take place in the U.S. embassy in Moscow rather than in Rome suggests that Soviet Jews might find it more difficult to be admitted to the United States as refugees and that more might opt for Israel in 1990. By early 1990, the rate of Soviet Jewish immigration in Israel was approaching 1,000 per week.

Israeli officials say that an agreement has been signed with the Soviet airline, Aeroflot, so that direct flights from Moscow to Tel Aviv could begin in early 1990. Previously, most Jews have flown to Austria with Israeli visas, but have "dropped out" after arriving in Vienna, preferring to go to the United States instead of their designated destination.

The renewal of diplomatic relations with Ethiopia after a 16-year break signalled a willingness on the part of the Mengistu government to permit Ethiopian Jews to emigrate. There are currently about 20,000 Jews in Ethiopia; more than 15,000 Ethiopian Jews are estimated to have arrived in Israel until their movement was abruptly halted in 1985. At least several hundred Ethiopian Jews are believed to have transited to Israel in 1989, out of a total of 1,900 immigrants from Africa (including 250 from South Africa).

Israel does not accord Jewish refugees any special status, but counts them in its total immigration pool. Immigration as a whole was up 84 percent in 1989 over the previous year, with 24,650 new immigrants and potential immigrants arriving.

Many Soviet and Ethiopian Jews remained in government "absorption centers" for long periods of time, as a recession resulted in a tight employment market and a housing crunch.

Occupied Territories

The Palestinian uprising—*intifada*—in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip completed its second year in December 1989. The character of the *intifada* became that of a grueling war of attrition, fought largely with stones, strikes, and barricades on the Palestinian side, and with live ammunition, beatings, tear-gassing, mass arrests, curfews, house demolitions, and deportations on the part of Israeli military and security forces.

An average of one Palestinian per day has been killed during the *intifada*, more than 700 altogether, though sources vary in how fatalities and other casualties are counted. In December, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin announced that 35,000 to 40,000 arrests had been made and 37,000 wounded during the *intifada*. A new development in 1989 was the increased killing by Palestinians of Arabs suspected of collaborating with Israel; more than 100 were killed during the year.

Although the *intifada* had its origins in the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip, it has grown to include city and town populations. Distinguishing the refugee casualties from the Palestinian population as a whole has become problematic, and, in fact, UNRWA, whose mandate covers 398,391 registered refugees in the West Bank and 469,385 in the Gaza Strip, is now providing temporary emergency assistance to nonrefugees in the territories. This includes emergency medical services for the injured.

On a number of occasions, Israeli forces prevented or delayed UNRWA ambulances from evacuating the wounded. UNRWA reported instances when ambulance drivers were detained and beaten, and injured persons removed from ambulances.

On other occasions, Israeli forces raided hospitals and health clinics to arrest patients.

On October 18, Israeli Defense Forces raided UNRWA facilities in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, confiscating papers and assaulting and detaining UNRWA staff. Among other things, IDF Radio accused UNRWA of "attempts to assist residents who are not refugees and therefore not covered by UNRWA's mandate." IDF Radio said, "The fact that the facilities belong to UNRWA will not protect anyone from among the agency who conducts hostile or illegal activities."

USCR wrote to the Israeli authorities in October urging "utmost restraint," particularly in regard to "traditional sanctuaries—refugee camps, mosques, schools, hospitals."

The USCR letter cited statistics from the Israeli branch of the International Association for Children's Rights, showing that the percentage of children casualties had increased from 28 percent in the first six months of the year to 46 percent in August. In the first year of the *intifada*, children represented about 15 to 20 percent of the casualties.

"As legally constituted authorities," said USCR, "your forces are in fact held to a higher standard than the children who throw the stones and create provocations. And, as the casualty figures show, lethal power is most definitely heavier on the side of Israeli forces. The question, then, is how that power is exercised and to what end."

In January, the IDF authorized the firing of plastic bullets in nonlife-threatening situations, and, in September, new regulations permitted the use of live ammunition against masked men, whether or not they were armed. Sep-

Israeli soldiers at the entrance of the Aida refugee camp between Bethlehem and Jerusalem in the West Bank. On average, one Palestinian per day has been killed during the two year *intifada*, and refugee camps have been the scene of intense clashes. UNRWA/G. Nehmeh

tember saw the highest monthly toll of live-ammunition injuries since May.

In September, U.S. President George Bush rejected a request from Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir for $2 billion to restore refugee camps in the occupied territories. Bush said that the refugee camps cannot be separated from an overall peace initiative. Shimon Peres called Shamir's request "foolish" and "without logic."

Schooling suffered for another year, as West Bank schools remained closed for an 18-month period, ending in July, only to be shut again in December for a two-month "winter vacation."

Although 15 Palestinians were expelled from the territories on New Year's Day 1989, no new expulsion orders were announced during the year. Despite the downturn in actual expulsions, the issue of deportation of Palestinians as a means of fighting the *intifada*, and even of "mass transfers" of the Palestinian population, was much discussed in the Israeli press and Knesset (parliament). In August, five Palestinians were expelled who had been under deportation orders, bringing to 58 the number of Palestinians expelled under Emergency Defense Regulations for security reasons, as well as the case of Mubarak Awad, purportedly expelled for violation of visa regulations, but more obviously for his highly visible activity in support of nonviolent resistance in the territories.

It appears that far fewer family reunion applications have been approved since the *intifada* began. Spouses of West Bank residents have only been allowed three-month permits for visits, and children born of nonresident mothers while in the West Bank have not been permitted to register on their fathers' identification cards. About 80 adult Palestinians were deported to Jordan between May and October for violating three-month permits.

Jordan

Although Jordan officially severed its links with the West Bank in 1988, the events taking place across the Jordan River were never far from the thoughts of the 899,811 Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA within Jordan itself.

While Jordan prepared for the most open and representative elections in its history, great attention was paid to the aspirations of the Jordanian voters of Palestinian origin—including the refugees—who comprise more than half of the Kingdom's total population.

Palestinians enjoy full citizenship rights in Jordan, including the right to vote. The UN resolutions that define which Palestinians are refugees and what durable solutions should be sought on their behalf differ from the refugee definitions and solutions in the UN Convention regarding other refugees. Palestinian refugees are defined as persons who resided in Palestine two years prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1948, who lost their homes and livelihood as a result of that war. The UNRWA mandate recognizes only repatriation or compensation as permanent solutions for the Palestinian refugee problem. Therefore, citizenship in another country, such as Jordan—which would represent the cessation of refugee status for other refugee groups covered by the UN Convention and Protocol—does not terminate a Palestinian's refugee status.

As part of the severing of links with the West Bank, Palestinian refugee camps were no longer reserved seats in Parliament, but instead were integrated with other constituencies.

King Hussein welcomed Palestinian participation in the elections, saying, "All those who have chosen to be Jordanian nationals have the right to take part in the elections, with the understanding that this will not undermine in any way whatsoever their rights regarding their cause."

Although many candidates for Parliament placed support for the "blessed *intifada*" as a top priority, refugees at the sprawling al-Baqa'a camp—one of the largest refugee camps in the Middle East—were said to be pressing candidates on sewage, water, and transportation problems, as well.

Although Palestinians remained aloof from rioting in April in the southern part of the country, several violent incidents occurred in December involving Palestinians marking the second anniversary of the *intifada*. Injuries were reported following the burning of tires and the blocking of the Amman-Damascus highway outside the al-Baqa'a camp. Several arrests were also made at al-Yarmuk University following clashes between Palestinian and native Jordanian students. These events prompted heated debate in the newly elected Parliament about the "sectional character" of the disturbances, and whether or not they indicated a more far-reaching "national segregration" of Jordanian society between those of Palestinian origin and the rest of the population.

Kuwait

More than 70 percent of Kuwait's population of 1.9 million is comprised of expatriates. Kuwait is not a signatory to the UN Convention and Protocol on refugees and does not formally recognize or grant refugee status. Although informal recognition has been accorded some Afghans and Iranians, who have been allowed to remain or permitted to seek third-country resettlement, other asylum seekers have reportedly been returned to their countries of origin. Even long-term expatriates receive only temporary residence permits, and can be summarily expelled without charge or appeal.

In recent years, tens of thousands of expatriates have been summarily deported, many for security reasons. Although a high of 27,000 were deported in 1986, subsequent years have not seen as many deportations, and those who have been deported are often expelled for violating immigration or residency regulations. As many as 25,000 are estimated to have been deported in 1989.

Expatriates generally are denied civil and political rights accorded citizens, and, with the exception of stateless Palestinians, are required to be sponsored by a Kuwaiti citizen. Even children born in Kuwait to expatriates lack citizenship rights.

The expatriate community includes about 350,000 Palestinians, many of whom were born in Kuwait. A significant number of these Palestinians have now grown to adulthood, after having been educated in Kuwaiti schools, and have left the country to seek higher education. In many cases, Palestinian students have thereby been denied Kuwaiti residence permits, with the result that many find it difficult even to return to visit their families.

Since the Palestinians are outside UNRWA's mandated area of operations, they receive no assistance from that agency.

Lebanon

As the Lebanese civil war entered its fifteenth year, Beirut and its environs took its heaviest pounding, and unprecedented numbers of people were displaced, at least temporarily, by the fighting.

Most of the intrafactional conflicts that had torn the country in 1988 abated in 1989. In January, the Amal and Hizbullah militias signed an accord that held up for most of 1989, easing some of the worst violence of the previous year (although intra-Shi'ite fighting did flare again at the end of the year and into 1990). Intra-Palestinian fighting that had pitted pro- and anti-Arafat groups against each other eased, as well. There was a last spate of fighting in February between the Christian Lebanese Forces of Samir Geagea and the Lebanese Army, led by General Michel Aoun, whom outgoing President Amin Gemayel had appointed to head a military Cabinet. Intra-Christian violence abated after February, but erupted again at the end of the year and into 1990.

The sorting out of internal conflicts within the Christian, Shi'ite, and Palestinian camps, however, did not result in more peaceful times, but rather in a new round of intensified fighting on sharply drawn sectarian lines.

General Aoun's assertion of an uncompromising hostility toward the Syrian presence in Lebanon, combined with an effort to choke off militia rule, resulted in a showdown between the Syrian-backed Muslim militias and the Christian-dominated army.

A pivotal figure in the year's developments was Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. The year started with an invitation by Jumblatt for more than 200,000 Christians displaced by previous rounds of fighting to return to their homes in the Druze-controlled Chouf Mountains. Had this massive return been successful, the trend toward the "cantonization" of Lebanon into distinct sectarian zones would have met with a significant reversal.

But, in an incident characteristic of the ongoing tragic story of the derailing of moves towards peace and reconciliation, one of Jumblatt's top aides was assassinated while touring one of the villages slated for the returnees. Jumblatt cancelled the offer.

Also in March, Aoun's forces intercepted a ship going to a Druze port, as part of Aoun's effort to cut off militia control of ports; the civil war then entered one of its bloodiest and most destructive chapters.

For the next six months, Beirut was pounded by a war of artillery shelling. Jumblatt, backed by more than 30,000 Syrian troops, spearheaded the Muslim confrontation with Aoun's Christian forces. Heavy barrages would rain down on Christian neighborhoods of East Beirut. Then, Muslim West Beirut would be mercilessly pounded. About 900 people were killed and 3,000 injured in the artillery exchanges—almost all civilians—and the city was heavily damaged. One report said that not a single home escaped damage at least to windows and doors. An estimated 15,000 homes were severely damaged or destroyed.

Carrying belongings through rubble, W. Beirut man scurries to avoid sniper fire. More than a million people fled Beirut as fighting raged. Reuters

The shelling war caused as many as 90 percent of the city's 1.5 million population to flee their homes. As many as 200,000 are believed to have fled the country—principally to Syria, Cyprus, and France. About 40,000 stayed in Cyprus, but many used Cyprus as a transit point to France and other parts of Western Europe and North America.

But most could not afford to emigrate or find a means to do so. About 600,000, mostly Muslims from West Beirut, fled to south Lebanon, many staying with friends or relatives in the Tyre area. Some Christians from East Beirut returned to their homes in areas east of Sidon, from where they had fled the fighting in 1985.

The poorest of the *Muhajjarin*, the internally displaced, massed along the riverbanks of the Awwali and Zahrani rivers without any shelter, in unsanitary conditions. Sidon hosted about 60,000 internally displaced; all 21 government schools were used to house refugees.

About 150,000 fled to the Syrian-controlled Beqa'a valley. And more than 150,000 Christians from East Beirut fled to Christian-controlled areas north of Beirut.

Another 20,000 fled from Beirut to the Israeli "security zone" along the southern border. Although the area is controlled by the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army, a predominantly Christian force, more than 90 percent of the new arrivals were displaced Shi'ite Muslims. Many Shi'ite villages are located in the "security zone," and the areas separating that area from Beirut are Muslim controlled, making movement of Beiruti Christians to that part of the country more difficult.

In August, USCR sent letters to the principal militia leaders, General Aoun, and President Assad of Syria, calling for an immediate end to the bloodshed. USCR called for a cessation of hostilities "on behalf of the civilian population of Lebanon of all faiths, nationalities, and ethnic backgrounds, particularly on behalf of the hundreds of thousands who have lost their homes and been forced to flee."

As the violence ebbed in late September, most of those displaced from Beirut returned to their homes, including almost all of those who had fled to Cyprus. At the close of the year, perhaps a million Lebanese from all backgrounds and in various parts of the country remained in some form of internal displacement. Since the beginning of the civil war in 1975 until the end of 1989, more than half of Lebanon's total pop-

ulation are estimated to have been displaced from their homes at some point during the war.

The Palestinian refugee population, in a change from previous years, was on the periphery rather than the center of the Lebanese civil war. Although the Beirut refugee camps were not specifically targeted, they too suffered further damage during the months of sustained shelling. About 4,000 Palestinian refugees from Beirut fled to the Sidon area; about 2,200 to Tyre; and more than 1,000 to the north. Reconstruction of the Beirut camps from the previous year's destruction proceeded slowly because of the continued poor security situation.

In April, UNRWA relocated its Lebanon field office from Beirut to the Siblin Training Center near Sidon for security reasons. The war also caused UNRWA to close 27 of its schools in central Lebanon, the Shouf Mountains, and the Beqa'a Valley. Some of the schools were used to house displaced persons.

In August, Jumblatt's forces were reported to have expelled about 100 Palestinian families from the Iqlim al-Kharrub region to Sidon.

Although things were relatively quiet for Palestinian refugees in the south in 1989, tensions flared on several occasions with the Amal militias and between rival Palestinian groups. On May 18, the SLA shelled Ein el Hilweh, Lebanon's largest refugee camp, near Sidon, killing five refugees. At various times, Israel struck at Palestinian targets in and near the camps in the south.

In December 1988 and January 1989, Israel and the SLA also expelled 86 Shi'ite villagers, mostly women and children, from the "security zone" following protests about forced conscription into the SLA. The SLA maintained that the deportees were indirectly involved in an unsuccessful assassination attempt on SLA leader Antoine Lahade. In July, the SLA expelled 21 Lebanese police men from the zone.

Pakistan

Despite raised hopes that Afghan refugees might soon repatriate following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February, relatively few refugees left the sanctuary of Pakistan because of continued danger and uncertainty back home.

In fact, about 70,000 additional refugees arrived from Afghanistan during the year, primarily urban dwellers from Jalalabad, the scene of intense rocket attacks and a prolonged siege. Because they had lived for so long in areas under the control of the Kabul government, the new arrivals were treated with a degree of suspicion by the *mujahedin* resistance leadership who control security and assistance for the Afghan refugee population. Before refugees are eligible to be registered, the Pakistan government requires that they belong to one of the *mujahedin* parties. Those who were not able to move in with established refugee family members who could vouch for them were kept in refugee villages segregated from the other refugees. New camps were constructed near Kohat, Peshawar, and Mansehra.

Some 3.3 million Afghans have been registered as refugees and live in 340 refugee villages, more than two-thirds of which are located in the Northwest Frontier province.

As many as 300,000 refugees may be unregistered. Questions have often been raised about the accuracy of the refugee census, both registered and nonregistered.

Although the figure is disputed, the Kabul government claims that some 80,000 Afghan refugees repatriated from Pakistan during 1989, and that a total of 200,000 have returned from Pakistan and Iran since the government announced a policy of "national reconciliation."

Some spontaneous returns to areas outside government control also occurred during the year, particularly of men returning to plant crops and rebuild homes. Refugees from areas around Quetta in Pakistan's Baluchistan province were reported to have crossed into the area of Qandahar in the southern part of Afghanistan, where crops were being planted, irrigation systems repaired, and heavily damaged residential areas being rebuilt. Spontaneous repatriation has also been reported to another heavily war-damaged province, Kunar, on the Pakistan border due east of Kabul. As in repatriations to Qandahar province, the returnees to Kunar appear to be tentative, seasonal, and, perhaps, temporary.

Three-quarters of the refugees are women and children. Among the refugees, are hundreds of thousands of widows, orphans, and persons crippled by war-related injuries. A whole generation of Afghan children, inside and outside the country, have been deprived of an education, as a result of a decade of war. More than 90 percent of women are illiterate.

The mortality rate for Afghan refugee children under the age of five is 130/1,000 (as opposed to 30/1,000 in the United States). But the mortality rate for children within Afghanistan is even worse—a staggering 300/1,000.

The majority of the refugees are ethnic Pathans, mostly of rural origin. Few, however, have continued to pursue agriculture during the years of exile, leading to concerns that farming skills are not being passed along to a new generation.

Refugee boys in Kheshki refugee village near Peshawar, Pakistan. A decade of war has deprived a generation of Afghan children of an education. UNHCR/J. Mohr

The government of Pakistan provides about half of the cost of caring for the refugees; significant contributions have come from the international community as well.

In the hope that Afghan refugees may in the foreseeable future be able to repatriate in significant numbers, UNHCR has reoriented its assistance programs towards preparing the ground for potentially one of the largest scale repatriations in history. No investment in new infrastructure was made by UNHCR in 1989, but vocational and health training, as well as training in detecting and deactivating mines did go forward. UNHCR cooperated in efforts spearheaded by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, appointed by the UN Secretary General as the Coordinator for UN Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programs related to Afghanistan.

Pakistan is not a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention and Protocol, but has been generous, despite social and economic costs to its own society, in providing temporary asylum for Afghan refugees.

About 3,000 non-Afghan refugees have been registered by UNHCR in Pakistan, most of whom are Iranians. Pakistan tolerates their presence if they are recognized by UNHCR and have the possibility of being resettled elsewhere. Among the undocumented population of Iranians living in urban areas of Sind and Punjab provinces who have not been registered or recognized as refugees, another 6,000 are estimated, in fact, to be refugees. Since 1987, several clashes among pro- and anti-Khomeini Iranians have strained the patience of the Pakistani authorities, who have often threatened to deport illegal immigrants—read Iranians—to their country of origin.

On May 30, Pakistani police broke up a six-day sit-in at the UNHCR office in Islamabad staged by about 450 Iraqi refugees of Kurdish background. Five refugees were reported injured in the incident. At year's end, about 600 Iraqi refugees were registered by UNHCR in Pakistan.

Saudi Arabia

Although Saudi Arabia plays host to millions of Muslims throughout the world for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and employs a large expatriate work force, it does not recognize asylum seekers or refugees, as such.

More than 250,000 expatriates are in circumstances that suggest that they may well be refugees. They include an estimated 110,000 Palestinians, 100,000 Ethiopians, 40,000 Afghans, thousands of Somalis and Yemenis from the People's Democratic Republic, and scattered other nationals from Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and other countries who fear return to their homelands. They are treated like other expatriate workers; their stays depend on the sponsorship of their employers (though members of the royal family are known to have sponsored people in refugee circumstances, allowing them to stay indefinitely).

Sri Lanka

Political violence continued throughout the island in 1989. An estimated 12,000 Tamils, mostly young men, fled to India in 1989, 3,000 of whom entered refugee camps, swelling to more than 100,000 the total number of Tamil refugees in India. An estimated half-million Sri Lankans remained internally displaced, and additional numbers of people were forced to flee their homes during the year.

In July 1987, New Delhi and Colombo signed a peace accord to try to end the five-year bloody civil war led by Sri Lankan Tamil militants seeking independence for the areas of the island dominated by the Tamil-speaking minority community.

The relationship quickly soured between the Tamil population and the Indian troops who arrived after the July 1987 accord to replace the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan army in the Northern and Eastern provinces. Initially looked upon as natural allies by the Tamil population, the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) attempted to destroy the leading militant group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or Tigers). Conflict escalated, and more than 1,000 Indian troops were killed by snipers, land mines, and in pitched battles with Tamil militants. The death toll in the Northeast section of the country for the 1983-1989 period topped 10,000 by mid-year. Hundreds of Tamils have been detained by the IPKF, and human rights organizations have alleged mistreatment and deaths in detention, as well as "disappearances" following arrest.

Violence between the IPKF and Tamil militants in the north and east of the island had by December 1989 made safe return impossible for the estimated 500,000 Tamils internally displaced during the last several years.

India began withdrawing its military forces in late 1989—a process that is likely to be completed by April 1990—and control of Tamil-majority areas in the north and east is being returned to either elected Tamil authorities or to the Tigers. The Indians forcibly conscripted large numbers of Tamil youth to serve in the local security forces late in 1989. Many Tamil men fled south during late 1989 rather than be drafted into these unpopular civilian security forces. By year's end, fighting between the Tigers and the new local militias had displaced thousands of local families and slowed the resettlement of internally displaced refugees.

More than 25,000 Tamils have returned to Sri Lanka from camps in India under a UNHCR-sponsored voluntary repatriation program, and another 17,000 have returned on their own. Most returnees have been from coastal fishing families who have been living in refugee camps—some for as long as six years—in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu. About 10,000 Tamils were still registered by the Indian government for return at the end of 1989, but no group repatriations had occurred since the spring. Between 103,000 and 105,000 Sri Lankan Tamils continue to live in Tamil Nadu and are unlikely to return home until the situation is firmly resolved.

The repatriation program has been suspended since the return of two boatloads of 900 Tamils in March and April. A small number have returned by air, but group returns by boat had not resumed by year's end.

In light of the forced conscription of Tamils into the India-backed local security forces and allegations that hundreds of Tamil civilians have been detained and dozens have disappeared in Indian army custody, human rights groups have questioned continuing the UNHCR repatriation program, despite its voluntary status, at least until sufficient follow-up and personal security safeguards can be enacted.

European countries that had granted large numbers of Tamils political asylum in the early 1980s began to deport small numbers during 1988–89. Britain returned five Tamils to Sri Lanka in 1988, but following revelations that the five were detained and tortured for their alleged ties to the Tigers, they were granted visas and allowed to return to Britain in

1989. In total, 80 Tamils have been expelled from Britain and other European countries.

The Tamil minority is not the only group in Sri Lanka to suffer death and displacement as a result of the civil war. An estimated 96,000 Tamil-speaking Muslims and ethnic Sinhalese who had also fled the violence in the eastern province since 1987 have been unable to re-establish their lives. Many have continued to live in resettlement camps near army outposts or to live with friends and family.

Since the July 1987 India-Sri Lanka accord, most of the violence has been intra-group—Tamil versus Tamil and Sinhalese versus Sinhalese—rather than directly between Sinhalese and Tamils, as had been characteristic of earlier phases of the civil war. This escalation of bloodshed has pitted the Sinhalese-dominated military against a radical Sinhalese group, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, People's Liberation Front).

In 1988–89, a newly resurgent JVP leadership used widespread popular dissatisfaction with Colombo's handling of the Tamil question to encourage popular support for a violent insurrection. The violent methods used by the JVP, including assassination, torture, and revenge killings against government sympathizers and the families of security forces, were met by brutal methods from government security forces, including widespread roundups of Sinhalese youth in the 18–30 age-range and allegations of physical mistreatment during interrogations. According to several international human rights organizations, the government has also allowed—if not encouraged—the violent actions of a number of right-wing vigilante groups that are alleged to have executed hundreds of suspected JVP activists and their families.

Attacks and counterattacks between JVP supporters and the national security forces increased from January until November 1989, accounting for nearly 1,000 deaths per month last summer. A government offensive in November and December resulted in the arrest, death, or execution of nearly all of the JVP's senior leadership. JVP activity continued—although at a lower rate—through the last days of December 1989.

Although changes in the JVP leadership and the imminent withdrawal of the IPKF had become new realities at the end of 1989, the problems of ethnic hatred, a flagging economy, and the presence of hundreds of thousands of homeless displaced persons, exacerbated by growing population pressures, continued to make dim the prospects for peace and the safe return of refugees in the coming year.

Syria

A total of 272,778 Palestinian refugees are registered with UNRWA in Syria. Although ten refugee camps have been established for them, they can live and work elsewhere, and three-quarters do live outside the camps.

Surveys of health conditions in the camps have suggested the need for replacement or refurbishing of health facilities, but UNRWA has encountered serious difficulties in finding funding for needed improvements. In the Qabr Essit camp near Damascus, the survey showed 60 percent of the children to suffer from intestinal parasites due to contaminated water. In cooperation with UNICEF, UNRWA upgraded water and sewer lines and launched a health education campaign.

Several thousand Palestinians considered loyal to Yasir Arafat are estimated to be held in Syrian prisons. Palestinian sources reported the release of hundreds of these prisoners in 1989, but indicated that many remained imprisoned.

An indeterminate number of Kurdish refugees from Iraq have also found refuge in Syria. In the village of Mezgeft, just across the border from Iraq, live some of the Kurdish refugees, spontaneously settled with no support or assistance from international protection agencies.

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), like other states of the Arabian peninsula, depends heavily on expatriate labor. Although not a signatory to the UN refugee Convention and Protocol, the U.A.E. has informally provided temporary refuge to some Iranians and other nationals.

The lack of any formal mechanism for determining refugee status, however, leaves many de facto refugees dependent on maintaining work permits in order to avoid forced return to their homelands.

In recent years, a number of Iraqis and other foreign nationals have been summarily deported following their arrest in the U.A.E.

Following events in Somalia in late 1988, increased numbers of Somalis were noted in the U.A.E. and other Gulf States in early 1989. In July, Amnesty International protested the detention without charge and alleged flogging of a 14-year-old Somali, detained for purported political reasons in November 1988.

In June, a prominent Iranian exile associated with the Shah's regime was assassinated shortly after arriving in Dubai. Approximately 80,000 Iranians live in Dubai.

The United Arab Emirates also hosts a large Palestinian population. In December, the PLO announced that it would begin issuing PLO identification cards, starting with Palestinians in the U.A.E., to supplement other travel documents. An estimated 250,000 identification cards were expected to be issued in the U.A.E., Qatar, and Kuwait.

Yemen Arab Republic

The signing of an agreement paving the way for the unification of North and South Yemen, the withdrawal of troops on both sides of the frontier, and the free movement of citizens across the border all heralded a lessening of tensions in 1989, but continued uncertainty for the tens of thousands of followers of former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) President Ali Nasir Muhammad who fled north following a bloody coup in 1986.

In principle, the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) considers all Yemenis as a common nationality, and therefore does not accord refugee status to the estimated 55,000 who have fled the PDRY since 1986 (considering those remaining in need of assistance as displaced persons), nor to the estimated 400,000 who have fled the PDRY for various reasons since that country became independent in 1967.

About 1,100 Eritrean refugees from Ethiopia are sheltered in the El Khaukha camp, and about half that number are believed to be scattered in other parts of the country.

Many of the Palestinians who arrived from Lebanon in 1982–1983 are believed to have left the Yemen Arab Republic. Some remain in a closely guarded camp near Sanaa.

NORTH AMERICA

Canada

Despite fears expressed in many quarters that a new refugee determination law that went into effect January 1, 1989 would begin a highly restrictive approach towards asylum seekers, Canada, in fact, gave remarkably high rates of recognition for those claiming refugee status.

In 1989, 81 percent of all cases decided were approved. Also, the fear that many applicants would not have their cases heard on the merits, but would be refused for failing to meet eligibility or credibility standards proved largely unfounded. Although the new law included a provision for the return of aliens who came by way of safe third countries, the government declined to name any such safe countries in the law's first year of operation. Also, although the government had formally terminated the "B-1" list of countries to which people would not be deported, in practice, the government showed a reluctance to deport Lebanese, Haitians, Salvadorans, Chinese, and some groups of Iranians during the year.

The largest groups of asylum seekers came from Sri Lanka and Lebanon. Somalis, Salvadorans, and Iranians were also represented in significant numbers.

The new law did seem to contribute to the decrease in the number of asylum seekers who came forward during the year. The number of applications filed during the year, 21,745, represented a 27 percent decrease from 1988, when 34,498 applications were filed. Another factor that cut into the numbers seeking asylum was the imposition of visas for Portugal and Trinidad, from which large numbers of claimants had come in 1988.

Although the new system was touted by the government as efficient and expeditious, a backlog did begin to develop among the new applicants. Some 6,804 claimants were awaiting interviews at the beginning of December. Canada was also faced with handling a considerable backlog of cases that had been filed before the new law went into effect at the beginning of the year. Little progress was made in adjudicating between 102,000 and 124,000 believed to be in that backlog. About 4,500 cases were processed for "landing" status and another 10,000 were awaiting credibility determinations at year's end. About 78,000 persons had no initial hearing; 36 were removed from Canada and 1,236 voluntarily departed.

Canada expected to admit about 26,000 refugees from abroad in 1989, half of whom would be privately sponsored. Another 3,000 to 6,000 with family ties to Canada were expected to be admitted under special humanitarian measures.

A young Buddhist monk from Laos is just one of the more than 930,000 Indochinese refugees who have resettled in the United States since 1975. USCR/C. Robinson

United States

The year began with the implementation of a plan for quick adjudications of asylum claims on the Texas-Mexican border, the detention of those appealing

their asylum denials, and prompt deportation proceedings.

Within days of its implementation, the number of persons coming forward voluntarily to apply for asylum dropped precipitously. At the same time, detention facilities were filled beyond normal capacity, and tents were erected to accommodate the large numbers of detainees.

The policy was directed primarily at Central Americans, whose numbers entering the United States have increased each of the three years since passage of the 1986 immigration reform law. That law, which was fashioned to deter unauthorized entry to the United States, has, in fact, resulted in an overall decrease in the numbers caught trying to cross without inspection, as evidenced by a 5 percent decrease from fiscal years 1988 to 1989. But, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans have bucked the trend with increases of 41, 45, and 185 percent, respectively, from fiscal years 1988 to 1989 alone.

At the end of FY 1989, 21,693 Nicaraguan, 19,929 Salvadoran, and 6,287 Guatemalan asylum claims were pending with Immigration and Naturalization Service district directors, out of a total of 71,993 pending cases. A total of 101,679 asylum applications were filed with the INS in FY 1989, 85 percent of which were from Nicaraguans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans.

While the overall approval rate for asylum seekers of all nationalities stood at 18 percent, there were considerable discrepancies according to nationality, with low approval rates for some of the most seriously war-torn countries. This continues a trend since 1983, in which the average approval rate for Lebanese has been under 10 percent and under 3 percent for Salvadorans, Sri Lankans, Haitians, and Guatemalans.

A USCR team visited INS detention facilities in Texas and Florida and published a report, *Refugees at Our Border: The U.S. Response to Asylum Seekers*, about the effects of the new policy. The report concluded, "Undocumented aliens in detention in the United States are being denied access to legal counsel, resulting in deportation or coerced departure of persons, who, if they knew their rights and could be assisted, might apply for asylum or other forms of legal relief to which they are entitled. As a result, persons in many cases are being returned to dangerous conditions without ever having been given a meaningful opportunity to explain why they might fear return."

A bill that would provide temporary safe haven to Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and Chinese nationals in the United States passed the U.S. House of Representatives in October, but had not yet reached the Senate floor by year's end.

Legislation that would have allowed Chinese students to adjust to permanent resident status without first returning to China was vetoed by President Bush at the end of November, though he directed the INS to look favorably upon such cases.

Some of the largest monthly totals ever recorded in the history of the Haitian interdiction operation occurred during the year. The total for the 1989 calendar year was 3,429, bringing to 21,406 the number of Haitians interdicted since the program began in 1981. Of that number, only 6 persons have been allowed to enter the United States for the purpose of pursuing asylum claims.

On several occasions during the year, USCR raised concerns about the Haitian interdiction program with U.S. officials. In a letter to President Bush in July, USCR referred to the 0.028 percent allowed to pursue asylum claims and wrote, "These paltry statistics, taken in combination with the human rights

A total of 3,429 Haitians were interdicted and returned in 1989. Since 1983, 98 pecent of those who reached U.S. shores have been denied asylum. UNHCR/L. Solmssen



Red Cross shelter in Brownsville, Texas, used to detain Central American family groups. Those without children were held in prison-like INS detention facilities and county jails. USCR/H. Ruiz

conditions in Haiti during this decade, as well as the risk to life these Haitians take when embarking on a very dangerous journey, suggest that they have not been given a fair hearing." The letter went on to say, "Interviews take place on board the Coast Guard cutters as they are being returned to Haiti; interviews take place in groups and in the presence of Haitian naval personnel, giving no real opportunity for confidentiality, a *sine qua non* of a fair asylum hearing."

At the President's behest, the State Department said that the Administration considers the program to be "a humane deterrent to illegal immigration and a humanitarian effort to prevent needless loss of life at sea." The letter said that "we are satisfied that Haitians are not being sent back into a hostile political environment where their attempted emigration will disadvantage them."

Although the United States was attempting to keep the door closed to Central American and Haitian asylum seekers, overseas refugee admissions exceeded the 100,000 mark for the first time since 1981. Soviet, Southeast Asian, and East European refugees accounted for nearly 90 percent of the total. The largest increases came for Soviet refugees. As recently as FY 1986, less than 800 Soviet refugees were admitted; the number admitted in FY 1989 exceeded 39,000.

Congress took an active interest in the increase in emigration from the Soviet Union. In May, an emergency funding bill was passed, enabling the resettlement of 28,500 more refugees than had been planned at the beginning of the year. Of the new resettlement numbers, 24,500 were allocated to the Soviet Union. Congress passed legislation, known as the "Lautenberg Amendment," directing the Attorney General to establish "categories of aliens who share common characteristics that identify them as targets of persecution." The category groups were to include Soviet Jews, Evangelicals, Ukrainian Orthodox Christians, and Ukrainian Catholics, as well as ten categories of Vietnamese, six categories of Laotians, and ten categories of Cambodians. Eligibility for U.S. refugee processing for members of category groups would not be required to establish that they had been singled out individually for persecution, if they assert a "credible basis of concern" based on past persecution, an accumulation of discriminatory acts, or a knowledge of patterns and practices in their geographic locale against persons in the applicants' category.

The possibility that hundreds of thousands could be permitted to emigrate from the Soviet Union led to some changes in the U.S. approach to processing Soviet citizens for U.S. refugee admission. As part of its package of plans for FY 1990, the Administration called not only for the admission of 50,000 Soviets for the coming year out of a worldwide ceiling of 125,000 (though the budget request only provided funding for 84,000), but also for the termination of refugee processing out of Vienna and Rome and for interviewing to take place at the U.S. embassy in Moscow. The Administration said that this would prevent the phenomenon of Soviet emigres stranded in Rome waiting for refugee admission numbers to the United States to become available. It would also, the Administration argued, enable the United States to give applicants an assessment of their chances for admission to the United States as refugees prior to making the commitment to leave the Soviet Union. The admission places for FY 1990 were almost all slated for resettling the backlog of more than 40,000 Soviet emigres in the Rome-Vienna "pipeline."

The State Department announced in November that the United States would no longer register Polish and Hungarian refugee applicants in Western Europe for U.S. refugee resettlement and that the United States would only interview for admission Polish and Hungarian applicants who had already registered for resettlement and who had close family in the United States. Only 6,500 East Europeans were slated for admission as refugees in FY 1990, a drop from the 9,948 admitted in FY 1989.

In July, after years of unsuccessful negotiations, the United States and Vietnam reached an agreement to allow thousands—and potentially tens of thousands—of former reeducation camp prisoners and their family members to migrate to the United States. Interviewing began in October, and the first group of 190 people arrived in the United States in early January 1990.

DIRECTORY OF ORGANIZATIONS

The following are selected international, governmental, and private U.S. organizations providing information about or assistance for refugees. Descriptions are generally provided by the agencies themselves.

International Organizations

Centre for Documentation on Refugees (CDR), 5–7 av. de la Paix, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland. (022) 739 81 11. FAX: (022) 731 95 46. E-mail address: THOOLEN @ UNICC.

Computer-based documentation center which gathers, stores, and disseminates information on all aspects of refugee protection, reception, resettlement, and integration. The center forms part of UNHCR, but also serves outside users. Reading room and computer files available through staff. Publisher of quarterly *REFUGEE ABSTRACTS* and ad hoc bibliographies.

International Organization for Migration (IOM, formerly ICM), 17, route des Morillons, P.O. Box 71, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. (022) 717-9111. FAX: (022) 798-6150. Director General: Mr. James N. Purcell, Jr. Representatives: New York—Richard Scott, Room 717, 1123 Broadway, New York, NY 10010. (212) 463-8422; California—James Gildea, Suite 1225, The Adam Grant Building, San Francisco, CA 94901 (415) 391-9796; Washington—Ms. Frances Sullivan (Acting), 1750 K Street, NW, Suite 1110, Washington, DC 20006. (202) 862-1826.

Established in 1951 to arrange resettlement processing and transportation for refugees and migrants. Conducts related programs for medical screenings, language training, and cultural orientation. Plans and implements programs for the transfer of specialized human resources through migration to developing countries. Undertakes research projects and organizes international seminars on major migration themes. Represented in forty countries worldwide.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 17 Avenue de la Paix, CH-1202 Geneva, Switzerland. (022) 734 60 01. FAX: (022)733 20 57. Telex: 22269. Delegations in 43 countries. In the U.S.—780 Third Avenue, 28th Floor, New York, NY 10017. (212) 371-0770. FAX: (212) 838-5397. President: Cornelio Sommaruga.

Founder of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Promotes international humanitarian law. A Swiss, independent, neutral organization with the internationally recognized role of humanitarian intermediary between belligerants during armed conflicts. ICRC protects and assists the victims of international and civil wars and of internal disturbances and tensions by providing medical aid, relief supplies, a tracing and information agency for prisoners of war and missing persons, a service for transmission of family messages, and visits to civilian internees and prisoners of war and political detainees.

League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 17 chemin des Crets, P.O. Box 372, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. (022) 734 60 01. FAX: (022) 733 20 57. Telex: 22555 LRCS-CH. Secretary-General: Par Stenback. New York Fax: (212) 838-5397.

The League, the international federation of 149 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, contributes to the humanitarian activities of National Societies, coordinates relief operations for natural disaster victims, cares for refugees outside areas of conflict, and aims to promote peace in the world. In refugee situations, the Secretariat mobilizes the League's own financial and in-kind contributions and health and managerial staff to supplement National Societies' and UNHCR's resources.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Case Postale 2500, CH-1211 Geneva 2 Depot, Switzerland. (022) 739 81 11. High Commissioner: Thorvald Stoltenberg. UNHCR Liaison Office to the United Nations Headquarters, UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017. (212) 963-6200. UNHCR Branch Office for the United States of America, 1718 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20009. (202) 387-8546.

Established in 1951 to provide international protection to refugees who fall within the scope of its statute and to seek durable solutions for the problems of refugees. Also coordinates assistance programs for displaced persons in accordance with various subsequent General Assembly resolutions. Representation in over 100 countries.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 3 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017. (212) 326-7000. Executive Director: James Grant.

Since 1946, has cooperated with developing countries in providing child assistance programs involving nutrition, primary health care, water and sanitation, and education. Provides humanitarian assistance to emergency victims of natural and man-made disasters.

United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO), Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 100, Switzerland. (022) 34 60 11 or 33 20 10. Telex: 28148 UNDR CH. Cable: UNDRO GENEVA.

Created in 1972 to provide a single central office within the United Nations community to coordinate and strengthen relief efforts. Since it began operations, UNDRO has helped coordinate relief and raise money for emergency aid in more than 380 major disasters.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Vienna International Centre, PO Box 700, A-1400 Vienna, Austria. (011) 43 1 26 31, ext. 4530. Commissioner-General: Giorgio Giacomelli. New York Liaison Office: John Miles, UN Bldg., Rm. DC2-0550, New York, NY 10017. (212) 963-2255.

Since 1950, has provided assistance to registered Palestinian refugees, now numbering more than two million, in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Offers basic health and relief services to eligible refugees, and education to children up to the lower secondary level, as well as vocational and teacher training. Also provides emergency relief services to Palestine refugees displaced by war and violence, as it has been doing continuously since 1975 in Lebanon. The Agency has provided additional emergency aid—including medical treatment and food—to refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip where the Palestinian uprising broke out in December 1987.

World Council of Churches, Commission on Inter-Church Aid, Refugee & World Service, P.O. Box 2100, 1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland. (022) 791 61 11. FAX: (022) 791 03 61. Telex: 415 730 OIK CH. Coordinator: Melaku Kifle.

Works with local churches in about 70 countries in support of their refugee service, including both emergency and long-term assistance. Also, in cooperation with local churches, advocates on behalf of refugees; provides resettlement services; public information and training; and facilitates meetings between churches on refugee issues.

World Food Program (WFP), Via Cristoforo Colombo 426, 00145 Rome, Italy. Executive Director: James C. Ingram. 06–57971. Telex: 626675 WFP I. Liaison Office at UN Headquarters. Director: T.A. Tomlinson, Room DC1–1027. (212) 963-8364.

The food aid arm of the United Nations System, with offices in 80 developing countries, provides both long-term development assistance and emergency aid. A major share of the program's emergency resources is channeled to more than 7.5 million refugees and displaced persons around the world. Often WFP arranges on behalf of other donors the procurement, shipment and delivery of commodities and coordination of the food aid shipments in emergency situations. Also assists governments in disaster-stricken countries in the implementation of large-scale logistics operations.

U.S. Government Offices

Department of Education, Office of Bilingual Education and Minority Language Affairs, Transition Program for Refugee Children, Division of State and Local Programs, 400 Maryland Ave., SW, Rm. 5082, Mary E. Switzer Building, Washington, DC 20202-6641. (202) 732-5708. Senior Program Officer: Jonathan H. Chang.

Administers federal grants to states for educational services to refugee children in public and private (nonprofit) local schools.

Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Family Support Administration, 370 L'Enfant Promenade, SW, 6th Floor, Washington, DC 20447 (202) 252-4545. Director: Chris Gersten.

Assists refugees in achieving rapid economic self-sufficiency following their arrival in the United States. Assistance primarily provided through state-administered resettlement programs. Reimburses states for costs incurred in providing refugee cash and medical assistance (RCA/RMA) to newly arrived refugees in need. Provides social service grants to states primarily for making available English language and employment training services to refugees.

Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 425 I'ye St. NW, Washington, DC

20536. (202) 633-2000. Commissioner: Gene McNary.

Administers immigration and naturalization laws relating to the admission, exclusion, deportation, and naturalization of aliens.

Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs, Room 5824, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520. (202) 647-5822. Director: Princeton N. Lyman.

Formulates policy for and directs U.S. refugee and migration programs; assists refugees abroad and during reception and placement in the U.S.

House Judiciary Committee, 2138 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515. (202) 225-3951. Chairman: Jack Brooks; Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law. Chairman: Bruce A. Morrison.

Studies and makes recommendations on immigration and naturalization, citizenship, admission of refugees, treaties and international agreements, and other appropriate matters.

Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Department of State, (S/R) Rm. 6333, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520. (202) 647-3964. U.S. Coordinator for Refugees: Jewel S. Lafontant.

Coordinates the development and implementation of the international and domestic refugee policies of the U.S. government.

Senate Judiciary Committee, 224 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg., Washington, DC 20510. (202) 224-5225. Chairman: Joseph Biden; Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 520 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg., Washington, DC 20510. (202) 224-7878. Chairman: Edward M. Kennedy.

Studies and makes recommendations on the problems of refugees; has jurisdiction over immigration and naturalization legislation.

U.S. Resettlement Agencies

Following are selected U.S. voluntary agencies that participate in programs to resettle refugees. Readers may contact such agencies for information on sponsorship.

American Council for Nationalities Service, 95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016. Telephone: (212) 532-5858. FAX: (212) 532-8558. Executive Director: Wells C. Klein.

For 70 years assisting immigrants and refugees, since 1975 has been actively engaged in the resettlement of refugees and entrants from Indochina, Cuba, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, and other African countries. The U.S. Committee for Refugees is an ACNS public information program, as is International Social Service—American Branch (see separate entries).

American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, Inc., 1776 Broadway, Room 2105, New York, NY 10019. (212) 265-1919. Chief Executive Officer: Vojtech Jerabek.

Organized in 1948 to help resettle Czechoslovak and Central and Eastern-European refugees. Since 1975, AFCR has participated in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees.

Church World Service/Immigration and Refugee Program, 475 Riverside Dr., New York, NY 10115. (212) 870-3153. Director: Dale S. de Haan.

A part of the National Council of Churches. Provides refugee resettlement and first asylum services in the U.S. and responds to human need around the world. Works closely with ecumenical agencies worldwide, including the World Council of Churches.

Episcopal Migration Ministries, 815 Second Ave., New York, NY 10017. (212) 687-9454. Executive Director: Mrs. Marion M. Dawson.

Official channel through which the Episcopal Church responds to relief and development needs of refugees, migrants, displaced persons, and asylum seekers globally. Resettles refugees and assists immigrants and asylum seekers throughout the U.S. through 98 Episcopal dioceses. Assists refugees throughout the world in concert with the Anglican Communion and partner agencies, in cooperation with the Presiding Bishop's Fund for World Relief. Advocates for legislation to respond to the protection and resettlement needs of refugees and displaced persons.

Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Inc. (HIAS), 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 674-6800. Executive Vice President: Karl D. Zukerman.

The refugee and migration agency of the organized American Jewish community. Assists Jewish refugees and migrants from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere. Also assists Indochinese, Ethiopian, Afghan, and other non-Jewish refugees through programs in cooperation with the U.S. government. Global network of offices and affiliated organizations in 47 countries on six continents.

International Rescue Committee, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. Executive Director: Robert P. DeVecchi.

Nonsectarian, nonpartisan voluntary agency providing medical, public health, education, emergency relief, and resettlement services for refugees and displaced victims of war.

Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, 390 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 532-6350. Executive Director: The Rev. Dr. Donald H. Larsen.

Since 1939, has resettled refugees from Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Soviet Union. Provides a full range of services from pre-arrival through resettlement, with a national network of professional social service agencies supporting the work of local congregational and community group sponsors. Official arm of the Lutheran church to minister to asylum seekers, undocumented persons and immigrants. Also serves as advocate for their protection and humane treatment. Has special units for unaccompanied minors, immigration services, first asylum concerns, and a Washington office for advocacy. Trains and encourages Lutheran groups in immigration and advocacy processes.

Migration and Refugee Services (MRS), United States Catholic Conference, 3211 Fourth Street, NE, Washington, DC 20017-1194. (202) 541-3220. FAX: (202) 541-3399. Executive Director: Rev. Msgr. Nicholas DiMarzio.

The United States Catholic Conference (USCC) is the public policy and social action agency of the Catholic Bishops of the United States. Within USCC, Migration and Refugee Services (MRS) is the lead office responsible for developing Conference policy on migration, immigration, and refugee issues. MRS provides program support and regional coordination for 145 diocesan refugee resettlement offices which were responsible for resettling almost 30,000 refugees in FY 89. MRS also provides support services for 70 local immigration offices throughout the United States.

Tolstoy Foundation, Inc., 200 Park Ave. South, Suite 1612, New York, NY 10003. (212) 677-7770. Executive Director: Leon O. Marion.

Originally founded to assist Russian refugees. Scope broadened to provide a range of services to refugees from Eastern Europe, the Near East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Oppressed minorities such as Tibetans, Circassians, and Armenians have also received assistance. European headquarters in Munich and South American headquarters in Buenos Aires oversee offices in these regions. Six regional offices in the U.S. provide resettlement services including orientation, training, employment counseling, placement, English language training referral, and school placement for children.

World Relief of the National Association of Evangelicals, P.O. Box WRC, Nyack, NY 10960. (914) 268-4135. Director for United States Ministries and Refugee Resettlement: Donald N. Hammond.

Provides comprehensive refugee services through an international network of offices, including both regional and satellite offices in the United States. Overseas, provides relief and development assistance in countries of first asylum. Domestically, assists sponsoring churches, community groups, families, and individuals from pre-arrival through initial resettlement of Indochinese, Afghan, African, and Eastern European refugees. Provides ongoing services to Cuban and Haitian entrants, other refugee communities, and ethnic churches and individuals from pre-arrival through initial resettlement of Indochinese, Amerasian, Near Eastern, African, Eastern European, Soviet and Latin American refugees.

Aid & Information Organizations

Following are selected voluntary agencies and human rights and educational organizations that provide assistance to or information about refugees.

Africare, Inc., 440 R St. NW, Washington, DC 20001. (202) 462-3614. Executive Director: C. Payne Lucas.

Dedicated to improving the quality of life in rural Africa through the development of water resources, increased food production, the delivery of health services, and refugee assistance. Currently operates more than 220 programs in Africa and many development education programs in the United States. Refugee programs currently in East, Southern, and Francophone Africa.

Alien Rights Law Project (ARLP), Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1400 Eye St. NW, Suite 450, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 682-5900. Acting Director: Deborah Sanders.

Begun in 1978 by the Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law, the project provides legal assistance to aliens, focusing on asylum and refugee issues as well as those cases where aliens suffer employment or housing discrimination because of immigration status.

American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction), 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 777-8210. President, Chief Executive Officer: Peter J. Davies. Program Officer, Commitee on Migration and Refugee Affairs: Cindy Suh. Executive Assistant to the President: Eric D. Lee. Washington, DC Office—1815 H St. NW, 11th floor, Washington, DC 20006.

A broadly based, participatory association of 120 U.S. private and voluntary organizations working in international development, relief and reconstruction, migration, refugee assistance and resettlement, public policy and federal relations, and education on Third World issues. Member agencies participate in any or all of six working committees: Development Assistance, Migration and Refugee Affairs, Resources, Public Policy, Development Education, and Private Funding.

American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102. (215) 241-7000. FAX: (215) 241-7026. Executive Secretary: Asia Bennett.

Quaker organization that provides food, shelter, and supplies, especially in response to needs created by war, disaster, gross violations of human rights, where provisions of relief may lead to constructive community development. Advocacy for refugees in the United States.

American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc., 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017. (212) 687-6200. Executive Vice President: Michael Schneider.

Established in 1914 and funded predominantly by the campaigns of the UJA, JDC serves as the overseas arm of the organized American Jewish community, providing for rescue, relief, and rehabilitation of Jewish communities around the world. Current programs in 35 countries include Soviet Jewish emigres, Israel's social needs, glasnost-facilitated expansions in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and nonsectarian development and disaster relief worldwide.

American Jewish Philanthropic Fund, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. President: Charles J. Tanenbaum.

Provides relief, resettlement, and retraining services to Jewish refugees in Europe and the U.S. through programs administered by the International Rescue Committee.

American Red Cross, 17th & D Sts. NW, Washington, DC 20006. (202) 737-8300. Chairman: George F. Moody. International Social Services Unit: Mary-Lou McCutcheon (202) 639-3308.

Works in cooperation with the 149 Red Cross/Red Crescent societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Assists refugees in locating missing family members through its Tracing Services. Other Red Cross programs include disaster preparedness and relief, and the strengthening of programs of other national societies.

American Refugee Committee, Headquarters: 2344 Nicollet Ave., Rm. 350, Minneapolis, MN 55404. (612) 872-7060. Chicago Office: 317 Howard St., Evanston, IL 60202. Executive Director: Jack D. Soldate.

Internationally, provides medical volunteers for refugee camps in Thailand (Southeast Asia) and in Sudan and Malawi (Africa), to provide direct care, medical training, and nutritional feeding for Indochinese, Eritrean, and Mozambican refugees. In U.S., provides acculturation assistance: Illinois program focuses on public/mental health and English language/citizenship training; Minnesota Program uses volunteer American mentors with traditional educational experience to move refugee youth, women and elders toward self-reliance.

Amnesty International, 1 Easton St., London WC1X 8 DJ, United Kingdom. Secretary General: Ian Martin. U.S. Section: 322 8th Ave., New York, NY 10001. Executive Director: John G. Healey. Address requests for assistance to Refugee Office, 655 Sutter, Suite 402, San Francisco, CA 94102. (415) 776-2473.

International human rights organization working for the release of prisoners of conscience, for fair and prompt trials for all political prisoners, and to abolish torture and executions worldwide. Provides information for political asylum applications and opposes *refoulement* of persons who might reasonably be expected to be imprisoned as prisoners of conscience, tortured, or killed. Publishes annual report, newsletter, and country and special reports on worldwide human rights conditions.

Armenian Assembly of America, 122 "C" St., NW, Suite 350, Washington, DC 20001. (202) 393-3434. FAX: (202) 638-4904. Executive Director: Ross Vartian.

Through the Armenian Refugee Coordinating Committee (ARCC), the Assembly advocates for a humane and appropriate response to the plight of Armenian refugees, provides direct assistance, and serves as a resource for the public and private sectors and media for information about Armenian refugees and emigres. In 1988, ARCC operated direct assistance programs in Belgium, Greece, and Pakistan.

Boat People S.O.S. Committee, 6970 Linda Vista Road, San Diego, CA 92111. (619) 571-3957. Executive Director: Tiep Phan.

Mission is to help Vietnamese refugees in refugee camps or on open sea. Organizes rescue missions to rescue boat people on open sea. Offices throughout the United States and branches in Canada, Australia, Japan, and Europe.

CARE, 660 First Ave., New York, NY 10016. (212) 686-3110. Executive Director: Dr. Philip Johnston.

An international aid and self-help development organization. Responds to the needs of refugees and displaced persons in emergency situations through effective delivery systems to facilitate the distribution of food and other aid. Also implements long-term development programs in health and nutrition education and natural resource management to improve living conditions and facilitate self-sufficiency among refugees, displaced persons, and repatriates. Has refugee programs in Somalia, Sudan, and Thailand and programs for the displaced in Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.

Catholic Relief Services—USCC (CRS), 1011 First Ave., New York, NY 10022. (212) 838-4700. Executive Director: Lawrence A. Pezzullo.

Overseas relief and development agency of the American Catholic community. Active in 74 countries with nutrition, community development, self-sufficiency, emergency relief, refugee aid, and rehabilitation projects. Major refugee foci are Africa and Central America. Refugee assistance in 1987 was valued at thirteen million, or five percent of the CRS budget. Works only overseas.

Center for Applied Linguistics, 1118 22nd St., NW, Washington, DC 20037. (202) 429-9292. President: G. Richard Tucker.

Operates the Refugee Service Center, with offices in Washington, DC and Manila, Philippines, under a cooperative agreement with the U.S. Department of State. The Washington office acts as a liaison between the State Department's Overseas Refugee Training Programs in Thailand, the Philippines, several sites in Europe, and Botswana, Africa, and the stateside resettlement community. Manila office serves the testing, materials, and information needs of the Overseas Refugee Training programs in Southeast Asia. Additionally, refugee educational materials, including teaching materials and phrasebooks, have been placed in the ERIC database by CAL's Clearinghouse on Languages and Linguistics.

Center for Migration Studies (CMS), 209 Flagg Place, Staten Island, NY 10304-1199. (718) 351-8800. FAX: (718) 667-4598. Executive Director: Lydio F. Tomasi.

Founded in 1964, CMS encourages the interdisciplinary study of human migration and refugee movements everywhere through scientific research projects; publication of the quarterly *International Migration Review* and the bimonthly *Migration World Magazine* as well as of books, occasional papers and the *CMS Newsletter*; the CMS Annual National Legal Conference on Immigration and Refugee Policy in Washington, DC; and a specialized library and archives on migration and refugees.

Central America Resource Center, Refugee Legal Support Service (RLSS), Box 2327, Austin, Texas 78768. (512) 476–9841. Director: Jill Gronquist.

Established in 1983, provides political asylum documentation for refugees from all Central American countries. Information is obtained from an extensive human-rights data base of computer-indexed U.S., Central American, and international human-rights reports, newsclipping services, and church and government reports. Referrals are made to direct service organizations and to attorneys with comparable cases.

Church World Service (See U.S. Resettlement Agencies)

Cultural Survival, Inc., 11 Divinity Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138. (617) 495-2562. President: David Maybury-Lewis.

Provides research and analysis concerning the survival of indigenous peoples and ethnic groups. Examines ethnic persecution as cause of refugee flows. Involved in maintaining the land and health care necessary for the survival of threatened groups.

Direct Relief International, 2801-B De La Vina St., P.O. Box 30820, Santa Barbara, CA 93130. (805) 687-3694. President: Robert K. McGill.

Receives and donates contributions of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment to assist needy health facilities in medically less developed areas of the world, as well as refugees and other victims of natural disaster and civil strife. Recruits, screens, and arranges assignments for volunteer doctors, nurses, and other medical/dental personnel.

Episcopal Migration Ministries (See U.S. Resettlement Agencies)

Eritrean Relief Committee, Inc., 475 Riverside Drive, Rm. 907, New York, NY 10115. (212) 870-2727. Executive Director: Tesfa A. Seyoum.

Founded in 1976, aids Eritreans affected by war, drought, and famine, including people displaced internally and refugees in the Sudan. U.S. partner agency of the indigenous Eritrean Relief Association (ERA), based in the Sudan, which focuses on self-help and grassroots initiatives. Emergency assistance includes food, medicine, shelter, and pest control. Development support includes an agricultural rehabilitation program, rural health care facilities, and vocational and academic education projects.

The Ethiopian Community Development Council, Inc. 3213 Columbia Pike, Suite 101, Arlington, Virginia 22204. (703) 685-0510. Director: Tsehaye Teferra.

A private, nonprofit organization established in 1983. Engages in programs that promote the economic, educational, and social development of the Ethiopian community in the U.S. ECDC's programs are designed to provide Ethiopians and other refugees with the means to gain the knowledge and skills necessary to become self-sufficient, and to disseminate information concerning Ethiopia and the Ethiopian community in the United States through research, publications, training workshops, and conferences.

Exodus World Service, P.O. Box 7000, West Chicago, IL 60185-7000. (312) 733-8433. Executive Director: Dennis Ripley.

International humanitarian agency that provides educational services to individuals and churches to heighten their knowledge and awareness of refugees. Exodus advocates for humane and compassionate treatment of refugees, and assists in every stage of their flight and settlement.

The Experiment in International Living (EIL). Projects in International Development and Training Division, Kipling Road, Brattleboro, VT 05301. (802) 257-4628.

In a consortium with Save the Children Federation and World Education, offers English as a second language, cultural orientation, work orientation, preparation for American secondary schools and native language literacy for Indochinese adults and families in Phanat Nikom, Thailand. Program assists refugees in becoming self-sufficient in the U.S. In Pakistan, conducts a curriculum development and teacher training program for Afghan teachers.

European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles, Bondway House, 3–9 Bondway, London S.W.8., U.K. (01) 582-9928. General Secretary: Philip Rudge.

International forum for 50 West European nongovernmental organizations which assist refugees or are concerned with refugee asylum policy. Monitors national and international developments, promotes legal and information networks, and advocates progressive standards for the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. Secretariat based in London.

Freedom House, 48 East 21 St., New York, NY 10010. (212) 730-7744. Executive Director: Leonard R. Sussman.

Publishes a survey of freedom; monitors compliance with the Helsinki Accords; publishes writing from individuals in countries where there is oppression; and has information and analysis programs on the Caribbean Basin, Central America, Afghanistan, Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and other countries.

Georgetown University Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance (CIPRA), P.O. Box 2298, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. (202) 625-3545. Director: Fr. Harold Bradley, S.J.

Provides research, training and consultation to contribute to the development of humane, reasonable and enforceable immigration and refugee policies. Sponsors lectures, seminars, public meetings on refugee policy; and educational programs offering internships in refugee assistance and medicine, dental care, and nursing, small business training and leadership development. Tutorial program offers community service to refugees in local school systems. Conducts research on migration in the Americas and U.S. immigration legislation and its effects.

Grassroots International, P.O. Box 312, Cambridge, MA 02139. (617) 497-9180.

Provides humanitarian assistance to Third World peoples and social movements as a basis for building awareness and activism among North Americans in support of equity, justice, and peace. Sends funds and material aid to local partner organizations linked to broad-based movements for change in crisis areas—currently South Africa, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East. All projects supported are community-based with emphasis on community organizing and empowerment.

Holt International Children's Services, Inc. 1195 City View, Box 2880, Eugene, OR 97402. (503) 687-2202. Executive Director: David H. Kim.

An international child-caring agency serving children in Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, India, and Latin America. Works with affiliate agencies in providing a wide range of services to homeless children. Holt's philosophy is to 1) re-unite the child with birth parents if possible, 2) place the child with adoptive parents in the country of origin, or 3) if the first two solutions are not possible, provide a permanent home for the child with a family in the United States.

Human Rights Internet, Harvard Law School, Pound Hall, Room 401, Cambridge, MA 02138. (617) 495-9924. Telex: 5106014536. Executive Director: Laurie S. Wiseberg.

An international communications network and clearinghouse which serves the information needs of the human rights community: scholars, activists, and policymakers concerned with the promotion and protection of internationally recognized human rights. Publishes *Human Rights Internet Reporter*, a comprehensive reference work on humanitarian activity worldwide. Internet publishes directories describing the work of human rights organizations worldwide. Currently available are directories on: North America (1984); Western Europe (1982); Africa (1989); Latin America (Spanish/English, 1990); Eastern Europe (1987). Others are forthcoming for Asia and the Middle East.

Indochina Resource Action Center (IRAC), 1628 16th St. NW, 3rd Floor, Washington, DC 20009. (202) 667-4690. Executive Director: Le Xuan Khoa.

Assists Southeast Asians in the U.S. to make the transition from the status of refugees to a productive Asian-American minority. Major activities include public education and advocacy, leadership and citizenship development, capacity-building for Indochinese self-help organizations, and economic development.

International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), 37–39 rue de Vermont, Case postale 96, CH-1211 Geneva 20 CIC, Switzerland. (022) 733 41 50. FAX: (022) 734 79 29. Secretary General: Dr. Andre Van Chau. President: Mr. Edward De Brandt. In the U.S., 1319 F St. NW, Suite 820, Washington, DC 20004.

Links Catholic assistance agencies in both first asylum and refugee resettlement countries, providing logistical and sometimes financial support for their emigration processing activities. Since 1951, has administered a series of travel loan funds for refugees and migrants. Acts as Joint Voluntary Agency Representative in six countries. Administers the U.S. component of the Orderly Departure Program. Promotes local settlement activities through project assistance and training of refugee officers.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), 13 Rue Gautier, 1201 Geneva, Switzerland. (022) 732 66 00. FAX: 738 99 04. Telex: 22891 ICVA-CH. Executive Director: Anthony Kozlowski.

Founded in 1962 to provide a forum for voluntary agencies active in the fields of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. At present, has 83 members comprising international and national voluntary agencies.

International Rescue Committee (See U.S. Resettlement Agencies)

International Social Service—American Branch, 95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016. (212) 532-5858. Executive Director: Wells C. Klein. Associate Director: Marie Mercer.

Established in 1924, liaison between social agencies in U.S. and agencies abroad to resolve on a case-by-case basis problems which derive from international migration and the separation of families by national boundaries. Special emphasis on services and protection for children in migration, inter-country adoption planning, and family reunification, including refugee families. Member of an international structure with General Secretariat in Geneva. Since 1983, affiliated with the American Council for Nationalities Service.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 330 Seventh Ave., 10th Floor North, New York, NY 10001. (212)629-6170. Executive Director: Michael Posner. Director, Refugee Project: Arthur Helton.

Public interest law center in the fields of international human rights and refugee law. Monitors human rights and refugee protection in countries around the world. Works to ensure that persons seeking refuge in the U.S. receive the protections they are guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution and international law. Legal representation is provided by volunteer attorneys for individual asylum applicants who cannot afford counsel.

Lutheran World Relief, 360 Park Ave., South, New York, NY 10010. (212) 532-6350. Executive Director: Norman E. Barth.

Serves as the overseas development and relief agency on behalf of most U.S. Lutherans to assist with long-term and emergency help for people, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Refugee assistance is often channeled through programs of the Lutheran World Federation.

Mennonite Central Committee, 21 S. 12th St., Akron, PA 17501. (717) 859-1151. Canadian Office—134 Plaza Dr., Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 5K9. (204) 261-6381. Executive Secretary: John A. Lapp.

Cooperative relief and service agency for Mennonites and Brethren in Christ in North America. Provides material aid and development assistance to refugees from man-made and natural disasters. Current work includes assistance to refugees in the Horn of Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia, and Middle East. Arranges resettlement for refugees in the U.S. and Canada.

Minority Rights Group, 29 Craven St., London WC2N 5 NT, U.K. (01) 930-6659. Director: Alan Phillips. New York Branch: Sue Roff, 35 Claremont Ave., Suite 4S, New York, NY 10027. (212) 864-7986.

International human rights information and education body. Publishes reports on minority groups worldwide. Free list of reports and activities available.

National Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Forum, 220 I Street, NE, Suite 220, Washington, DC 20002. (202) 544-0004. Executive Director: Frank Sharry.

A national, nonprofit, educational organization with a broad multi-institutional and multi-ethnic membership. Mission is to establish positive working relationships among the diverse communities represented by its membership, and to promote the pro-immigrant, pro-refugee philosophy embodied in its statement of principles. By creating and preserving a national atmosphere conducive to and supportive of the migration and full integration of newcomers into our society, helps assure that its diverse membership can best carry out their respective missions.

Operation California/USA, Inc. 7615½ Melrose Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90046. (213) 658-8876. FAX: (213) 653-7846. Telex 295252 OPCAUR. President: Richard Walden.

A nonprofit organization founded in 1979. Objectives are to collect and transport high-priority emergency relief supplies to areas of need. Has been active in Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tibet, Kampuchea, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Ecuador, Mexico, Lebanon, Poland, and the United States.

Oxfam America, 115 Broadway, Boston, MA 02116. (617) 482-1211. Executive Director: Dr. John Hammock.

A nonprofit, international agency that funds self-help development and disaster relief projects in poor countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. Also produces and distributes educational materials for people in the United States on issues of hunger and development. One of seven autonomous Oxfams worldwide, Oxfam America was founded in 1970.

Polish-American Immigration and Relief Committee, 140 West 22nd St., New York, NY 10011. (212) 254-2240. Executive Vice President: Janusz Krzyzanowski.

Nonsectarian voluntary agency founded in 1947 to help displaced persons and political refugees. Field offices in Europe. Activities include resettlement, adjustment of status, family reunification, and social services.

Rav Tov, Inc., International Jewish Rescue Organization, 500 Bedford Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11211. (718) 963-1991.

Through its network of overseas offices, provides care and maintenance, medical assistance, visa documentation, and pre-migration planning to refugees while in transit. In countries of resettlement, provides a full range of services including reception, housing, medical care, language training, education, employment counseling, and maintenance assistance.

Refugee Policy Group (RPG), 1424 16th St. NW, Suite 401, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 387-3015. Executive Director: Dennis Gallagher.

Serves as an independent center of policy analysis and research on domestic and international refugee issues. Houses a refugee resource library and provides auspices for policy analysts, researchers, and program developers to meet and conduct their work.

Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University, Queen Elizabeth House, 21 St. Giles, Oxford OX1 3LA. Telephone: (0865) 270722 or 270729. FAX: (0865) 270729. Telex: 83147—attn QEH/RSP. E-mail: Bond [@] UK. AC. Oxford. VAX. Director: Dr. Barbara Harrell-Bond.

Center for multi-disciplinary research, teaching, and training of practitioners in the field of involuntary migration. RSP provides public information; holds weekly seminars and annual international symposia to provide a forum for dialogue between academics, refugees, host government officials and agency workers. Publishes the *Directory of Current Research on Refugees and Other Forced Migrants*, the *Journal of Refugee Studies*, the *Refugee Participation Network* and *Displaced Peoples an' Refugees: A Resource Guide*, and other works in this field.

Refugee Voices, Inc., 713 Monroe St., NE, Washington, DC 20017. (202) 832-0020. Director: Frank Moan, S.J.

A public education organization that, through various media, attempts to inform Americans of the plight of refugees settled in the U.S. and those in camps throughout the world.

Refugee Women in Development (RefWID), 810 First St., NE, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20002. (202) 289-1104. Executive Director: Sima Wali.

The only national organization established specifically to promote the economic transition efforts and physical protection of refugee women who come from sizeable Third World refugee communities. Priorities include developing practical program models and other tools for education and skill development; developing emerging and potential women leaders; carrying out education and advocacy with refugee and mainstream organizations, policy makers, and the general public; and doing applied research on refugee women's needs and priorities with special attention to rape trauma and domestic violence. RefWID publishes a multilingual newsletter.

Refugees International, 220 I Street, NE, Suite 240, Washington, DC 20002. (202) 547-3785. Executive Director: Lionel Rosenblatt.

Monitors refugee situations worldwide to ensure that refugees' basic needs for protection and care are met. Provides information to policymakers and the public. Advocates for fair refugee policy at home and abroad. Organizes letter writing campaigns and publishes a quarterly newsletter.

Relief and Development Institute, 1 Ferdinand Place, London NWI 8EE, U.K. (01) 485-0944. Telex: DISINST 21879. Director: Edward Clay.

Researches all aspects of disaster relief and management, including refugee communities. Runs workshops, briefing and training courses for field staff, and acts as an information center. Also publishes reports; the newsletter, *RDI News*; and the quarterly journal, *Disasters*.

The Salvation Army World Service Office (SAWSO), 1025 Vermont Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 737-3330. Executive Director: Dean B. Seiler.

As a development arm of The Salvation Army, provides technical and financial assistance in support of self-help, relief, and training programs. Assistance, including aid to disaster victims, refugees, and displaced persons, is available to the 91 countries and territories in which the Salvation Army operates.

Save the Children Federation, Inc., 54 Wilton Rd., Westport, CT 06880. (203) 221-4000. President: James J. Bausch.

Founded in 1932, serves children through community development in 39 countries including the U.S. In its refugee programs, provides humanitarian assistance with an emphasis on making refugees self-sufficient and providing a base on which long-term development can take place. Agriculture, nutrition, health care, sanitation, education and small-scale enterprise are program components in Somalia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Sudan, and Pakistan. Training in literacy, language, cultural orientation, employment skills, and secondary and primary education are program components in Thailand and Indonesia.

U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1025 Vermont Ave., NW, Suite 920, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 347-3507. FAX: (202) 347-3418. Executive Director: Wells Klein; Director: Roger P. Winter.

Public information and advocacy program of the American Council for Nationalities Service. Issues publications and provides information about refugees worldwide. Participates actively as refugee advocate in development of U.S. policy with respect to refugees in U.S. and abroad. Supports specialized UN agencies working to ensure refugee protection and assistance. Publishes *The World Refugee Survey* and *Refugee Reports*, a monthly news service on refugee issues.

U.S. Committee for UNICEF, 331 E. 38th St., New York, NY 10016. (212) 686-5522. President: Lawrence E. Bruce, Jr.

Established in 1947, the oldest and largest of 34 national committees for UNICEF. The committee informs Americans about UNICEF's efforts to meet the needs of the developing world's children and their mothers in the areas of nutrition, primary health care, clean water and sanitation, education, social services, and emergency relief and rehabilitation. Raises funds for UNICEF through greeting card sales, group fund-raising events, direct contributions, and special events.

World Concern International, P.O. Box 33000, 19303 Fremont Ave. North, Seattle, WA 98133. (206) 546-7201. Executive Director: Fred Gregory.

Provides emergency relief, but focuses primarily on long-term development to refugees and non-refugee populations in Asia, Africa and the Americas. Assistance is usually provided through indigenous agencies in the form of technical assistance, grants, and commodities.

World Relief (See U.S. Resettlement Agencies)

World Vision Inc., 919 W. Huntington Dr., Monrovia, CA 91016. (213) 357-7979. President: Dr. Robert A. Seiple.

World Vision is an international Christian child care, relief and development agency which supports more than 5,000 projects in 89 countries worldwide. Through emergency disaster relief, child sponsorship, primary health care, agricultural development and community leadership training projects, World Vision's work benefits approximately 13 million people, including 616,000 sponsored children.

YMCA Refugee Resettlement Services, YMCA of the USA, 101 N. Wacker Dr., Chicago, Ill. 60606. (312) 977-0031. Director: Michael Diamond.

Coordinates YMCA services for refugees in the United States. Acts as liaison for local U.S. YMCAs and World Alliance of YMCAs. Cooperates with other national voluntary agencies and appropriate government agencies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This selected bibliography was prepared for the *World Refugee Survey* by the Refugee Policy Group with additions from the U.S. Committee for Refugees. Generally, only materials published after 1986 have been chosen, except for some basic works of considerable importance in the field.

General Works

Andre, Jacques. *The Stranger Within Your Gates: Uprooted People in the World Today*. Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1987.

Beyer, Gregg. "Improving International Response to Humanitarian Situations." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1987.

Bramwell, A., ed. *Refugees in the Era of Total War: Twentieth Century Case Studies of Refugees in Europe and the Middle East*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Borg, Francoise. *The ICRC and Refugees*. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1986.

Canadian Human Rights Foundation. *Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees under International Law*. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1988.

Cohen, Roberta. "Introducing Refugee Issues into the United Nations Human Rights Agenda." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1990.

El-Hinnawi, Essam. *Environmental Refugees*. United Nations Environmental Program, 1987.

Forbes, Susan and Emily Copeland. "Refugees," *Issues before the 43nd General Assembly of the United Nations*. New York: United Nations Association of the United States of America, 1988.

Gallagher, Dennis. *The Era of Refugees: Evolution of the International Refugee System*. Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1988.

_____, ed. *Refugee Issues and Directions*, Special issue of *International Migration Review*, Vol. XX, no. 2, summer 1986.

Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. *The Refugee in International Law*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.

Gordenker, Leon. *Refugees in International Politics*. Croom Helm, 1987.

Grahl-Madsen, Atle. *The Status of Refugees in International Law*. 2 vols. Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1966.

Holborn, Louise W. *Refugees: A Problem of Our Time*. 2 vols. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1975.

Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues. *Refugees: Dynamics of Displacement*. London: Zed Books Ltd., 1986.

_____. *Winning the Human Race*. London: Zed Books Ltd., 1988.

Loescher, Gil and Laila Manahan, eds. *Refugees and International Relations*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Loescher, Gil and John A. Scanlan. *Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945-Present*. New York: Free Press, 1986.

Melander, Goran. *Refugees in Orbit*. Geneva: International University Exchange Fund, 1978.

Nichols, Bruce. *The Uneasy Alliance*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Refugee Policy Group. "Refugees and Human Rights: A Research and Policy Agenda." Washington, DC: RPG, 1989.

Rogge, John, ed. *Refugees: A Third World Dilemma*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1988.

Schorr, Alan Edward, ed. *Refugee and Immigrant Resource Directory, 1990-1991*. Anchorage: The Denali Press, 1990.

Smyser, W.R. *Refugees: Extended Exile*. New York: Praeger Press, 1987.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Collection of International Instruments Concerning Refugees*. Geneva: UNHCR, 1979.

_____. *Directory of Non-Governmental Organizations*. Geneva: UNHCR, 1986.

_____. *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*. Geneva: UNHCR, 1979.

U.S. Committee for Refugees. *World Refugee Survey*. Washington, DC: USCR, Annual.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs. *World Refugee Report*. Washington, DC: DOS, Annual.

Zolberg, Aristide, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aquayo. *Escape From Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Political Asylum and Refugee Admissions in Industrialized Nations

Aleinikoff, Alexander and David Martin. *Immigration: Process and Policy*. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1985.

Anker, Deborah E., et al. *The Law of Asylum in the United States: A Manual for Practitioners and Adjudicators*. Washington, DC: American Immigration Lawyers Association, 1989.

Cels, Johan. "A Liberal and Humane Policy for Refugees and Asylum-Seekers." London: European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles, 1987.

Church World Service. *Fulfilling the Promise: A Church Orientation Guide to the New Immigration Law*. New York: CWS, 1987.

Council of Europe. *Human Rights of Aliens in Europe*. Dordrecht: Marlinus Nijhoff, 1987.

Crittenden, Ann. *Sanctuary: A Story of American Conscience and Law in Collision*. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988.

Dowty, Alan. *Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.

European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles. "A Refugee Policy for Europe." London: ECRE, 1987.

Fagen, Patricia Weiss and Sergio Aguayo. *Fleeing the Maelstrom: Central American Refugees*. Washington, DC: School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, 1986.

Forbes, Susan and Patricia Weiss Fagen. "Minors in Immigration Proceedings: Problems of Child Welfare and Immigration Enforcement." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1987.

Frelick, Bill. "The Back of the Hand: Bias and Restrictionism towards Central American Asylum Seekers in North America." Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1988.

_____. "Refugees at Our Border: The U.S. Response to Asylum Seekers," Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1989.

Gibney, Mark, ed. *Open Borders? Closed Societies? The Ethical and Political Issues*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988.

Gozdziak, Elzbieta. "East to East: Refugees from Rumania in Hungary." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1989.

Harris, David A. *Soviet Jewish Emigration: The Controversy over Destination*. New York: American Jewish Committee, 1988.

Hawkins, Freda. *Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared*. Kingston and Montreal: McGill and Queen's University Press, 1989.

Helton, Arthur. "The Legality of Detaining Refugees in the United States," *Review of Law and Social Change*. New York University, Vol. XIV, 1986.

Konig, Karen. *Detained, Denied, Deported: Asylum Seekers in the United States*. New York: Helsinki Watch, 1989.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. *Mother of Exiles: Refugees Imprisoned in America*. New York: LCHR, 1986.

Levine, Barry B. *The Caribbean Exodus*. New York: Praeger, 1987.

Martin, David A., ed. *The New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980's*. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.

_____. "Reforming Asylum Adjudication." Washington, DC: Administrative Conference of the United States, 1989.

Matas, David. *Closing the Doors: The Failure of Refugee Protection*. Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1989.

Mitchell, Christopher. "U.S. Immigration Policy: International Relations in the Americas." Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue, 1986.

Sanders, Ronald. *The Shores of Refuge: A Hundred Years of Jewish Immigration*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1988.

Schmidt, Paul. "Detention of Aliens." *San Diego Law Review*, Vol. 24, No. 2. San Diego Law School, 1987.

Silk, James. *Despite a Generous Spirit: Denying Asylum in the United States*. Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1986.

Tomasi, Lydio F., ed. *In Defense of the Alien*. Proceedings of the Annual National Legal Conference on Immigration and Refugee Policy. New York: Center for Migration Studies, Annual.

U.S. Congress. *Refugee Act of 1980*. Public Law 96-212, 96th Congress, March 17, 1980.

U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. "Proposed Refugee Admissions and Allocations for Fiscal Year 1990, in Accordance with the Refugee Act of 1980." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1989.

Zucker, Norman L. and Naomi Flink Zucker. *The Guarded Gate*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Press, 1987.

Adaptation and Integration

Bach, Robert L. "State Intervention in South East Asian Refugee Resettlement in the United States." *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1988.

Caplan, Nathan, John K. Whitmore, and Marcella H. Choy. *The Boat People and Achievement in America: A Study of Family Life, Hard Work, and Cultural Values*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1989.

Chan, Kwok B. and Doreen M. Indra. *Uprooting, Loss and Adaptation: The Resettlement of Indo-Chinese Refugees in Canada*. Canadian Public Health Association, 1987.

Cichon, Donald J., et al. *The Economic and Social Adjustment of Non-Southeast Asian Refugees*. 2 vols. Falls Church, VA: Research Management Corporation, 1986.

Gozdziak, Elzbieta. "Older Refugees in the United States: From Dignity to Despair." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1988.

_____. "New Americans: The Economic Adaptation of Eastern European, Afghan and Ethiopian Refugees." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1989.

_____. "The Refugee Employment Project: An Evaluation." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1989.

Lewin and Associates, Refugee Policy Group, and Berkeley Planning Associates. "Health Care Options for the Working Refugee: A Manual." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1987.

Mitchell, Florence Sue. *From Refugee to Rebuilder: Cambodian Women in America*. University Microfilms International, 1987.

Refugee Policy Group. "Future Directions in the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services/ Office of Refugee Resettlement, 1987.

_____. "Scientist in Exile: Issues and Perspectives on the Refugee Experience." Washington, DC: RPG, 1988.

Rumbaut, Ruben G. and Kenji Ima. "The Adaptation of Southeast Asia Refugee Youth: Final Report to the Office of Refugee Resettlement." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services/ Office of Refugee Resettlement, 1988.

Santoli, Al. *New Americans: An Oral History, Immigrants, Refugees in the U.S. Today*. New York: Viking, 1988.

Strand, Paul J. and Woodrow Jones, Jr. *Indochinese Refugees in America: Problems of Adaptation and Assimilation*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement. *Refugee Resettlement Program: Report to the Congress*. Washington, DC: HHS, Annual.

Refugee Relief, Assistance, and Protection

Aga Khan, Sadruddin. *Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories*. Study on Human Rights and Massive Exoduses. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights. E/CN.4/1503; December 31, 1981.

Amnesty International. *Amnesty International Report*. London: AI Publications, Annual.

Benjamin, Marva P. and Patti C. Morgan. *Refugee Children Traumatized by War and Violence: The Challenge Offered to the Service Delivery System*. Washington, DC: CASSP Technical Assistance Center, Georgetown University Child Development Center, 1989.

Clark, Lance. "Early Warning of Refugee Movements." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1990.

Cuny, Frederick. *Disasters and Development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

_____. "Background Paper: Observations from Other Countries about Assistance for Displaced Persons." Dallas: Intertect, 1988.

Georgetown University. "The Georgetown Declaration on Health Care for Displaced Persons and Refugees: Conclusion on Progress, Problems and Priorities." Washington, DC: Available from Refugee Policy Group, 1988.

Harrell-Bond, B.E. *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Kelly, Ninette. *Working with Refugee Women: A Practical Guide*. Geneva: International Working Group on Refugee Women, 1989.

Minear, Larry. "Helping People in an Age of Conflict: Toward a New Professionalism in U.S. Voluntary Humanitarian Assistance." New York: InterAction, 1988.

Morgan, Scott; and Elizabeth Colson, eds. *People in Upheaval*. New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1987.

Ressler, Everett M., Neil Boothby, and Daniel J. Steinbock. *Unaccompanied Children: Care and Protection in Wars, Natural Disasters, and Refugee Movements*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Sandler, Richard H. and Thomas C. Jones, eds. *Medical Care of Refugees*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Taft, Julia. "Issues and Options for Refugee Women in Developing Countries." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1987.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: *UNHCR Activities Financed by Voluntary Funds: Report for 1988–89 and Proposed Programmes and Budget for 1990*. A/AC.96/724. Geneva: UNHCR, August 18, 1989.

Williamson, J. and A. Moser. *Unaccompanied Children in Emergencies: A Field Guide for Their Care and Protection*. Geneva: International Social Service, 1987.

Zarjevski, Yefime. *A Future Preserved: International Assistance to Refugees*. Oxford: Pergamon Press for UNHCR, 1988.

—Africa

Africa Watch. *Angola: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1989.

Brennan, T.O. *Uprooted Angolans: From Crisis to Catastrophe*. Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1987.

Bulcha, Mekuria. *Flight and Integration: Causes of Mass Exodus from Ethiopia and Problems of Integration in the Sudan*. Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1988.

Clark, Lance. "Key Issues in Post-Emergency Refugee Assistance in Eastern and Southern Africa." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1987.

Clay, Jason, Sandra Steingraber and Peter Niggli. *The Spoils of Famine: Ethiopian Famine Policy and Peasant Agriculture*. Boston: Cultural Survival, 1988.

Gersony, Robert. "Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1988.

_____. "Why Somalis Flee." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1989.

Jansson, K., M. Hair, and A. Permose. *The Ethiopian Famine*. London: Zed Books Ltd., 1987.

Kibreab, Gaim. *Refugees and Development in Africa*. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1988.

Panos Institute. *War Wounds: Sudanese People Report Their War*. London: PI, 1989.

Quan, Julian. *Mozambique: A Cry for Help*. London: Oxfam, 1987.

Refugee Policy Group. *Major Issues in Refugee Health in Eastern Sudan—1989*. Washington, DC: RPG, 1989.

Rogge, John. *Too Many, Too Long: Sudan's Twenty-Year Refugee Dilemma*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld, 1985.

Ruiz, Hiram and Bill Frelick. "Africa's Uprooted People: Shaping a Humanitarian Response," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*. Vol. XVIII, No. 1, African Studies Association, 1989.

Ruiz, Hiram. *Beyond the Headlines: Refugees in the Horn of Africa*. Washington DC: Committee for Refugees, 1988.

_____. *Peace or Terror: A Crossroads for Southern Africa's Uprooted*. Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1989.

_____. "When Refugees Won't Go Home: The Dilemma of Chadians in Sudan. Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1987.

United Nations Children's Fund. *Children on the Front Line: The Impact of Apartheid, Destabilization, and Warfare on Children in Southern and South Africa*. New York: UNICEF, 1989.

U.S. Committee for Refugees. *Refugees from Mozambique: Shattered Land, Fragile Asylum: An Update*. Washington, DC: USCR, 1988.

—Latin America

Aguayo, Sergio and Patricia Weiss Fagen. *Central Americans in Mexico and the United States: Unilateral, Bilateral, and Regional Perspectives*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Hemispheric Migration Project, Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, 1988.

Bilbao E., Jon Ander. *Migration, War, and Agrarian Reform: Peasant Settlements in Nicaragua*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Hemispheric Migration Project, Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, 1988.

Bottinelli, Cristina. *Salvadoran and Guatemalan Families in Mexico City: A Psychological Assessment of Migration, Exile, and Future Options*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Hemispheric Migration Project, Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, 1989.

Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance. *Central American Refugees—Workshop Report, Central American Refugee Research: Recommendations for Policy*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Hemispheric Migration Project, CIPRA, 1989.

Forbes Martin, Susan. "Development and Politically Generated Migration." Washington, DC: Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, 1989.

Gallagher, Dennis and James Morsch. "If the War in Nicaragua Ends: Where Will the Contras Go?" Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1988.

Manz, Beatriz. *Refugees of a Hidden War: The Aftermath of Counter-Insurgency in Guatemala*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988.

_____. *Repatriation and Reintegration: An Arduous Process in Guatemala*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Hemispheric Migration Project, Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, 1988.

Mozo, Segundo Montes. *Salvadoran Migration to the United States: An Exploratory Study*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Hemispheric Migration Project, Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, 1988.

O'Dogherty, Laura. *Central Americans in Mexico City: Uprooted and in Silence*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Hemispheric Migration Project, Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, 1989.

Pacheco, Gilda. *Nicaraguan Refugees in Costa Rica: Adjustment to Camp Life*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Hemispheric Migration Project, Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, 1989.

Ramirez, Mario. *Costa Rica's Refugee Policy and the Prospects for Repatriation of Nicaraguan Refugees*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Hemispheric Migration Project, Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, 1989.

Washington Office on Latin America. *Uncertain Return: Refugees and Reconciliation in Guatemala*. Washington, DC: WOLA, 1989.

—Middle East and South Asia

Arnaout, Ghassan Maarouf. *Asylum in the Arab-Islamic Tradition*. Geneva: UNHCR, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 1987.

Bonner, Arthur. *Among the Afghans*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1988.

British Voluntary Agencies. *Afghanistan: The Human Tragedy*. London: British Refugee Council, 1987.

Christensen, Hanne and Wolf, Scott. "Survey of the Social and Economic Conditions of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan." Geneva: UN Research Institute for Social Development, 1988.

Operation Salam. *Second Consolidated Report*. Geneva: Office of the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes Relating to Afghanistan, 1989.

U.S. Committee for Refugees. "From Isolation to Exile: Refugees from the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh." Washington, DC: USCR, 1988.

Viorst, Milton. *Reaching for the Olive Branch: UNRWA and Peace in the Middle East*. Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1989.

—Southeast Asia

Amnesty International. "Memorandum to the Governments of Hong Kong and the United Kingdom Regarding the Protection of Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong." London: AI, 1990.

Asia Watch. "Khmer Rouge Abuses Along the Thai-Cambodian Border." New York: Human Rights Watch, 1989.

Chantavanich, Supang and E. Bruce Reynolds, eds. *Indochinese Refugees: Asylum and Resettlement*. Asian Studies Monograph. Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1989.

Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand. *The CCSDPT Handbook: Refugee Services in Thailand*. Bangkok: CCSDPT, 1988.

Chanda, Nayan. *Brother Enemy: The War after the War*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986.

Diller, Janelle M. *In Search of Asylum: Vietnamese Boat People in Hong Kong*. Washington, DC: Indochina Resource Action Center, 1988.

Forbes Martin, Susan and Michael Knowles. "The Second International Conference on Indochinese Refugees: A New International Consensus?" Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1989.

Jackson, Tony. "Just Waiting to Die: Cambodian Refugees in Thailand." Oxford: Oxfam/UK, 1987.

Knowles, Michael. "The International Conference on Indochinese Refugees and its Aftermath." Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group, 1989.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. "Refuge Denied: Problems in the Protection of Vietnamese and Cambodians in Thailand and the Admission of Indochinese Refugees into the United States." New York: LCHR, 1989.

_____. "Forced Back and Forgotten: The Human Rights of Laotian Asylum Seekers in Thailand." New York: LCHR, 1989.

Levy, Barry S. and Daniel C. Susott, eds. *Years of Horror, Days of Hope: Responding to the Cambodian Refugee Crisis*. Milwood, NY: Associated Faculty Press, Inc., 1987.

Pack, Mary E. "The Human Dimension of Long-Term Encampment: Vietnamese Boat Refugees in First Asylum Camps." Bangkok: Ford Foundation, 1988.

Reynell, Josephine. *Political Pawns*. Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, 1989.

Robinson, Court and Arthur Wallenstein. "Unfulfilled Hopes: The Humanitarian Parole/Immigrant Visa Program for Border Cambodians." Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1988.

Sutter, Valerie O'Connor. *The Indochinese Refugee Dilemma*. Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1990.

Wiesner, Louis A. *Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988.

—Bibliographies:

Ashmun, Lawrence. *Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees in the United States: A Selective and Annotated Bibliography*. Occasional Paper No. 10. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1983.

Gutierrez, Margo, Milton Jamail, Chandler Stolp. *Sourcebook on Central American Refugee Policy: A Bibliography with Subject and Country Index*. Austin, Texas: Central American Refugee Policy Research Project and Central America Resource Center, 1985.

International Refugee Integration Resource Center. *International Bibliography of Refugee Literature*. Working edition. Geneva: IRIRC, 1985.

Olney, Douglas P. *A Bibliography of the Hmong (Miao)*. SARS Occasional Papers, No. 1, 2nd ed. Minneapolis, MN: Southeast Asian Refugee Studies Project, Univ. of Minnesota, 1983.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *A Selected and Annotated Bibliography on Refugee Women*. Geneva: Refugee Documentation Center, 1989.

_____. *A Selected and Annotated Bibliography on Refugee Children*. Geneva: Refugee Documentation Center, 1988.

United States Catholic Conference. Migration and Refugee Services. *Resource Bibliography: A Compilation of Resources and Program Materials*. Washington, DC: USCC, 1984.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. *An Annotated Bibliography on Refugee Mental Health*. Washington, DC: HHS, 1987.

—Periodicals:

Center for Migration Studies. *International Migration Review*. Journal of human migration and refugee movements. Staten Island, New York: CMS, Quarterly.

_____. *Migration Today*. Magazine on migration and refugees. Staten Island, NY: CMS, Bimonthly.

Church World Service. Immigration and Refugee Program. *Monday*. Newsletter on refugee and immigration issues. New York: CWS, Weekly.

Indochina Resource Action Center. *The Bridge*. Newsletter on Southeast Asian refugee resettlement. Washington, DC: IRAC, Quarterly.

Intergovernmental Committee for Migration and the Research Group for European Migration Problems. *International Migration*. Review on the role of migratory movements in the contemporary world in English/French/Spanish. Geneva: ICM, Quarterly.

International Catholic Migration Commission. *Migration News*. Review devoted to migration, population, land settlement, and refugees. Geneva: ICMC, Quarterly.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies. *ICVA News*. Newsletter on humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. Geneva: ICVA.

Interpreter Releases. Information service on asylum, immigration, naturalization, and related matters. Washington, DC: Federal Publications, Weekly.

Refugee Documentation Project. *Refuge*. Forum for discussion of Canadian and international refugee issues: Toronto: York University, Refugee Documentation Project. Five times per year.

Refugee Studies Program. *Journal of Refugee Studies*. Academic exploration of forced migration and national and international responses. Oxford, Oxford University Press, Quarterly.

Relief and Development Institute (formerly International Disaster Institute). *Disasters*. International journal of relief studies and practice. London: RDI, Quarterly.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Refugees*. Magazine on international refugee situations and issues. Geneva: UNHCR, Monthly.

_____. Refugee Documentation Center. *Refugee Abstracts*. Abstracts of international literature on refugees. Geneva: UNHCR, RDC, Quarterly.

International Journal of Refugee Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Quarterly.

U.S. Committee for Refugees. *Refugee Reports*. News service on national and international refugee issues. Washington, DC: USCR/ACNS, Monthly.

World Council of Churches. *Refugees*. Newsletter. Geneva: WCC, Monthly.

YOU CAN HELP

The U.S. Committee for Refugees needs and welcomes your interest and support in its efforts to inform the public about the needs of refugees.

☐ I'd like to help. Enclosed is a tax-deductible contribution of _____.

☐ I can't contribute financially, but would like to stay informed about refugee issues, especially _____

_____

☐ Send me information about *Refugee Reports*.

☐ Send me information on next year's *Survey*.

☐ Enclosed is $35.00 for a *Refugee Reports* subscription.

☐ I enclose $ _____ for _____ issue papers at $3.00 each. I have circled the titles below.

☐ Send me the USCR publications brochure.

NAME _____

ORGANIZATION: _____

ADDRESS: _____ CITY: _____

STATE: _____ ZIP: _____

In addition to the *World Refugee Survey*, the U.S. Committee for Refugees produces the following publications on refugee issues. Please detach and mail this form for further information.

USCR's Issue Paper series includes:

***Peace or Terror: A Crossroads for Southern Africa's Uprooted*, 1989**
***Refugees at our Border: The U.S. Response to Asylum Seekers*, 1989**
***Beyond the Headlines: Refugees in the Horn of Africa*, 1988**
***Back of the Hand: Central American Asylum Seekers*, 1988**
***Uncertain Harbors: The Plight of Vietnamese Boat People*, 1987**
***Uprooted Angolans: From Crisis to Catastrophe*, 1987**
***Despite a Generous Spirit: Denying Asylum in the United States*, 1986**
***Refugees from Laos: In Harm's Way*, 1986**
***Refugees from Mozambique: Shattered Land, Fragile Asylum*, 1986 (Updated, 1988)**
***Human Rights in Uganda: The Reasons for Refugees*, 1985**
***Time for Decision: Sri Lankan Tamils in the West*, 1985**
***Iranian Refugees: The Many Faces of Persecution*, 1984**
***The Asylum Challenge to Western Nations*, 1984**
***Vietnamese Boat People: Pirates' Vulnerable Prey*, 1984**
***Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Will They Go Home Again?* 1982 (Updated, 1985)**
***Cambodian Refugees in Thailand: The Limits of Asylum*, 1982, (Updated, 1985)**
***Flight to Uncertainty: Poles Outside Poland*, 1982**

***Refugee Reports*. Monthly. $35 per year. Includes information about policy, legislation, programs, resources to assist refugees or inform the public, and research on resettlement and asylum. Contains articles on international refugee developments and statistics on refugee populations. Subscribers receive free copies of the *World Refugee Survey* and Issue Papers.**

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES
1025 Vermont Avenue NW, Suite 920
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 347-3507

FOLD HERE

PLACE
STAMP
HERE

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES
1025 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Suite 920
Washington, D.C. 20005

FOLD HERE

USCR IS A PROGRAM OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE

Further information about the world refugee situation may be obtained from: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1025 Vermont Ave., NW, Suite 920, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 347-3507; or 95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016 (212) 532-5858; or from one of the following local agencies affiliated with the American Council for Nationalities Service.

AKRON
International Institute
207 East Tallmadge Avenue
Akron, OH 44310
(216) 376-5106

ALBANY
International Center of the Capital Region
West Mall Office Plaza
875 Central Avenue
Albany, NY 12206
(518) 459-8812

BINGHAMTON
American Civic Association
131 Front Street
Binghamton, NY 13905
(607) 723-9419

BOSTON
International Institute of Boston
287 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02115
(617) 536-1081

BRIDGEPORT
International Institute of Connecticut
670 Clinton Avenue
Bridgeport, CT 06605
(203) 336-0141

BUFFALO
International Institute of Buffalo
864 Delaware Avenue
Buffalo, NY 14209
(716) 883-1900

CHICAGO
Travelers and Immigrants Aid of Chicago
327 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 435-4500

CINCINNATI
Travelers Aid-Int'l Inst. of Cincinnati
632 Vine Street, Suite 505
Cincinnati, OH 45202
(513) 721-7660

CLEVELAND
The Nationalities Service Center
The Price Building
1715 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44115
(216) 781-4560

DETROIT
International Institute of Met. Detroit
111 East Kirby Avenue
Detroit, MI 48202
(313) 871-8600

ERIE
International Institute of Erie, Pennsylvania
330 Holland Street
Erie, PA 16507
(814) 452-3935

FLINT
International Institute
515 Stevens Street
Flint, MI 48502
(313) 767-0720

FRESNO
Lao Family Community of Fresno, Inc.
3121 East Olive Avenue
Fresno, CA 93702
(209) 264-4080

GARY
International Institute of Northwest Indiana, Inc.
4433 Broadway
Gary, IN 46409
(219) 980-4636

HONOLULU
Kalihi Palama Immigrant Service Center
720 North King Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96817
(808) 845-3918

HOUSTON
YMCA International Services
3635 W. Dallas Street
Houston, TX 77019
(713) 527-8690

JERSEY CITY
International Institute of New Jersey
880 Bergen Avenue
Jersey City, NJ 07306
(201) 653-3888

KANSAS CITY
Don Bosco Community Center
529 Campbell Street
Kansas City, MO 64106
(816) 421-0546

LAREDO
Associacion Pro Servicios Sociales
Centro Aztlan
406 Scott Street
Laredo, TX 78040
(512) 724-6244

LAWRENCE
International Institute of Greater Lawrence, Inc.
454 Canal St.
Lawrence, MA 01840
(508) 687-0981

LOS ANGELES
International Institute of Los Angeles
435 South Boyle Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90033
(213) 264-6210

LOWELL
International Institute of Lowell
79 High Street
Lowell, MA 01852
(508) 459-9031

MANCHESTER
International Center
102 N. Main Street
Manchester, NH 03102
(603) 668-8602

MIAMI
Christian Community Service Agency
3360 West Flagler Street
Miami, FL 33135
(305) 442-4202

MILWAUKEE
International Institute of Wisconsin
2810 West Highland Boulevard
Milwaukee, WI 53208
(414) 933-0521

NEW YORK CITY
Travelers Aid Services
2 Lafayette Street, 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10007
(212) 577-7700

OAKLAND
International Institute of East Bay
297 Lee Street
Oakland, CA 94610
(415) 451-2846

PHILADELPHIA
Nationalities Service Center of Philadelphia
1300 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 893-8400

PROVIDENCE
International Institute of Rhode Island, Inc.
421 Elmwood Avenue
Providence, RI 02907
(401) 461-5940

ST. LOUIS
International Institute of Metropolitan St. Louis
3800 Park Avenue
St. Louis, MO 63110
(314) 773-9090

ST. PAUL
International Institute of Minnesota
1694 Como Avenue
St. Paul, MN 55108
(612) 647-0191

SAN FRANCISCO
International Institute of San Francisco
2209 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94109
(415) 673-1720

TOLEDO
International Institute of Toledo
2040 Scottwood Avenue
Toledo, OH 43620
(419) 241-9178

WASHINGTON, DC
Travelers Aid Society of Washington, DC
1015 12th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 347-0101

The U.S. Committee for Refugees receives major support from:
The Ford Foundation
The John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
The Pew Charitable Trusts
The Joyce Mertz-Gilmore Foundation
The New York Friends Group, Inc.

In addition, USCR is grateful to the following individuals and organizations for their sponsorship of this year's **World Refugee Survey**:

BENEFACTORS

Anonymous
Episcopal Migration Ministries

SPONSORS

Anonymous
Armenian Assembly of America
David Carliner
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society
Victor Jacobs
Edward B. Marks and Vera J. Barad
Loeb and Troper
Migration and Refugee Services U.S. Catholic Conference
National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the United States
New York Association for New Americans, Inc.
Wayne Radomski
Marilyn E. and Donald W. Scott
Southern Baptist Refugee Resettlement Program
Mark Teitelbaum
United Methodist Committee on Relief/Board of Global Ministries
World Relief of the National Association of Evangelicals
World Service/Presbyterian Church (USA)

FRIENDS

American Baptist Churches National Ministries
Anonymous
Aurora Foundation
Blum-Kovler Foundation Marjorie Kovler Fund
E.O. Brennan
Mary Carswell
Federal Publications, Inc.
Michael H. Hoffman
Lao Family Community of Fresno, Inc.
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
Mennonite Central Committee
The National Council of La Raza
Rav Tov, Inc.
Save the Children Federation
United Church Board for World Ministries/United Church of Christ